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Foreword
The Arab world has not been a happy or successful place for quite 
a while. As one o f Arab diplomats once said: “There is a sense o f 
failure, which has opened a gap between the rulers and the ruled. 
It has led to a lack o f confidence in Arab culture, and hostility to 
foreign influences.”1
The Arab Human Development Reports2002 and 2003, prepared 
by a group of leading Arab intellectuals under the auspices o f the 
UNDP and the Arab Fund for Social and Economic Development 
confirmed such a very pessimistic view of the Arab world.2 The 
combined gross domestic product o f the 22 Arab countries was 
lesser than Spains. Labor productivity in these countries dropped 
between I960 and 1990, while it soared elsewhere in the world. 
Even Africa outperformed the Arab world in rates o f economic 
growth. An exploding population cannot be supported by scarce 
resources and every other citizen is ready to emigrate.
According to the authors o f Arab Human Development Report, 
the main reason for the dramatic situation in the Arab world is 
poor governance. “The wave o f democracy that transformed 
governance in most o f the world has barely reached the Arab 
world (...) The freedom deficit undermines human development 




Many Western experts stress that there is a dramatic gap between 
the levels o f freedom and democracy in Arab countries and the rest 
o f the world.3 First o f all, there are no true Western-type democracies 
in the Arab world or really free Arab countries. Secondly, in the last 
more or less three decades, this world, as a whole, has not seen 
any significant improvement in political openness, respect for 
human rights, and transparency, contrary to the trends in all other 
parts o f the world. Democracy is now present in states following 
every major religious or philosophical tradition: Christian, Hindu, 
Buddhist, Confucian, Muslim and Jewish. It is present in rich as 
well as very poor states, in big and small countries. But, as Larry 
Diamont pointed out, “by any category that is meaningful in the 
world today, there is only one set of countries that is completely 
undemocratic: the Arab world.”4
The Economist evaluated the state o f democracy in all Arab 
countries and results presented on the special scale (April 3, 2004). 
The most democratic Arab state, Morocco, barely crossed the 
middle point, while several countries, with Saudi Arabia at the top, 
did not even reach a quarter of the possible level of democracy.
This situation increasingly worries enlightened intellectuals 
in the Arab world and Western governments. It is believed to be 
typical for sudden and violent conflicts, which can de-stabilize the 
whole region of high strategic importance, and for further spread 
o f terrorism.
Not beginning here a comprehensive analysis o f the very complex 
issue: democracy in the Islamic world, let me just note that there 
exist very different opinions on the matter. Some people believe 
that the very idea o f democracy “is quite alien to the mind-set of 
Islam”.5 As Lisa Anderson explained: “Islam’s failure to distinguish 
the realms of Caesar and God, its insistence that sovereignty rests 
with God and that the essence of the law is divinely revealed and 
therefore beyond human emendation, its discriminatory treatment
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of women and non-Muslim minorities, all appear quite inconsistent 
with democratic politics.”6 Also in reality, many Arabs, derived 
from teaching of the Koran and historical tradition, believe that 
firm rule, based on consensus rather than elections, is good form 
of government.
In turn, for a group of experts from the Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace major reasons for democracy deficit in the 
Middle East are not connected with Islam but are caused by: (1) 
lack of previous experience with democracy, which, for example, 
facilitated transitions in Central and Eastern Europe; (2) lack 
of the prolonged periods of economic growth and the resulting 
changes in educational and living standards as well as life styles, 
which led several Asian countries to democratic changes (in fact 
there is a socioeconomic deterioration in the Middle East); (3) 
lack of a positive “neighborhood effect”, the regional, locally 
exerted pressure to conform, which helped to democratize Latin 
America.7 Moreover, what makes the democratization of the region 
more difficult to achieve is: a fear of illiberal Islamic movements, 
which have broad support in most o f the Arab countries and which 
can win democratic elections, if introduced, and while in power 
abrogate democracy itself; the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian 
territories, the fact that is regularly exploited by rulers o f the Arab 
countries to deflect attention of their citizens from domestic 
problems; the negative perception of the United States, whose 
promotion of democracy in view of Washington’s support o f Israel 
and occupation of Iraq is perceived as a new American attempt to 
dominate the Arab world.8
Many people believe however that democracy can be 
implemented in Muslim societies and states. They argue that, first 
o f all, there are reasonably democratic Muslim states already, like 
Turkey. Then, there are millions of Muslims living in democratic 
states o f Europe, United States or Asia who have successfully
-9-
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combined their religion with demands of the democratic system. 
There are also Arab countries, not only the non-Arab Muslim states, 
that have experimented successfully with democracy. For example 
post-Saddam Iraq, Lebanon, Marocco and even the Palestinian 
Authority practiced pretty free elections and have functioning 
parliaments, proving that certain democratic procedures can be 
implemented in the predominantly Islamic states. Finally, more and 
more experts begun to believe that also the Islamic doctrine itself 
“contains elements that may be both congenial and uncongenial to 
democracy” and that the only question is to find out how and under 
what circumstances elements in Islam favorable to democracy “can 
supersede the undemocratic aspects” .,J
At the same time profound social changes accompany political 
transformations. Let me mentioned a few. There are changing 
group identities in the Arab world. Although common religion, 
language, customs and memory of the glorious past maintain their 
importance, nation-state identity plays increasingly important role. 
Arab societies became younger due to high fertility rate which 
brings tremendous pressure on the labor market. In effect, growing 
unemployment increases on one side immigration and, on the other, 
pressure governments for economic reforms. Arab populations are 
becoming better educated and aware of the real causes o f problems 
facing their countries. Emancipation of women is under way, despite 
the fact that they still face considerable discrimination. Urbanization 
continues, with all changes the movement from traditional rural or 
Bedouin type of life to city’s permanent settlement can bring. Etc.
Recently, these issues have obtained special importance in relation 
to the Gulf states due to developments in the region. American 
politics, deposition of the Saddam Hussein regime, process of 
occupation and transformation of Iraq, daily bloody attacks in 
the country, international crisis over nuclear program of Iran and 
highly controversial politics o f new Iranian president Ahmedinejad,
-10-
Foreword
problems with democratization of conservative monarchies o f the 
Arabian Peninsula and with the dominant role of the foreign labor 
in these states preoccupy minds of local and world politicians, 
academics and average people.
In the last year or so, I have published several articles and presented 
few papers on various conferences on these topics. Most of them are 
not easily available. Interest in certain academic centers and think- 
tank groups encouraged me to put them together in one volume. 
It’s content starts with the analysis o f President George W. Bush 
“democratization drive” in the Middle East, with special emphasis 
on its impact on the Gulf states. Then, results and consequences of 
recent elections in Iraq and Iran are analyzed. Two papers discuss 
political changes in the monarchies of the Gulf: one analysis elections 
and parliamentary activity in these states, second specifically deals 
with problems of opening up Saudi Arabia. The second part o f the 
volume deals with population and labor issues, very “hot” topics in 
the Gulf Cooperation Council states, when growing unemployment 
of local population and broadening political awareness o f dominant 
foreign labor, mostly Asian, increasingly cause tensions. In more 
detail these problems are analyzed for Oman. Finally, problems of 
“stateless” Arab residents in the Peninsula are discussed.
Despite the fact that most o f these topics have strong political 
connotation, as a sociologist by background, I look at them as 
important processes o f social change as well, which will bring, 
and some of them are bringing already, dramatic, painful but 
overall positive transformation of Gulf societies. In its background 
crucial nation forming processes are underway, establishing new, 
or changing old, identities o f the people and also creating new, or 
transforming old, political systems in the region. In the Middle 
East, extended from north Africa to Afghanistan, countries o f Iraq, 
Iran and the Gulf Cooperation Countries states, lead now the way 
of change. And despite current problems, I am optimistic about
- 11 -
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its outcome. Countries of the region, rich in oil and gas resources, 
should be able to become a valued members of international 
community in the years to come.
Krakow, May 2006 Andrzej Kapiszewski
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George W. Bush's "promotion of 
democracy" agenda in the Middle East
For a long period of time, basically throughout the Cold War era, 
promotion of democracy was not a goal of United States foreign 
policy. The democracy deficit in many parts of the world was not 
considered a pressing issue as long as pro-American stability in 
vital regions for U.S. security was not jeopardized. The American 
government did not pay much attention to the consequences of the 
lack of democracy, nor did it push for democratic change In fact, 
it often cherished friendly relations with non-democratic regimes. 
Saudi Arabia or Pakistan were the best examples of such a policy.
The situation began to change, by the end of the 1990—91 
Gulf War. A growing number of people in Washington began to 
argue that it was time to promote democracy in the Middle East. 
In particular, they held the view that the United States should 
remove Saddam Hussein and install a democratic regime in Iraq, 
what should bring similar results to those achieved in Germany 
and Japan after World War II.1 These ideas, however, were not 
accepted by the U.S. government. President George Bush 
strongly preferred the regional status quo. Consequently, the U.S. 
concentrated its efforts on resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
and left friendly Arab governments to deal with their internal 
problems as they wished.
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The situation somewhat changed when President Bill Clinton 
came to office. One of the stated goals of the new Democratic 
administration was the promotion of democracy around the world. 
Robert H. Pelletreau, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern 
Affairs pointed out clearly that: “The development of democracy 
and human rights -  for the two go together -  has been and remains 
central to U.S. foreign policy... It rests on a hard-headed assessment 
o f our long-term interests. Briefly put, we know that democracies 
are less likely to go to war, less likely to traffic in terrorism, more 
likely to stand against the forces o f hatred and intolerance and 
organized destruction. We also know that removing the heavy hand 
of bureaucracy and opening up national economies within and 
across borders fosters the sort of economic growth that underpins 
regional peace and security... For all of these reasons, the Clinton 
Administration is committed to help countries make the arduous 
transition from authoritarianism to freedom, and to work to create 
institutions that will make leaders accountable and responsive to 
their peoples’ aspirations.2
Despite proclaiming these ideas, Clinton’s government soon 
concluded that the Middle East region should be exempted from 
U.S. democracy promotion efforts and that peacemaking should, 
instead, be the goal there. The argument was that the United States 
should not risk the destabilization that pressure for reform would 
generate in deeply traditional and repressed societies. “Pushing hard 
for political change might not only disrupt the effort to promote 
peace but could also work against vital U.S. interests: stability in 
the oil-rich Persian Gulf and in strategically critical Egypt.3 This 
argument prevailed, and on that basis the Clinton administration 
“fashioned a bargain” with America’s Arab allies that held, more or 
less, until September 11, 2001.”
Thus, the United States in the 1990s focused only on “improving 
the climate for political liberalization in the region”.4 Clinton
George W. Bush's „promotion of democracy" agenda...
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administration officials did not speak about democracy promotion 
much but only about “better governance”, “enhanced political 
participation”, “pluralism” or “greater openness” in the Middle 
East.5 In only a few cases did the State Department call for concrete 
actions, for instance, pressing for a political solution to the Shi’ite- 
Sunni conflict in Bahrain or to the war between the government 
and the Islamist opposition in Algeria, as well as supporting efforts 
by the rulers of Morocco, Jordan and Yemen, to co-opt the political 
opposition into government and parliament. While a number of 
factors motivated these actions, chief among them was the post Cold 
War era context; the U.S. realized that the promotion of democracy 
in communist countries had made an important contribution to 
the fall o f totalitarian regimes, and would like to achieve the same 
in the Arab world. Altogether, the Clinton government spent in 
the 1990s some $250 million for democracy-assistance programs in 
nine Middle East countries, especially in Yemen, Jordan, Morocco 
and the Palestinian Authority.6 Projects included strengthening 
parliaments, improving human rights monitoring and training 
judges.
In general, these actions did not bring meaningful results, 
mainly because many of them were poorly designed and executed 
and were not supported by high-level U.S. government policies.7 
For example, although occasionally the U.S. did raise the human 
rights issue with Arab governments, such concerns were always 
secondary in dealings with countries considered strategically 
important. “Washington did not want to antagonize regimes whose 
cooperation it needed to keep the peace process going and the oil 
flowing...[it] hesitated to press for bolder reforms out of concern 
for stability and fear o f Islamist opposition gains”.8
When George W. Bush (son of former president George Bush) 
came to the White House in early 2001, it appeared he would 
continue that approach. But the situation changed dramatically
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with the September 11 attacks on the United States. All the terrorist 
perpetrators were Muslims and 15 of the 19 plane hijackers were 
Arabs from Saudi Arabia. Many observers understood that the attacks 
were motivated, in large part, by the conditions in the countries 
of the Middle East and the Muslim world; large unemployment 
among the youth, backward education and repressive regimes 
created fertile ground for the widespread appeal of political Islam, 
which reinforced existing anti-American sentiments and broadened 
the social base for A1 Qaeda and similar militant groups. With 
the general conviction that Western-style democracy offers better 
guarantees for peace and stability, a new policy toward the Arab 
and Islamic world was than proposed: the goal o f democratizing 
this world was elevated by the American government from a stated 
objective to a national security imperative, a crucial element in the 
proclaimed war on terror.9 Explaining President Bush’s standpoint 
on the matter, Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs Paula 
Dobriansky stated that the “advancement of human rights and 
democracy... [is] the bedrock of our war on terrorism. Ihe violation 
of human rights by repressive regimes provides fertile ground for 
popular discontent.. .cynically exploited by terrorist organizations... 
[A] stable government that responds to the legitimate desires of 
its people and respects their rights, shares power... is a powerful 
antidote to extremism.”10
The democratic deficit in the Arab world. 
Democracy and Islam
There is a dramatic gap between the levels o f freedom and 
democracy in Arab countries and the rest of the world.11 First of all, 
there are no true Western-type democracies in the Arab world and 
not truly free Arab states. None of the 16 Arab majority countries
George W. Bush's „promotion of democracy" agenda...
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has democratically elected governments. Approximately, in the last 
three decades, this world, as a whole, has witnessed no significant 
improvement in political openness, respect for human rights, or 
transparency, contrary to trends in all other parts o f the world.12
Beyond the serious democratic deficit in the Arab countries, they 
also suffer significant economic and social problems. In early 2000’s, 
the combined gross domestic product of 22 Arab countries was less 
than that of Spain.13 Labor productivity in these countries dropped 
between 1960 and 1990, while it soared elsewhere in the world. 
Even Africa outperformed the Arab world in rates o f economic 
growth. Simultaneously, the population of the region skyrocketed, 
worsening the life conditions of majority o f people. Most experts 
agree that there are three major reasons for the democratic deficit 
in the Middle East: (1) lack of previous experience with democracy, 
which, for example, facilitated transitions in Central and Eastern 
Europe; (2) lack of prolonged periods o f economic growth and 
resulting changes in educational and living standards as well as life 
styles, which led several Asian countries to democratic changes; 
(3) lack of a positive “neighborhood effect” , pressures to conform, 
emanating from one’s regional neighbors, which helped democratize 
Latin America.14 Some additional factors complicate demo­
cratization in the Arab world. First, many fear the possibility o f the 
accession to power, in a democratic context, o f broadly supported 
illiberal Islamic movements, that could abrogate democracy itself. 
Second, Arab leaders regularly exploit the Israeli occupation of 
the West Bank and Gaza to deflect attention of their citizens from 
domestic problems. Finally, U.S. democracy-promotion efforts, 
in view of Washington’s support of Israel and occupation of Iraq, 
are perceived as a new American attempt to dominate the Arab 
world.15
There are, naturally, a number of more fundamental questions 
related to the possibility of democratization of Islamic states. Is
George W. Bush's „promotion of democracy" agenda...
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democratization in the Western sense possible in such states at 
all, especially in countries, whose rulers use Islam to legitimate 
themselves and where the religious establishment plays significant 
role in politics?16 Opinions on the matter are diverse.17 Many 
political scientists express the view that “Islam’s failure to distinguish 
the realms of Caesar and God, its insistence that sovereignty rests 
with God and that the essence of the law is divinely revealed and 
therefore beyond human emendation, its discriminatory treatment 
o f women and non-Muslim minorities, all appear quite inconsistent 
with democratic politics.” 18
According to a well-known scholar Adam Garnfinkle, Muslim 
societies, to various degrees, lack three pre-requisites for democracy:19 
(1) the belief that the source of political authority is intrinsic to 
society (“o f the people, by the people, for the people”). Muslims 
believe that God or an accepted extra-societal source is the basis of 
political authority, therefore the idea of political pluralism as well 
as the legitimacy of a “loyal opposition” cannot be accepted, while 
tolerance for any set o f social, political or religious principles other 
that the Islamic one amounts to heresy (2) a concept o f majority rule; 
without this the idea o f elections as a mean to form a government 
does not make sense, yet Muslims are used to governance through 
consensus-building; the idea that someone who has won 51 percent 
of the vote in an election should get 100 percent o f power, while 
the person who wins 49 per cent should get none is perceived by 
them as both illogical and dangerous, an invitation to civil strife. 
Moreover, in Western democracy the majority view prevails, but 
in Islam matters should be decided according to the Koran and 
the tradition of the prophet Mohammed and not according to the 
views o f the people.20; (3) equality of all citizens before the law -  
this idea is in conflict with nearly all Islamic traditional authority, 
where men are “more equal” than women, the educated considered 
superior to the illiterate, the pious to non-religious, the elderly
- 18 -
to the youth, and members of the ruling family to the common 
people.
Nevertheless, even with such obstacles, many Western and 
Islamic scholars believe that democracy can indeed be implemented 
in Muslim societies and states. First o f all, they point out that 
theoretically, any revealed religion can have problems with its 
compatibility with democracy; “all have authoritarian base, are 
patriarchal, dogmatic what constitutes the truth, and do not 
believe that reason can bring one to God”.21 But many, Catholics 
and Protestants in particular, managed to compromise between the 
ideology and practice. Similarly, while Muslim fundamentalists 
argue that human beings cannot pass the legislation that infringes 
on the moral principles of Islam and its tradition, modernists point 
out that Islam does not specify in any way what form of the state 
should take and that God gave people the power of reason with 
which to formulate public policy. Graham E. Fuller goes even further 
stating that “democracy and political Islam are potentially quite 
compatible in principle, and the record indicates as much.”22 There 
are Muslim states which successfully implemented some elements 
of democracy (Turkey, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, 
Iran) and there are millions o f Muslims leaving in democratic states 
of Europe, America or Asia, who have successfully combined their 
religion with the demands of a democratic system. Although there 
are no fully “democratic” Arab states (maybe except Lebanon) -  if 
democracy is defined by the ability to change the ruling authority 
through elections -  but some Arab countries are moving in that 
direction (Jordan, Morocco, Kuwait, Bahrain, Yemen). All have 
functioning parliaments and at least some democratic, or quasi- 
democratic procedures. Moreover, in recent years even some of 
the most autocratic regimes, the conservative monarchies o f the 
Persian Gulf, like Bahrain or Qatar, implemented political reforms, 
broadened political participation of citizens, liberalized the media
George W. Bush's „promotion of democracy" agenda...
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and gave more rights to women.23 These examples gave a boost to 
supporters of the U.S. idea to democratize the Arab Middle East. 
President George W. Bush himself stated that “it should be clear to 
all that Islam — the faith of one-fifth of humanity — is consistent with 
democratic rule” and that “more than half o f the world’s Muslims 
are today contributing citizens in democratic societies.”24
President Bush's "promotion 
of democracy" agenda
As Bush administration became convinced that autocracies were 
making Muslims, and particularly Arabs, especially vulnerable 
to the appeal of radical Islamist ideologies, fomenting political 
change in the Arab world became a policy priority.25 First, the U.S. 
government decided that the promotion of democracy should be 
a key component o f its new National Security Strategy, initially 
released in September 2002. This document, which outlines the 
government’s overall plan for defending the United States and 
advancing its interest and values, declared that “America must stand 
firmly for the nonnegotiable demands of human dignity and the 
rule o f law; limits on the absolute power of the state; free speech; 
freedom o f worship; equal justice; respect for women; religious 
and ethnic tolerance; and respect for private property.” It noted 
further that “We will actively work to bring the hope of democracy, 
development, free markets, and free trade to every corner of the 
world.”26
In the second step the U.S. Secretary of State Collin Powell 
unveiled in December 2002 the “US-Middle East Partnership 
Initiative” .27 The initiative rested on three pillars. It proposed that 
the U.S. government (1) engage with public and private sector 
groups to bridge the jobs gap with economic reform, business 
investment, and private sector development; (2) partner with
George W. Bush's „promotion of democracy" agenda...
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community leaders to close the freedom gap with projects to 
strengthen civil society, expand political participation, and lift the 
voices of women; (3) work with parents and educators to bridge 
the knowledge gap with better schools and more opportunities for 
higher education. Twenty-nine million dollars were allocated for the 
first phase o f the plan implementation; funding than went up by 
$100 million in 2003, obtained $45 million for the fiscal year 2004 
and another $90 million for 2005.28 The essence of the initiative 
was supposed to be a partnership with different Arab domestic 
reformers. Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Bill 
Burns explained that it “means that we in the U.S. governments 
must listen to ideas and advice and criticism and proposals from 
the region.”29 Nevertheless, while noble in theory, the execution of 
the program was highly criticized. Most of the money was awarded 
to non-democratic and often corrupted Arab governments or state 
organizations, directly for their subsequent dispersion, or was spent 
on training for government officials, not for programs aimed at 
developing nongovernmental pro-reform organizations. Funded 
programs were focused less on political reforms than on improving 
the performance of Arab governments, economies, and schools. 
Altogether, most independent observers believed the program 
stood little chance of serving “as a catalyst for a tangible political 
change.”30
The administration then decided to reorient U.S. diplomacy 
and American foreign aid policy to lend support to pro-democracy 
movements in the region as well as to develop a public diplomacy 
campaign to win Arab “hearts and minds”. Special Arab-language 
radio and television stations were established — the Sawa (Together) 
radio-station and Al-Hurrah (The Free) television station -  to 
promote American values, especially o f religion tolerance, open 
debate and women rights. Further, study tours, stipends, and 
English-language studies were offered to expose Arabs to American
- 21 -
democratic institutions and help them to learn and understand 
America better. In turn, the U.S. government began to send signals 
that it would not favor Arab governments reluctant to democratic 
reform. For example, in August 2002, the White House rejected an 
Egyptian request for $ 130 million in aid to protest the sentencing 
of Egyptian-American democracy activist Saad Eddin Ibrahim and 
his colleagues to prison for alleged fraud and defamation.
All these actions were, naturally, a consequence of President 
Bush’s approach to the issue. In fact, Bush himself became a great 
supporter o f democratization of the Middle East, and Iraq in 
particular. That idea became a crucial part of what is becoming 
known now as “the Bush doctrine”.31 But it came as a surprise to 
many.
Historically, during the administration of George H. W. Bush 
(1988—1992), the U.S. was only beginning to develop ideas about 
what role the country might play in the post-Cold War world. 
Consequently, in the Middle East, U.S. policy aimed to preserve 
the existing status quo. Bush senior believed that the maintenance 
of stability should be the main rationale of American foreign policy. 
Therefore, when Saddam Hussein disturbed the balance of power in 
the Middle East by invading Kuwait in 1990, Bush went to war not 
to create a new order in the region but rather to restore the status 
quo ante. And for the same reason, after driving the Iraqi forces 
out o f Kuwait, he allowed Saddam Hussein to remain in power in 
Baghdad. When his son took the presidency in 2000, most people 
expected him to follow this “realist” approach. But the events 
o f September 11, 2001, compelled Bush jr. to take dramatically 
different approach. Addressing the nation on September 20, nine 
days after attacks, he presented himself as a passionate democratic 
idealist, ready to follow the Wilsonian idea o f spreading democracy 
to as many other countries as possible.32 Bush underlined that 
despite the great loss the American nation had suffered, “ in our grief
George W. Bush's „promotion of democracy" agenda...
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and anger”, the U.S. mission was found: “the advance of human 
freedom”. He continued: “we will not tire, we will not falter, and 
we will not fail” fulfilling this task.33 In the State of the Union 
address of January 29, 2002 Bush further elaborated his ideas. First, 
Bush said that: “The 20th century ended with a single surviving 
model of human progress, based on non-negotiable demands of 
human dignity, the rule of law, limits on the power of the state, 
respect for women and private property and free speech and equal 
justice and religious tolerance” .34 Then, he stated: “When it comes 
to the common rights and needs o f men and women, there is no 
clash of civilizations. The requirements o f freedom apply fully to 
Africa and Latin America and the entire Islamic world. The peoples 
of the Islamic nations want and deserve the same freedoms and 
opportunities as people in every nation. And their governments 
should listen to their hopes.”35
In turn, addressing the United Nations on September 12,
2002, he pointed out that “free societies do not intimidate through 
cruelty and conquest, and open societies do not threaten the world 
with mass murder”. Therefore, referring to the Iraqi crisis, he said 
that “liberty for the Iraqi people is a great moral cause and a great 
strategic goal. The people of Iraq deserve it; the security of all nations 
requires it.” On another occasion he elaborated that “for decades, 
free nations tolerated oppression in the Middle East for the sake 
of stability. In practice, this approach brought little stability and 
much oppression, so I have changed this policy... Some who call 
themselves realists question whether the spread of democracy in 
the Middle East should be of any concern of ours. But the realists 
in this case have lost contact with a fundamental reality: America 
has always been less secure when freedom is in retreat; America is 
always more secure when freedom is on the march.”36
The ideology adopted by President Bush was subsequently 
promoted by various government officials and accompanied by
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endless editorials and articles in major American newspapers 
presenting optimistic view of the expected results of the new 
democratizing mission for America.37
In March 2003, President George W. Bush decided to take an 
enormously large and costly action to change the regime in Iraq. 
He believed that toppling Saddam Hussein would facilitate the 
rapid democratization of Iraq, which, in turn, would produce a 
democratic boom in the Middle East, comparable to the successful 
one that had occurred earlier in Eastern Europe, ending the Cold 
War.38 To stress the importance of that argument, the operation 
was termed “Iraqi Freedom.” Nonetheless, there were two more 
important motivations behind Bush’s decision to invade Iraq. First, 
in the U.S. Saddam Hussein was perceived as an accomplice, if not 
a sponsor, of Osama bin Laden; further, Iraq was believed to have 
weapons o f mass destruction, threatening for the region. Given that 
neither o f these justifications turned out to be accurate, the argument 
regarding the importance of democratizing Arab countries in order 
to win the war on terror has become the important one.
Arabs were not convinced by the argumentation that a desire 
to promote democracy had motivated Bush’s actions. Instead, 
they believed that controlling oil, protecting Israel and weakening 
and dominating the Arab world were the real motives behind the 
invasion and occupation of Iraq.39 In fact, a large majority of Arabs 
expected that the war in Iraq would result in less democracy in 
the region (and more terrorism against the United States). Saddam 
Hussein and Osama bin Laden remained for them highly admired 
world leaders.40
On November 6,2003, President Bush delivered the now-famous 
address on the need to strengthen democracy around the world 
and, in particular, to support its development in the Middle East. 
He called for an end to “sixty years o f Western nations excusing and 
accommodating the lack of freedom in the Middle East”, admitting
Ceorge W. Bush's „promotion of democracy" agenda-
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for the first time that perhaps the U.S. had taken the wrong approach 
to the matter.41 Then, he proposed to adopt a new Middle East 
policy — “a forward strategy of freedom”. Bush optimistically stated 
that the success of democracy in Iraq would “send forth the news, 
from Damascus to Teheran, that freedom can be the future of every 
nation. The establishment of a free Iraq at the heart of the Middle 
East will be a watershed event in the global democratic revolution.”42 
He stressed, however, that democracy takes time to develop and 
that, consequently, the American commitment to democracy in 
the Middle East must be the focus of American foreign policy for 
decades to come. Bush also pointed out that “democratization must 
always reflect the cultures and tradition of the region. Moreover, 
democracy can be realized in different political systems”. He spoke 
positively of the rulers of Morocco, Oman, Kuwait, Yemen, Bahrain 
and Qatar, supported Saudi Arabia’s “first steps toward reform” and 
urged Egypt to “show the way towards democracy in the Middle 
East.” The president rejected exceptionalism of the Middle East as a 
region inhospitable to democracy, an idea that had often dominated 
thoughts of Western politicians before.
The American reaction to the speech was mixed.43 Many 
commentators praised it, some even compared it to President 
Ronald Reagan’s famous June 1982 speech to members o f the 
British Parliament, in which he predicted the imminent demise 
of communism because it failed to respect freedom and human 
rights and reward individual creativity. Others, from the right, 
criticized Bush on the grounds that he launched “a moral crusade 
in politically volatile regions without regard to potentially negative 
consequences”, warning that his efforts could unintentionally bring 
Islamic regimes to power in the Middle East or plunge the region 
into major turmoil.44 In turn, conservative realists criticized Bush 
saying that what he was really proposing was either “a major shift 
in U.S. attitudes toward the undemocratic ruling classes in Saudi
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Arabia, Egypt, Jordan and others which we long called our friends”, 
which could jeopardize U.S. interests in the region, or “a permanent 
condition of blatant diplomatic hypocrisy”, unacceptable as 
well.43 Finally some skeptics claimed that Bush’s professed U.S. 
commitment to democracy was just rhetoric and would eventually 
surrender to the pressures of economic and political interests.
In the Middle East reaction to Bush’s speech was generally 
negative. The media in the region criticized Washington’s arrogance, 
hypocrisy, and interference in Arab internal affairs.46
The G-8 Broader Middle East 
and North Africa Initiative
President Bush in his November 2003 speech did not announce any 
new initiative, nor did he define a specific set of policy guidelines. 
That was left for the White House administration, which began 
working on the details of the plan that was later named “The 
Greater Middle East Initiative”. The project proposed technical 
assistance to countries that held elections by 2006, setting up 
centers to train women managers, journalists and NGO activists 
as well as women primary school teachers. It called for economic 
transformation “similar in magnitude to that undertaken by the 
formerly communist countries o f Central and Eastern Europe”, 
mainly through the strengthening of the private sector via 
microfinancing (individual loans of $400 each to be made to 1.2 
million entrepreneurs, 750,000 of them women, in five years time). It 
also proposed establishment of a Greater Middle East Development 
Bank, creation of free trade zones, and pressure for Arab countries 
to join the World Trade Organization. Bush wanted to obtain 
broad international support for his initiative and planned to launch 
it at the G-8 summit. The plan was also designed to convince G-8 
members that poverty, illiteracy and unemployment in the region,
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being the roots of extremism, terrorism, international crime and 
illegal migration, represented a major threat to their security. At the 
same time, the plan presented the already existing European Middle 
East initiative (the “Euro-Mediterranean Partnership”, the so-called 
Barcelona process) and the U.S. State Department sponsored “US- 
Middle East Partnership Initiative”, as complimentary efforts. It 
also invoked the multilateral reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan 
and Iracj as if they were part of the same policy.47 In short the 
project involved what was termed the “Greater Middle East,” — the 
area from North-West Africa to Afghanistan, including not only 
Arab states but also Israel, Turkey, Iran and Pakistan.
When the working version of the project under the title “The 
G-8 Greater Middle East Partnership” was leaked to liberal Arabic 
daily Al Hayat in February 2003, Arab governments, intellectuals 
and media voiced strong criticism for the plan. They saw in it an 
unacceptable intrusion in their internal affairs.48 Egyptian President 
Hosni Mubarak, described any attempt to impose reform from 
outside as “delusional,” and warned that it would lead to anarchy. 
Bahrain’s Prime Minister, Sheikh Khalifa bin Salman Al Khalifa, 
asserted that “the imposition of any foreign view is not in the interest 
of the countries of the region”. Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister, 
Prince Saud al-Faisal said that the U.S. proposal “ include[d] clear 
accusations against the Arab people and their governments that 
they are ignorant of their own affairs... Those behind this plan 
ignore the fact ... that we are able to handle our own affairs” . The 
Syrian Vice President, Abdel Halim Khaddam went as far as to 
claim that the initiative “is reminiscent o f the situation after World 
War One, when major powers sought to carve up the region”. 
The Arab League Secretary-General Amre Moussa considered the 
project “an unacceptable attempt at dictating the development 
paths the people should take without consulting them.”49 The 
Tunisian human rights activists Moncef Marzouki stressed “the
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total lack of credibility of the U.S. policy to promote democracy 
in the Arab world” and went on to say “that U.S. policy as a whole 
greatly facilitates the growth of extremist Islamist forces, as we are 
seeing in Iraq and will see elsewhere.”50 Questions were also raised 
about the new U.S.-proposed concept of the Greater Middle East, 
whose only common denominator seemed to be that it included 
countries “where hostility to the U.S. is strongest, in which Islamic 
fundamentalism in its anti-Western form is most rife” .51
The Arab leaders’ criticism of the Bush plan were strengthen by 
U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney’s comments that as democracy 
was a precondition for peace and prosperity in Western Europe, 
democratic reform was also essential to a resolution of Arab-Israeli 
conflict” .52 To many, this suggested a justification for postponing 
efforts to solve this conflict. Moreover, as Zbigniew Brzeziński noted, 
the plan for the Middle East “ ignored the historical reality that 
democracy can flourish only in an atmosphere of political dignity. 
As long as Palestinians live under Israeli control and are humiliated 
daily, they won’t be attracted by the virtues of democracy. The same 
is largely true of the Iraqis under the American occupation... The 
program for Arab democracy will be more successful, and find 
wider acceptance, if it is matched by efforts to grant sovereignty 
to the Iraqis and Palestinians. Otherwise, democracy will be seen 
to many in the Arab world to be window dressing for continued 
external domination.”53
Europe was also critical o f the U.S. proposal. Gilbert Achcar 
wrote in Le Monde Diplomatique in April 2004 that America “in 
the name of democratization” plan now “to strengthen its grip on 
Middle Eastern oil wealth and markets and extend its network of 
military bases and facilities.” European governments perceived the 
American initiative as a duplication of their long-term efforts to 
engage with Arab countries on issues of economic and political 
reform through the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. They feared
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that American neo-conservatives would appropriate European ideas 
to support “democratic imperialism” and that the U.S. initiative 
would jeopardize their own “soft” approach.54 Thus, European 
governments and the E.U. itself reinvigorated. their democracy 
promotion efforts in the Middle East, “facilitating but not imposing 
change” and “building partnership” with countries of the region. 
In particular, they have increased aid for Arab governments that 
agreed to improve human rights in their countries.
In the face of such widespread criticism, the U.S. government 
scaled-down the original proposal and at the G-8 summit at Sea 
Island, Georgia, on June 8-10, 2004, presented a new version of the 
plan under the name “The Broader Middle East and North Africa 
Initiative” .55 That plan was eventually accepted by the G-8 leaders. 
The resolution adopted at that meeting called for a “partnership 
for progress and a common future with the region”. That goal is 
to be achieved through the establishment of the “Forum for the 
Future”, a framework for regular meetings of Western and Arab 
ministers as well as parallel meetings o f civil society and business 
leaders to discuss political and economic reforms.56 The initiative 
includes a microfinance program to help small entrepreneurs, 
support for training programs for businesses, and a project to 
enhance literacy. A call to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, an 
idea whose conspicuous absence in the earlier version of the plan 
had caused wide criticism, was included in the document. The plan 
acknowledged also that reforms cannot be imposed from outside 
and that different societies will change at different rates.’
Despite a new form, the G-8 reform plan was received coldly 
in the Arab world. Only five Arab countries accepted President 
Bush’s invitation for launching it at the summit. Two regional 
powers, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, as well as close U.S. allies Kuwait 
and Morocco, turned down the invitation, making it clear that 
they wanted nothing to do with the project. Only Jordan openly
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welcomed the plan as “reflective of the priorities of the region;” 
nonetheless, Jordan warned that reform imposed from outside 
could backfire. “Opponents of political and social reform will 
conveniently label reform efforts as a mere implementation of a 
western agenda against the interests o f the Arab world and will 
probably get away with it.37 The reaction of the Emir of Qatar, 
Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa A1 Thani, was a hesitant approval: he 
noted that “the calls for reform coming from abroad need reflection 
by the people of our region”.58 Although some Arab intellectuals 
declared that the U.S. plan could give impetus to homegrown 
reform movements, many people viewed it only as a bargaining 
tactic by the U.S. to pressure longtime Arab allies into unpopular 
and difficult decisions, like pushing the Palestinians to accept an 
agreement with the Israelis that didn’t favor Palestinian interests, or 
supporting American policy in Iraq.59
O f course, many Arab politicians, journalists, intellectuals and 
others do not reject the Bush ideas per se. Opinion polls reveal 
that the majority o f Arabs support democratic principles; they 
want to live in the states where leaders are freely elected, where 
there is freedom of speech and association, where all citizens are 
equal, and where the rule o f law is respected.60 But the same people 
usually reject American democratization plans for the region, and 
U.S. policy towards their countries. (In fact, U.S. Middle East 
policy in general, U.S. support o f Israel, and the U.S. invasion and 
occupation of Iraq are the reasons cited most often for Arabs’ lack of 
trust in American initiatives61). “The problem is the messenger not 
the message” — said the Arab League representative, Nassif Hitti.62 
The U.S. image in the Arab world is very negative and in the last 
few years has worsened: between 2002 and 2004 the number of 
Arabs who rated the U.S. favorably declined in Morocco from 38 
to 11 per cent; in Jordan from 34 to 15 per cent; in Egypt from 15 
to 2 per cent; in Saudi Arabia from 12 to 4 per cent.63 “After what
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has happened in Iraq, there is unprecedented hatred [of Americans] 
never equaled in the region”, said President Hosni Mubarak of 
Egypt, the key ally of the U.S. in a region where almost 100 percent 
of the population held an unfavorable opinion of the country.64
Bush's new term in office. Continuity or change 
of the "democratization drive"?
President Bush made the issue of promoting democracy in the 
Middle East an important part of his main speech at the Republican 
National Convention in New York City on September 2, 2004.65 
This was even more significant due to the fact that foreign policy 
issues are rarely given such prominence during the election 
campaign. Bush, repeating his earlier declarations, stated first that: 
“We are working to advance liberty in the broader Middle East, 
because freedom will bring a future of hope, and the peace we all 
want. And we will prevail.”
Then, the President pointed out that the U.S. strategy is 
succeeding.
“Four years ago, Afghanistan was the home base of al Qaeda, 
Pakistan was a transit point for terrorist groups, Saudi Arabia was 
fertile ground for terrorist fund-raising, Libya was secretly pursuing 
nuclear weapons, Iraq was a gathering threat, and al Qaeda was 
largely unchallenged as it planned attacks” . Today, according to the 
President, “the government o f a free Afghanistan is fighting terror, 
Pakistan is capturing terrorist leaders, Saudi Arabia is making 
raids and arrests, Libya is dismantling its weapons programs, the 
army of a free Iraq is fighting for freedom, and more than three- 
quarters of al Qaeda’s key members and associates have been 
detained or killed... The murderous regimes o f Saddam Hussein 
and the Taliban are history, more than 50 million people have been 
liberated, and democracy is coming to the broader Middle East.”
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(One, o f course, can have serious doubts about the accuracy of 
Bush’s analysis.)
Bush underlined that what Americans are doing is “a vital and 
historic cause that will make our country safer”. Moreover, in 
effect, “free societies in the Middle East will be hopeful societies, 
which no longer feed resentments and breed violence for export. 
Free governments in the Middle East will fight terrorists instead of 
harboring them, and that helps us keep the peace.”
For the President, the American mission in Afghanistan and Iraq 
is obvious: “help new leaders to train their armies, and move toward 
elections, and get on the path of stability and democracy as quickly 
as possible.” Bush noted that terrorists are aware of how crucial this 
work is. “They know that a vibrant, successful democracy at the 
heart o f the Middle East will discredit their radical ideology of hate. 
They know that men and women with hope, and purpose, and 
dignity do not strap bombs on their bodies and kill the innocent. 
The terrorists are fighting freedom with all their cunning and cruelty 
because freedom is their greatest fear — and they should be afraid, 
because freedom is on the march.”
For Bush, “the wisest use of American strength is to advance 
freedom”. “America is called to lead the cause of freedom in a 
new century”. “As freedom advances — heart by heart, and nation 
by nation — America will be more secure and the world more 
peaceful.”
While the “domino effect theory” was once used to explain 
how nations in the developing world would fall to communism, 
today Bush uses it to explain how democracy will spread in the 
Muslim world. According to him: “As the citizens of Afghanistan 
and Iraq seize the moment, their example will send a message of 
hope throughout a vital region. Palestinians will hear the message 
that democracy and reform are within their reach, and so is peace 
with our good friend Israel. Young women across the Middle
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East will hear the message that their day of equality and justice is 
coming. Young men will hear the message that national progress 
and dignity are found in liberty, not tyranny and terror. Reformers, 
and political prisoners, and exiles will hear the message that their 
dream of freedom cannot be denied forever.” Bush is convinced 
that the millions of people in the Middle East who “plead in silence 
for their liberty”, when given the chance, “will embrace the most 
honorable form of government ever devised by man.”
Bush spoke of America’s commitment to advancing the cause 
of democracy throughout the world also during his inauguration 
speech while being sworn again as the U.S. President on January 
20, 2005. In his short address he mentioned the word “freedom”
27 times and he devoted most o f his speech to the questions of 
human freedom (though this time he never referred to the situation 
in the Middle East directly). The president said that: “The survival 
of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success o f liberty 
in other lands. The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion 
of freedom in all the world. (...) So it is the policy of the United 
States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements 
and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal 
of ending tyranny in our world.” Simultaneously, “America will 
not impose our own style o f government on the unwilling. Our 
goal instead is to help others find their own voice, attain their own 
freedom, and make their own way. We will encourage reform in 
other governments by making clear that success in our relations 
will require the decent treatment o f their own people. (...) In the 
long run, there is no justice without freedom, and there can be no 
human rights without human liberty.”
At the same time, as the President said, America would not 
abandon those under repression and support democratic reformers. 
When making an appeal to the allies of the United States for unity in 
these issues, he finally pointed out that „the concerted effort of free
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nations to promote democracy is a prelude to Our enemies’ defeat.” 
Therefore, it looks like that during his second term in office he may 
continue his “democracy drive” in the Arab world. Senator Chuck 
Hagel, while outlining Republican foreign policy principles for the 
coming years, pointed out recently that “the United States must 
continue to support democratic and economic reform in the Greater 
Middle East” as “we cannot lose the war of ideas”.66 He provided a 
broad justification for such policy. Challenges to U.S. leadership and 
security hail not from rival global powers, but from weak “failing” 
states where terrorism finds sanctuary and support. These states often 
seek legitimacy and power through the possession of weapons of mass 
destruction, rather than from the will of their people. Thus “terrorism 
and proliferation go hand in glove with the challenges of failed and 
failing states.” This is why it is so crucial to reform such states.
Many Republicans, as well as most others, are aware that 
projects for political reform should be based on realistic assessments 
of the needs and specifics o f each country, not only on “ideological 
orthodoxy”. As Henry Kissinger has noted, “a foreign policy to 
promote democracy needs to be adapted to local or regional 
realities, or it will fail. In the pursuit of democracy, policy — as in 
other realms — is the art of possible.”67 Therefore, as Hagel stressed, 
“We should support democratic change through partnership 
with friendly governments and democrats abroad, developed 
through consultations, diplomacy, economic incentives, human 
rights standards, and performance-driven measures for success... 
Sustainable democracy will depend on institutions that support 
education, women’s rights, and private-sector development.”68 The 
resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is an important part of 
that policy as the continuation of conflict “ increases the capacity 
for radical politics and extremists acts o f violence” .
In the annual address to both chambers o f the Congress, the 
„State of the Union Address” , delivered on 31 January, 2006, Bush
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appeared to continuously believe in his mission. Similarly as in 
the address inaugurating his second term of office, he linked the 
security of the United States with the enlargement o f the group of 
free states in the world. „The only way to defeat the terrorists is to 
defeat their dark vision of hatred and fear by offering the hopeful 
alternative of political freedom and peaceful change. So the United 
States of America supports democratic reform across the broader 
Middle East (...) Democracies in the Middle East will not look 
like our own, because they will reflect the traditions o f their own 
citizens. Yet liberty is the future o f every nation in the Middle East, 
because liberty is the right and hope of all humanity.”
The question of propagating democracy in the Middle 
East was addressed by President Bush a number of times when 
commenting on the following elections in Iraq, perceived by him 
as a success of American policy, all the other failures in that country 
notwithstanding. He was supported in his actions by the Secretary 
of State Condoleezza Rice. The continuation of the process o f 
democratizing Iraq required from the United States some active 
measures with a view to convince various Iraqi groupings not to 
boycott the election or to make difficult compromises. In general, 
Washington accepted the results of the election, which gave 
a decisive voice in the state government to the Shiite majority, the 
latter being to a large extent under the influence of the Islamic 
groupings, often closely connected with Iran. On the other hand, 
it worked hard to include also other groups, especially Kurds and 
Sunnis, in the political process, and to keep anti-American radicals 
away from the key positions in the country. This was frequently 
criticized as an interference in the internal affairs o f a more 
sovereign Iraq.
An important role in the shaping of American policy in the field 
of promoting democracy in the Middle East was taken up by the 
Congress, particularly by means of providing finance for certain
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programs.6‘' In this respect, of particular significance is the Advance 
Democracy Act enacted in 2005, attached to the Foreign Relations 
Authorization Act for years 2006 and 2007, which was submitted by 
a group of Republican and Democratic Congressmen and Senators. 
The act imposed on the Department of State an obligation to 
coordinate actions for the sake of advancing world democracy. The 
decisions concerning the creation of regional „democracy centers” 
in diplomatic missions were made, the name of the post o f the 
undersecretary of state „for global affairs” was changed into the 
„undersecretary for democracy and global affairs”; in the Bureau of 
Democracy, Human Rights and Labor a post for promoting political 
reforms in non-democratic countries was established; the Bureau 
of Intelligence and Research was ordered to collect data on the 
properties possessed by the leaders o f non-democratic states or the 
countries undergoing political transformation; a decision was made 
that the question of one’s engagement in the process of advancing 
democracy would be taken into consideration when promoting 
diplomats to higher ranks; the secretary of state was obligated to 
give the Congress an annual report on the state of democracy in 
the world; also the heads o f diplomatic missions were requested 
to get personally involved in the promotion of American values at 
universities in the countries in which they held their office. For the 
sake of implementing these programs the sum of $50 million was 
assigned for 2006 and $60 million for 2007.
On the other hand there are signals that Bush may modify his 
“democratizing the world” policy.
There are many reasons for that. Iraq cannot be seen as a model 
for democratic transformation, and the anti-American attitudes 
in the Middle East has further limited Washington’s persuasive 
powers. At the same time the White House administration has 
noticed that despite all their flaws, Arab governments have mostly
-36-
proved co-operative in combating terrorism, and that several of 
them began introducing, although slowly, some political reforms 
(media became freer, women obtained more rights, etc.). Therefore, 
as Arab countries were called to start reforms as a way to fight 
terrorism, since they are doing their duty, it seems that the US is 
ready to neglect their slackness in the democratization drive.
This change in approach became visible at the first international 
conference under the Broader Middle East and North Africa 
Initiative scheme, held in Morocco in December 2004, The agenda 
prepared for this “Forum for the Future” covered mostly economic 
and financial issues (aid to small businesses, networking among 
regional financial institutions, exchange of views how to bring more 
capital in the region), not the political reforms.70Although American 
officials claimed that economic proposals can contribute in a long 
run to democratic change (“When you help small entrepreneurs, 
that creates a middle-class part of the social underpinning of a 
democracy”), it became obvious that the US has not seen the need 
and possibility to put the “democratization drive” high on the 
Middle East agenda now.
Conference in Rabat was attended by representatives from nearly
30 countries, including foreign and finance ministers from the G-
8 (Group of Eight Industrialized Countries) and key Arab and 
Islamic (Afghanistan and Pakistan) states. The ministerial meeting 
was dominated by the US insistence that promotion of democracy, 
economic growth, higher literacy rates and gender equality in Arab 
and non-Arab Muslim states should not be held hostage to the ups 
and downs of the Middle East peace process. On the other hand, 
Muslim delegates stressed the link between reform and progress on 
the Israeli-Palestinian front. Eventually, that link was made clear in 
the final conference statement.
What was new in Rabat was the presence of the Arab business 
and civil society groups, which in their statement openly criticized
George W. Bush's „promotion of democracy" agenda-
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government o f their countries for their lack of willingness to 
undertake real reforms.71 They clearly pointed out that Palestinian 
and Iraqi issues should not be used as excuses for not launching 
reforms, while Western governments should stop using double 
standards in assessing violations of human rights and democracy 
principles in each country. They called their respective governments 
to allow free ownership of media institutions, freedom of expression, 
especially freedom of assembly and meetings, ensure womens rights 
and remove all forms of inequality and discrimination against 
women in the Arab world and immediately release reformers, 
human rights activists and political prisoners.
While Arab media generally negatively reviewed the conference 
in Morocco, the US administration believed that the event provided 
a promising platform for human right and other nongovernmental 
groups in the Arab world and “created a mechanism for countries 
to participate fully with their neighbors in the room to talk about 
the issue of reform.”72
The second meeting of the Forum for the Future, which took 
place in Manama, the capital o f Bahrain, in November 2005 did 
not, however, prove to be particularly successful.73 As a result of 
the influence of Arabic states government representatives the 
conference organizing committee did not allow for a number of 
issues connected with violating human rights in those countries 
to be tackled. The participants of the meeting did not make any 
final declaration since Egypt disagreed with the conditions of 
establishing a foundation whose aim would be to directly (i.e. 
with no control of the authorities) finance programs of non­
governmental organizations in their countries, activities supporting 
political reforms and the development of civil society. The only 
success was launching a foundation supporting the promotion of 
economic reforms in the Middle East. Creating such foundations 
is important; many non-governmental organizations find it easier
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to cooperate with institutions of this type than with official 
governmental departments.
However, President Bush is determined to establish a foundation 
Forum for the Future,74 He believes that this foundation may 
become a basis for implementing his program of democratization 
of the Middle East. That is the reason why, despite the failure of 
the meeting in Manama, he has assigned $35 million dollars for 
its activity. Qatar, where the head office o f the foundation is to be, 
has become its other sponsor. The time will show whether the other 
Arabic states will join the realization of this initiative.
Obviously, the promotion of democracy in the Middle East 
constitutes a serious challenge for the policy of the United States as 
it demands reconciliation between putting pressure on the Arabic 
state governments in terms of introducing reforms, on the one 
hand, and the necessity to ensure their collaboration in the fight 
against terrorism, the process o f stabilizing the situation in Iraq or 
support for the peace process, on the other. The relations between 
the USA and Egypt are an example of the problems appearing in 
this respect in 2005 and 2006. On the one hand, the USA were 
pleased with the decision of President Hosni Mubarak who for the 
first time allowed for many candidates to run in the presidential 
election, on the other, they criticized the course of the election: 
the manipulation with the electoral law, arrests of the members 
of the opposition, blocking access to some polling stations, etc. 
Finally, when the Egyptian authorities had arrested Ayman Nour, 
a politician of the opposition, the USA suspended the talks on 
concluding a commercial contract. However, Arabic democrats 
criticized the steps taken by Washington as insufficient in the 
current circumstances.
The most serious challenge that President Bush had to face was 
the election in Palestinian Autonomy on 25 January, 2006. The 
United States had been striving for them for years hoping that
George W. Bush's „promotion of democracy" agenda...
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this would lead to removing Yasser Arafat from power. After his 
death, and in the face of the fact that in the election for municipal 
authorities in 2005 radical Islamic groups, and particularly Hamas 
(in the West commonly recognized as a terrorist organization), 
were tremendously successful, Washington may have no longer 
been so much interested in holding the election, however, as a 
state officially advancing democracy in the region, it was not in a 
position to prevent it. Unexpectedly, it was Hamas that won the 
election and it formed a new government of Palestinian Autonomy. 
As at the same time, despite the pressure from the West, Hamas 
did not back out from the policy of negating Israel’s rights to exist 
and conducting military action against it, moreover, it decided to 
continue rejecting earlier agreements between the Autonomy and 
Israel, the United States resolved not to maintain any contacts with 
the new government (despite the fact that as late as January 31, 
already after the election, but no doubt still in the hope that Hamas 
would not govern the Autonomy independently, on the occasion 
of expressing his recognition of the democratization process in 
Palestinian Autonomy in the State of the Union Address President 
Bush declared that he would appeal to the Congress for a grant of 
$350 million to support further political and economic reforms in 
the Autonomy).
The results o f the election in Iraq and Palestine Autonomy as 
well as in Egypt and Lebanon (where a fundamentalist grouping 
Muslim Brotherhood were highly successful) proved that wherever 
in today’s Arab world a free election was held, anti-Western Islamic 
groupings would come to power in most of the states. The efforts 
o f the West, and especially those of the United States, which 
promote the development of civil society, and non-governmental 
organizations in these countries would not able to prevent this. 
The attempts to find a „third way”, an alternative for the present 
authoritarian and Islamic governments have proved to be a failure.
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Thus, Washington is facing a very difficult dilemma of whether to 
continue a line o f confrontation with such groups (cf Hamas), an 
approach that threatens both parties with serious consequences, or 
to establish cooperation with them in the hope that, having reached 
the position of power, they would become less radical (cf. Turkey). 
Washington may also return to the former option of supporting 
authoritarian governments, thereby following the principle o f lesser 
evil, and thus postpone the projects of the democratization of the 
region. As of today (April 2006), President Bush appears to have 
decided to continue his former policy. Verbally, he still recognizes 
the democratization of the region to be one of the priorities o f his 
actions, at the same time, however, he does not condemn Muslim 
autocrats, the allies of the United Staes o f long standing, who ensure 
stability in their countries and make it possible for the United States 
to conduct business dealings in the Middle East.
Positive responses in the Arab world 
to the Bush democratization plans?
At the beginning of 2000’s, some Arab states decided to introduce 
certain political reforms.75 Morocco expanded the rights o f women. 
Qatar adopted a new constitution providing for a partially elected 
parliament and held municipal elections already; the Emir Sheikh 
Hamad, several times called for political reforms in the Arab 
world. Bahrain became a constitutional monarchy with an elected 
parliament and vocal opposition. Saudi Arabia’s rulers called for 
political and economic reform in the whole Arab world (the so- 
called Prince Abdullah plan), organized several debates with a 
broad range of people, including Islamists and other opposition 
figures, and announced its first municipal elections. In Kuwait, 
the Justice and Development Movement was established “to 
defend democratic gains and promote democracy” and the Islamic
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Constitutional Movement called for the establishment of a multi­
party political system in the emirate. Moreover, in the first half 
o f 2004, the League of Arab States, as well as different parties 
in several Arab countries, produced declarations on the need for 
broad political, social, and economic reforms. There is no doubt 
that many of these actions were inspired or at least invigorated by 
American democratization initiatives.76 For some Arabs, including 
some Arab governments, it became crucial to show the world, 
Americans, and their own countrymen that they are able to take 
the political initiative and not just follow the U.S. lead. For others, 
especially reformers and opposition figures, American initiatives 
offered support and the possibility o f assistance in case they would 
be prosecuted for their involvement in democratization efforts.
First, in January 2004, a large international conference was 
organized in Sanaa, Yemen, where a declaration calling for periodically 
elected legislatures in Arab countries, free media, the separation of 
institutional powers, and women’s empowerment was adopted. The 
conference established the Arab Democratic Dialogue Forum aimed 
at promoting dialogue; enhancing democracy, human rights and 
civil liberties (especially freedom of opinion and expression); and 
strengthening the partnership between public authorities and civil 
society.77
Then, on March 3, 2004, the otherwise banned Muslim 
Brotherhood unveiled its own reform initiative in Cairo. The 
initiative demanded that the Egyptian government rescind the 
emergency law and other restrictions on political activity, and limit 
the power of the presidency. The plan further called for reducing 
the military’s role in politics, privatizing Egypt’s economy, and 
fostering an independent judiciary (but also purging non-Islamic 
materials from the media).
A few days later, on March 12-14, intellectuals and civil society 
activists, together with former Arab ministers and other government
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officials, gathered in Alexandria, Egypt to debate the issue of reform. 
The adopted declaration demanded an end to the emergency laws 
existing in many Arab countries, and the establishment o f executive 
term limits, regular elections, and a clear-cut separation between the 
legislative and executive powers.78 The declaration further stressed the 
universal character of democratic values and the urgent need to promote 
them in the Arab world. “It is a call on the Arabs to adopt democracy — 
not because the West wants them to, but because its best for them.”79 
Characteristically, the statement did not mention the occupation of 
Iraq and Palestine as an obstacle to reform in the region.
The Arab League, for the first time in its history, managed to 
take a position on the political reform issue at its summit in Tunis 
in May 2004. (The process was not without problems however: the 
first meeting in Tunis in March was cancelled at the last minute due 
to disagreements over the summit outcome.80) In their declaration, 
Arab leaders pledged to “reaffirm attachment” to human rights, 
and to “reinforce” freedom of expression, thought, and worship, 
and the independence of the judiciary, as well as to “consolidate 
democratic practice, broaden participation in political and public 
life, reinforce the role of all components of civil society... and 
widen womens participation in the political, economic, social, 
cultural and educational fields.”81 The declaration stated, however, 
that reforms should be implemented according to the guidelines 
established in a framework document prepared in Cairo before the 
summit, “A Course for Development and Modernization in the Arab 
World.” . This document pointed out that reforms should take place 
according to each country’s “cultural, religious, and civilizational 
understandings and values, circumstance and capabilities” , thus 
seriously weakening its significance by giving possibility to wide 
interpretation.
On June 3-4,2004, Qatar University hosted a conference of Arab 
democracy advocates that drew civil society activists, professors,
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journalists and members o f political movements from across the 
region. The Emir o f Qatar, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, 
in his widely reported speech opening the event, stated that: (1) 
Arab states should consider U.S. proposals for democratic reform 
rather than rejecting them outright; (2) there are many problems 
in the Arab world with local roots “that have nothing to do with 
the outside world”, and in particular many that “ [do] not spring 
only from the Palestinian cause”; (3) “the adoption of reforms has 
always been the right way to stability” (though many Arabs have 
claimed that if popular participation is broadened the result would 
be the election of forces that would endanger peace and security).82 
Few Arab leaders have so openly stated such opinions, given that 
they contrast with many popular viewpoints. The adopted “Doha 
Declaration for Democracy and Reform” called all Arab states to 
adopt modern, democratic institutions; hold free, fair and regular 
elections; place limits on executive powers; guarantee freedom of 
association and expression; permit the full participation of women 
in political life; and end extra-judicial procedures, emergency laws, 
and torture. It also called for the creation of a body to monitor 
Arab governments’ progress on reform and to track the fate of 
other reform initiatives launched recently in the region. Finally, the 
declaration stated that “hiding behind the necessity of resolving the 
Palestinian question before implementing reform is obstructive and 
unacceptable”.
Finally, Dubai hosted in December 2004, “The Arab Strategy 
Forum” attended by 1500 Arab and non-Arab leaders. During the 
forum, the then Crown Prince of Dubai, Sheikh Mohammed Bin 
Rashid al Maktoum (now ruler of that emirate) in a strongly worded 
keynote speech said to his fellow Arabs in charge: “If you do not 
change, you will be changed. If you do not initiate radical changes, 
responsibly discharge your duties and uphold the principles of truth, 
justice and responsibility, your people will resent you. More than
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this, the verdict of history on you will be severe.”83 This comments 
were especially important as coming from one of the Arab leaders, 
and the one representing the country, the United Arab Emirates, 
which despite its tremendous economic achievements is not at all 
advanced in offering its citizens any public participation in the 
government.
All the above mentioned declarations constitute a new pheno­
menon in the Arab world. Reformists, civil society activists, 
intellectuals, and journalists, although not the un-invited Islamists, 
with the approval of their governments, and usually with the 
participation of heads of state and other officials, have begun to 
openly debate vital issues related to democratization. This debate 
represents a significant accomplishment. Nonetheless, as well- 
known British political analyst Rosemarie Hollis remarked, the 
process “should not stop at the issuing of a statement that everybody 
is committed to reform. Unless it is accompanied by some real 
changes, it is insufficient to address the issue.”84
*  *  *
In conclusion. The United States has never enjoyed greater power 
than it does today, nor been more able to impose by force what 
it wants; however, the country is simultaneously often unable 
to persuade and convince the targets of its policies to accept its 
proposals.85 The U.S. Middle East policies, the proclaimed ideology 
of the war on terror as well as occupation of Iraq has hurt America’s 
status as a model of democracy and weakened its credibility as a 
pro-democratic actor. Therefore, crucial American interests in 
the Middle East -  an uninterrupted flow of reasonably priced 
oil, pro-American political transformation in Iraq, and an Israeli- 
Palestinian peace settlement and successes in the war on terror 
-  can still probably be easier to protect through Washington’s
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cooperation with traditional, reasonably friendly allies representing 
stable (though not necessarily democratic) regimes, than through 
dealings with states experiencing the disorder that inevitably 
accompanies democratic transformation. Thus the prospects for 
achieving considerable success in democratization of the region in 
the foreseeable future remains questionable.
It will be possible to evaluate George W. Bush’s foreign policy only 
from a longer time perspective. However, as of today, it appears that, 
despite numerous mistakes he has committed in his policy, when 
advancing democracy in the Middle East President Bush did act 
rationally. As has been mentioned above, however, the critics both 
in the United States and in Europe blame his policy of propagating 
the idea of freedom and democracy for, paradoxically, making it 
possible for anti-Western, non-democratic, radical Islamic forces to 
seize the power in various countries o f the region and for bringing 
dangerous results for the West -  elections tend to be won not by 
lay liberals but religious fanatics, and this might easily lead to the 
national and religious divide in Iraq, an open war between Israel 
and the Palestinians, and the seizing of power by the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Egypt. Such a reasoning appears to be erroneous, 
though. It is not democracy as such that is responsible for such 
situations, but dictators who, at times, by way of taking advantage 
of social ignorance lead to national tragedies. On the other hand, 
the Arab world commonly believes that the attempts to advance 
democracy in the Middle East are a camouflage which once more 
aims to facilitate the process o f taking control of the region by the 
West. If it is so, however, why is then that Bush did not place pro- 
American authoritarian leaders at the head of the governments in 
Afghanistan and Iraq (as America frequently used to do in the times 
of „cold war”), but he got involved in the costly and problematic 
process o f a democratic election of sovereign authorities in those
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countries and he accepts its consequences? The examples of Turkey, 
India or Indonesia show that it is possible to combine democracy 
with Islam. The post-colonial, military, or dynastic and authoritarian 
political systems of the Arab world are in any case on a slow decline. 
Bush’s policy speeds up the process. And as The Economist, probably 
rightly, observes, „Whatever people think of Mr Bush, on this one 
thing — the universal potential and appeal of the democratic idea — 
he is on the side of the history”.86
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Elections and parliamentary activity in 
the GCC states -  Broadening political 
participation in the Gulf monarchies
Introduction
There is overwhelming agreement that a deficit o f freedom 
undermines human development. As is also well known, there is 
a dramatic gap between the levels o f democracy in Arab countries 
and the rest of the world.1 None of the 16 Arab majority countries 
has a democratically elected government. At the same time, the 
combined GDP of all Arab countries is less than that o f Spain, 
and labour productivity in these countries dropped between I960 
and 1990, while it soared elsewhere in the world. Even Africa 
outperformed the Arab region in rates of economic growth, etc.
Nevertheless, for the countries belonging to the Gulf Coopera­
tion Council (GCC) the situation is quite different from the 
portrait painted above. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the 
United Arab Emirates and Oman are among the richest countries 
in the world. Further, despite having similar, highly conservative 
political systems, these countries have carried out significant 
political reforms in recent years, given citizens more say in state
1 Arab Human Development Report 2002  and 2003, New York, www.undp.org.
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politics, and broadened freedoms. There is a movement from less 
transparent and accountable governments to more transparent and 
accountable governments; from less competitive (or non-existent) 
elections to freer, fairer, and more competitive elections; from very 
restricted liberties to better protected civil and political rights; from 
totally censured media to relatively independent ones; and from 
underdeveloped civil society institutions to more developed ones.2
Still, much progress needs to be made before the G CC countries 
could be characterized as “democracies” — that is — countries in 
which nearly every adult can vote, elections are freely contested, 
the chief executive is chosen by popular vote or by an elected 
parliament, and civil rights as well as ciyil liberties are substantially 
guaranteed.3 The existing systems often resemble what is sometimes 
called a “trick democracy”, rather then a true democracy.4 The highly 
publicized (although controversial) Freedom House democracy 
scale offers evidence for this assertion: in 2004, besides Kuwait 
and Bahrain (which were rated a “partly free” country), all GCC 
states were considered “not free,” and in 2002 Saudi Arabia was 
even labelled one of the world’s ten most repressive regimes.5 In 
turn, the Economist Intelligence Unit’s political freedom indicator 
(1 to 10, 10=most free) gave the G CC states in 2005 the following 
scores: Saudi Arabia — 1.75; UAE — 3.25; Oman — 4.45; Bahrain 
and Qatar — 4.90; Kuwait — 5.95. Saudi score make the country
2 David Potter, David Goldblatt, Margaret Kiloh, and Paul Lewis (eds.), 
Democmtisation (Cambridge, Mass., Polity Press, 1997), p. 6; Marina Ottaway, Thomas 
Carothers, Amy Hawthorne, Daniel Brumberg, “Democratic Mirage in the Middle 
East”, Policy Brief, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (October 2002).
3 Bruce Russett, “A Structure for Peace: A Democratic, Interdependent, and 
Institutionalized Order” , in: Tokashi Inoguchi, Edward Newman, and john Keane 
(eds.), I  he Changing Nature o f  Democracy (Tokyo, United Nations University 
Press, 1988), p. 32.
4 Fahmi Hweidi, “A trick democracy” , As Safir (Lebanon), August 23, 2005.
5 Freedom in the World 2002-2003  (New York, Freedom House, 2003).
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the least free in the Arab world, while the score for Kuwait put the 
country on the second best place (after Lebanon).6
Scholars have different opinions on the issue, which they often 
display in the titles of their works. For some, one can certainly talk 
about democracy in the G CC states already (Ghanim Alnajjar: “The 
challenges facing Kuwaiti democracy”; Louay Bahry: “Elections in 
Qatar: a window of democracy opens in the G ulf”); some question 
the extend of the democratic process (Susan B. Glaser: “Democracy 
in Kuwait is promise unfulfilled”; Abdelhadi Khalaf: “Bahrain: 
Democratisation by decree”), while some others firmly believe that 
democracy is not present in the Gulf yet (Michael Herb: “Parliaments 
in the Gulf monarchies are a long way from democracy”; Marc Pellas: 
“Far from democracy in the Gulf. Bahrain: the royals rule”).7
This chapter describes and analyses the development of the 
electoral process in all the G C C  states since 1990s up to mid-
2005, and examines the rulers’ decisions as well as activities of the 
consultative councils and parliaments. The author believes that 
full democracy will not necessarily be the outcome of the above- 
mentioned political liberalization.8 In the case of the G C C  states,
6 “The dynamics o f democracy in the Middle East” , The Economist Intelligence 
Unit Special Report, (London, March 2005), p. 3.
7 Ghanim  Alnajjar, “The Challenges Facing Kuwaiti Democracy” , Middle 
East Journal, vol. 54, No. 2 (2000), pp. 242—258; Louay Bahry, “Elections in 
Qatar: A window o f  democracy opens in the G u lf” , Middle East Policy, vol. 
VI, No. 4  (1999), pp. 118-127 ; Susan B. Glaser, “ Dem ocracy in Kuwait is 
promise unfulfilled” , Washington Post Foreign Service, February 27, 2003; 
Abdulhadi Khalaf, “ Bahrain: Dem ocratisation by decree” , paper presented at 
the British Society for M iddle East Studies, Edinburgh, July 2001; Michael 
Herb, “ Parliaments in the G u lf monarchies are a long way from democracy” , 
Daily Star, December 4, 2004; M arc Pellas, “ Far from democracy in the Gulf. 
Bahrain: the royals rule” , Le Monde Diplomatique, March 2005
“ Ihomas Carothers, “The end o f the transition paradigm”, Journal o f  
Democracy, No. 1(2002), pp. 5-21.
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it seems that a third type of relatively stable political system, 
somewhere “between” the old authoritarian regimes and Western- 
style democracy, may emerge. In these regimes, certain elements of 
democracy will be present why others will not.
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia, by far the largest and most important G CC country, 
has been since its establishment almost a century ago one of the 
most conservative (“absolutist”) monarchies in the world, ruled by 
the A1 Saud family with a tacit alliance with the fundamentalist 
Wahhabi movement. Nevertheless, since the beginning of the 
1990s, the country has witnessed political activity that, while not 
directly questioning the religious base o f the country’s identity and 
legitimacy of rulers, has called for changes in the manner of state 
governance.9 In particular, various groups submitted petitions to 
the King demanding political reforms. On March 1, 1992, King 
Fahd decided to take certain actions to calm down the situation. 
He decreed the long-promised Basic Laws — a constitution-like 
document, the statute for a new consultative council, and a system 
of regional government for the kingdom’s 14 provinces.
The most important decision taken concerned the Consultative 
Council, established as a debating assembly consisting of 60 
members appointed by the King.10 The Council was to study all 
government regulations, treaties and international accords before 
they are promulgated through royal decree, as well as to deliberate 
upon and evaluate economic and social development programs. 
It was also to discuss annual reports submitted by ministers and
9 Andrzej Kapiszewski, “Democratizing the Arab States. The Case of 
Monarchies o f the Gulf, 1991-2004”, Krakowskie Studia Międzynarodowe, 2004, 
3, pp. 78-80.
10 Selim Jahel, “A Parliament According to Sharia” , Arabics Trends, April 
1998, pp. 26—31; www.shura.gov.sa
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present recommendations, and was empowered to question the 
cabinet members. Tire Council was not, however, empowered to 
initiate debates on issues: it either had to obtain permission from the 
King to do so or await submission from the government. The King 
retained the power to dissolve or reorganize the Council at will.
lire Consultative Council finally set to work in mid-1990s. 
Members of the Council have been chosen from among the country’s 
regions and important constituent groups: religious establishment, 
government bureaucracy and the business community, followers of 
both conservative and liberal ideologies. They have usually been 
highly educated and experienced people, considered experts in their 
respective fields (academics, retired senior officers, ex-civil servants 
and private businessmen).11 Sheikh Mohammed bin Ibrahim bin 
Jubair, a respected Hanbali jurist and former Minister o f Justice 
became the President of the first State Council and of successive 
ones (to be replaced after his death in 2002 by Saleh bin Abdullah 
bin Homaid). The Council quickly established itself within Saudi 
political system. This is why, in 1997, the Council was enlarged 
from 60 to 90 members, in May 2001, to 120 and in April 2005, 
to 150 members. Its influence, not necessarily grounded in law, 
has been a function of its members’ prominence and diversity. It 
also reflects the tradition of governance, which “prizes consensus, 
strives to maintain harmony through consultation and is deeply 
averse to conflict” .12 Only occasionally the Council’s members have 
been deeply divided over certain issues; for example, in 2005, they 
disagreed over women’s rights to drive cars. While the verdicts of the 
Council are neither binding on the King, nor on the government, 
usually either the ministers accept the recommendations o f the 
Council or the two parties reach a compromise.
"  In 2005, out o f 150 members, 108 held doctorate degrees.
12 “Can Saudi Arabia reform itself?” , International Crisis Group Middle East 
Report No. 28, Cairo/Brussels, July 14, 2004, p.6.
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The establishment of the Consultative Council did not satisfy 
opposition, which since 1999 began to submit consequent 
petitions to the King requesting further reforms. An informal 
lobby of liberals, progressive Islamists, nationalists, and Shiites 
became even more vocal after September 11, 2001 attacks, in 
which Saudi militants were heavily involved, the subsequent 
international and local criticism of the Saudi regime, as well as 
after Al-Qaeda attacks inside the Kingdom. Vigorous debate then 
started about the causes of extremism, with usual conclusion that 
the closed nature of the Saudi political system, imposed to large 
extent by a religious establishment, was the main reason for that. 
O f particular importance in that movement was petition submitted 
to King Fahd in January 2003.13 The petition called “A Vision 
for the Present and the Future of the Nation”, was signed by 104 
academics, businessmen, religious scholars and professionals from 
various regions and representing different religious and political 
orientations.14 Among various issues raised in the petition, its 
signatories called for providing the Consultative Council with 
legislative and control powers and made it an elected body, as 
well as for an independent judiciary, freedom of expression and 
the establishment of civil society institutions. The petition, despite 
its non-confrontational tone and respectful language towards the 
monarchy, essentially suggested the establishment of institutions 
to curb the power of the ruling family and guarantee popular 
participation in decision-making, replacing a system with ruler’s
13 Municipal elections were held in Makkah, Madina, Taif, Jeddah, Yanbu 
and Qunfunha in the past, between 1926 and 1967. Anita Pratap, “Saudi women 
make gains” , Saudi Gazette, October 16, 2004.
H Richard Dekmejain, “Hie liberal impulse in Saudi Arabia” , Middle East 
Journal, No. 3 (Summer 2003); James A. Russel, “ Political and economic 
transition on the Arabian Peninsula: Perils and Prospects” , Strategic Insights, (May 
2003).
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absolute power with the constitutional monarchy in which power is 
shared with elected representatives.15
Another petition signed by more than 300 Saudis, including 
at this time 50 women, Sunnis and Shiites from all parts o f the 
Kingdom appeared in September 2003. The petition entitled “In 
Defence of the Nation” basically repeated the demands from the 
previous petition but in the view of the emergence of terrorist 
activity in the Kingdom, openly blamed the existing political 
restrictions for its development. “Being late in adopting radical 
reforms and ignoring popular participation in decision-making 
have been the main reasons that helped the fact that our country 
reached this dangerous turn.” 16
In yet another petition prepared in December, this time again 
jointly by a diversified group of Islamists, liberals and Shiites, 
titled “An Appeal to the Leadership and the People: Constitutional 
Reform First” , the signatories called for the implementation of the 
reforms outlined in the January petition and went even further, 
demanding adoption of the constitution, which would construct “a 
modern Arab Islamic state”.17
A response of the government to these petitions was the 
organization of broad debates, the so-called National Dialogue 
sessions. The issue of elections was raised during the second debate, 
which took place in Mecca in December 2003 and gathered 60 
intellectuals, clerics and businesspeople, including 10 women 
(seated in a different room). Various political, social and educational 
problems were openly discussed at the meeting, which ended in 
the formulation of 18 recommendations that were later formally 
presented to the acting ruler, Crown Prince Abdullah. Among others, 
they included holding elections for the state Consultative Council
15 “Can Saudi Arabia reform itself?” , p. 14.
16 www.arabrenewal.com. Translation by Gwenn Okhrulik and Yara Youssef.
17 Ibid.
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and local consultative councils, encouraging establishment of trade 
unions, voluntary associations and other civil society institutions, 
separating the legislative, executive and judiciary powers, as well as 
broadening freedom of expression.18
The National Dialogue recommendations generally reflected 
opinions on the discussed matters of the Saudi society at large. 
In particular, Saudis seem to be in favour of political reforms. In 
probably the first, relatively independent opinion poll on the matter 
conducted in the latter half of 2003, 85 per cent of respondents 
thought that political reform would be beneficial for the country 
and 90 per cent wanted to grant more rights to women.19 Somewhat 
contradictory, only 12 per cent of respondents had a positive view of 
liberal reformers, probably because they associated them only with the 
writing of inefficient petitions, while political reforms were perceived 
the most pressing concern for less than 10 per cent of respondents.
Responding to internal demands from liberals and the US 
pro-democracy pressures, the government began to think about 
organizing the first elections in the country, to municipal councils, 
following a well-tested pattern in neighbouring Bahrain and Qatar. 
Prince Abdullah stated in his address to the Consultative Council 
that “municipal elections will be the beginning of the Saudi citizens’ 
participation in the political system”, while the Foreign Minister, 
prince Saud Al-Faisal, similarly remarked that Saudi Arabia “has 
reached a stage in our development that requires expanding political 
participations”. In turn, Prince Turki al-Faisal said that “reforming 
the Kingdom is not a choice, it is a necessity”.20 Such vocabulary
18 Al Sbarq AlAwsat, January 4, 2004.
19 The survey was conducted by the independent Saudi National Security 
Assessment Projects. See Nawaf Obaid, “What the Saudi public really thinks?”, 
Daily Star, June 23, 2004.
2(1 Toby Jones: “Social contract for Saudi Arabia”, Middle East Report, No. 228, 
Fall 2003.
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used to be taboo among the ruling family.21 In this liberalized 
mode, the issue of elections became widely discussed throughout 
the Kingdom. As Islamist reformer, Abd al-Aziz al-Qasim stated: 
“It is hard to overestimate the importance of this step in a society 
where non-interference in politics is considered the condition of 
good citizenship. [The local] elections in themselves may not have 
much substance, but the decision to hold them breaks a barrier 
and establishes the principle that society can participate in making 
policy”22
Many Saudi officials, however, have continued to be afraid 
of such a move. They believe that elections would pose too great 
a risk to stability of the country and strengthen the hand of radical 
Islamists. Some of them claim that “because conformity to strict 
religious dogma remains the principal criterion for judging matters 
public and private... political debates could potentially turn into 
religious clashes”, while “the culture of democracy accepts the 
pluralism of opinions and relativity in all things. How can you reconcile 
relativity with a society that is governed by religion?” and “democracy 
now will produce something very similar to the Taliban”.23
With such thoughts in mind, the government decided to go 
ahead only with elections to municipal councils. Nevertheless, only 
half of the seats were to be appointed through ballot (the remaining 
was to be made of nominated incumbents, in theory the ones with 
the experience to assists the new members), second, that elections 
in 178 municipalities would be held in three phases: on February 
10, 2005 in Riyadh and the surrounding areas, on March 3, in the 
eastern and south-western regions and on April 21 in the remaining 
parts of the country (including Mecca and Medina, until then busy
21 Khalid Al-Dakhil, “2003: Saudi Arabia’s Year o f Reform”, Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, March 16, 2004.
22 “Can Saudi Arabia reform itself?” , p. 19.
23 As reported in: “Can Saudi Arabia reform itself?” , p. 19 and 20.
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with, the Hajj pilgrimage). That approach was designed for the 
authorities to have an opportunity to take a step back and evaluate 
the impact of elections before proceeding to the next phase.
Saudi women were not allowed to vote or stand in the elections. 
This decision made conservatives relieved and liberals dismayed. 
Nevertheless, women may be allowed to vote during the next elections 
in 2009. In fact, election rules are written ambiguously and for quite 
a time it was unclear whether they could participate even in the first 
elections or not.24 The officially cited reasons for not allowing women 
to participate in the elections were of administrative and legislative 
character and also the result of the Kingdoms limited experience in 
conducting elections. They did not stress religious norms or Saudi 
customs, just creating a window of hope for many liberals.25
Surprisingly, in late November 2004, the government allowed 
women for the first time to participate in the elections: to choose 
board members o f the Saudi chambers of commerce and industry (in 
the past, men voted on behalf of women members). Nevertheless, 
only a small number of women used that opportunity.26 Later, 
in 2005, women were also granted rights to be elected to Jeddah
24 For example, Saudi Arabia Justice Ministry advisor was quoted in Okaz: 
“Tliere is no reason to stop them from participating in the elections... Trends 
coming from the West which are beneficial and do not contradict our laws and 
religion should not be banned”; www.aljazeera.com, December 4, 2004. The 
decision not to allow women to vote was announced by the Interior Minister 
Prince Nayef on October 11, 2004.
25 “Women shut up o f upcoming Saudi vote”, The Associated Press, October 
12, 2004. I he reasons cited by the government were: lack o f women to run 
women’s only registration centers and polling stations as well as the fact that 
only a fraction o f Saudi women have the photo identity cards needed to vote. 
Moreover, a Saudi law prohibits men and women to work together — a major 
problems if a women became a council member.
26 Apparently only 46 women out o f 2,750 women members in the Riyadh 
Chamber o f Commerce and Industry participated in the elections; Arab News, 
December 1, 2004.
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Chamber of Commerce and Industry and in effect two women 
became members o f its board.
Establishing the municipality councils through elections is an 
innovation for this deeply conservative country used to tribal and 
extended family system of politics. It can be expected that, once 
the election is seen to work, the next ones will be for the whole 
municipal councils, then for regional councils, and eventually for the 
Consultative Council. Prince Sultan bin Abdel Aziz, the minister of 
defence and a key figure in the ruling family told the Consultative 
Council, that the country leadership agrees with demands that this 
body should be developed and given further powers, to “monitor” 
and “supervise” the government in particular.27 Following this 
reasoning, the royal decree of November 29, 2003, enhanced the 
Consultative Council rights to act as a partly legislative as opposed 
to purely advisory body. In particular, individual members were 
granted authority to propose new legislation and to have more 
power in disputes with the cabinet. At the same time, it was decided 
to begin, for the first time, televised coverage of the weekly sessions 
of the Consultative Council. That became an important decision, 
as Saudis have a traditional aversion to public debate, preferring to 
settle matters behind closed doors instead. The Shura members and 
Saudi intellectual elite welcomed these steps, although, especially 
following the Kuwaiti parliamentarian model, they clearly want 
further enhancement o f the Council’s role, in particular to 
make it the elective assembly, with power to pass the budget, to 
give or withdraw confidence from ministers and to separate the 
office o f prime minister from that o f the King.28 In response to 
such proposals, the Council was further reformed in the spring of 
2005; members were allowed to have access to state revenue data, 
discuss the state budget and question ministers. Prince Sultan,
27 Reuters, March 22, 2004.
28 As reported in “Can Saudi Arabia reform itself?”, p. 21.
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however, dismissed calls for an elected Council, saying that voters 
may choose illiterate and unqualified candidates to it and that 
the move would not serve national interests. “In some countries 
there are political parties and elections but the result is nothing, 
because o f their quarrels and conflicts between them”.29 Instead, on 
January 26, 2005, Prince Sultan announced that the Shura Council 
would be further expanded and that in the next term all tribes, 
cities and villages will be represented in it. As mentioned already, 
in April 2005, the Council was expended to 150 members. In May, 
210 members o f local consultative councils in the Kingdoms 13 
administrative regions were appointed by the authorities.
Allowing municipal elections to take place seems to be a tacit 
recognition by the ruling family that some reforms are needed, 
including greater transparency and accountability of decision 
making. Nevertheless, the rise of internal security challenges -  the 
extremist Islamist violence -  makes it difficult for the government 
to advance further the reform agenda. The leading members of the 
Saudi ruling family are not in agreement over the causes o f existing 
tensions in the country and possible actions to be taken to confront 
them. In particular, many of them are afraid that political openings 
can be perceived in some quarters as a victory for “liberal” forces, 
a fact that may reinvigorate Islamist attacks. For that reason, the 
Saudi government is anxious to depict the whole process leading to 
municipal elections as being wholly compatible with Islam. This is 
an important matter as many Islamists consider the elections un- 
Islamic. In particular, Osama bin Laden in the message released 
on December 16, 2004 criticized the elections, noting “it is haram 
(forbidden) to participate in legislative bodies ... because Allah is 
the only lawgiver.”30
29 Reuters, January 26, 2004.
30 Simon Henderson, “Saudi Municipal Elections: Royal Caution and Citizen 
Apathy”, Policy Watch # 937, January 3, 2005.
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Nevertheless, in an interesting development, the first round of 
elections, which took place in the Riyadh region on February 10, 
2005, was won by Islamists, who took all o f the seven available seats. 
Only around 140,000 men had registered to vote out of 400,000 
eligible voters in the area; 65 per cent of them eventually went to 
the pools in the capital, while in other districts the turnout often 
exceeded even 80 per cent. Six hundred and forty-six candidates 
were on the list. Immediately after the results were announced, 
many loosing candidates accused the winning seven of illegal 
formation of an Islamist alliance, using the backing of Saudi 
religious establishment to get votes, and breaking election laws 
for campaigning on the election day. The winners denied all the 
allegations. Interestingly enough, the winners used neither ads in 
the Saudi dailies, nor posters, nor did they set up “discussion tents” 
where they could meet potential voters, as all loosing candidates did. 
Instead, they skilfully used Internet and mobile phones (short text 
messages), the tactic often used by Islamist groupings in the region.
The situation was repeated during the final round of voting 
on April 21: there was not much interest in elections and Islamist 
candidates got most of the votes. In the Kingdom’s commercial 
capital of Jeddah, only 55,000 men, or 22 percent o f the city’s 
eligible voters, registered. Similar low turnout was observed in 
Mecca and Medina. In Jeddah, the most liberal Saudi city, the 
seven winning candidates all were those whose names had appeared 
on what was dubbed the “golden list” — the picks o f prominent 
conservative religious scholars from among 530 candidates. Five of 
the six winners in Buraydah, capital of ultraconservative Qaseem 
province, similarly had been given a clerical support. Islamists won 
all the seats in the holy cities o f Mecca and Medina as well.
Only in the voting which took place on March 3 in eastern 
regions, in some Shiite-majority areas, several non-Islamist were 
elected and the turnout was significant. For example, Shiites swept
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the board in the town of Qatif and won five out of six seats in 
Al Hasa. But in the urban centres of Dammam, Dhahran and 
Al Khobar where a significant Shiite minority also lives, they 
were Sunni candidates, which won with apparent backing from 
fundamentalist clerics.
The low turnout was due to several factors, including restrictions 
on campaigning, an inexperienced and poorly informed electorate, 
and the low stakes: voters were choosing only half the seats on city 
councils, bodies with limited responsibilities. The strong showing of 
the Islamist candidates was credited to the fact that as non-government 
political activity is forbidden in the Kingdom, religious gatherings are 
the only ones allowed and clerics can speak there publicly. Nevertheless, 
most of the elected Islamists represent the moderate religious stand 
and many of them are graduates from Western universities.
Thus, the elections “should not be viewed as just an experiment 
in democracy, but also as a window into the possible ramifications 
that come with democracy in the kingdom. If the truth be told, the 
group that wanted victory the most — the Islamists — won.”31
Ihe Saudi rulers, or at least some members of the royal 
family seems to be ready to allow further broadening of political 
participation, probably realizing the necessity to do so due to wide 
criticism of the existing system by Saudi citizens and pressure from 
the West. In June 2005, the Crown Prince Abdullah, now the 
country’s King, apparently promised Secretary of State Condoleezza 
Rice to introduce reforms that could give the Kingdom an elected 
government within 10 to 15 years.32 Also Prince Talal bin Abdel- 
Aziz, brother of King Abdullah, and one of the closest people to 
him, has called to adopt a constitutional kingdom system similar to
31 Mohammed Alkhereiji, “Riyadh’s polls, a window into Saudi social 
dynamics” , Daily Star, February 19, 2005.
32 Nicholas Kralev, “Abdullah sees elected leaders within 15 years” , The 
Washington Times, August 19, 2005.
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those o f Jordan, Bahrain, and Kuwait, and, in particular, give the 
Shura Council privileges to question and supervise the executive 
power and issuing electoral laws.33 Apparently, King Abdullah 
considers nominating Prince Talal to the position of second deputy 
prime minister, i.e. the third in line to the throne. Prince Talal 
insists, however, to get this post only through ballots.,
At the same time, there are forces in Saudi Arabia’s ruling elites 
which strongly oppose liberalization of the regime. For example, 
Prince Nayef, the interior minister, ordered in March 2004 the 
arrests, trial and imprisonment of 13 reformers, which a year earlier 
were warmly welcomed by Prince Abdullah after submitting to him 
a reform petition.34 Ten of them later submitted to his demand 
to stop asking for reforms and were released; the remaining three, 
which refused to do so, were sentenced to several years of prison. 
Only when Abdullah became a King, they were pardoned.
Kuwait
The Kuwait’s emirate is ruled since the 18th century by the A1 Sabah 
family. After obtaining independence in 1961, the constitution 
formally gave the Emir broad executive powers. In particular, it is 
he who appoints the prime minister and the cabinet. At the same 
time, the constitution established a partially elected parliament with 
some legislative powers; for several decades it had been the only 
national assembly of that kind in the G CC states.35 The parliament
33 “Constitutional reform in Saudi Arabia” , A l Quds A l Arabi, August 29, 
2005.
34 Mai Yamani, “ How to make violence inevitable in Saudi Arabia”, Daily 
Star, June 2, 2005.
35 Jill Crystal and Abdallah al-Shayeji, ‘The pro-democratic agenda in Kuwait: 
Structures and context’, in: Rex Brynen, Bahgat Korany, Paul Noble, Political 
Liberalization and Democratisation in the Arab World (Lynnie Rennier Publishers, 
Boulder and London, 1995), vol. 1, pp. 101-125.
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has never been a rubber-stamp and always discussed openly the 
vital Kuwaiti issues. Its criticism of the government, or from the 
other perspective, its activities perceived as threatening the political 
stability of the country, caused the Emir to dissolve it in 1976 (until 
the reestablishment in 1981) and again in 1986. When Saddam 
Hussein attacked Kuwait, the parliament was still disbanded. After 
the liberation of Kuwait from the Iraqi forces, the Emir, Sheikh 
Jabir al Ahmad al-Sabah was not eager to keep his earlier promises 
of prompt restoration of the assembly Only after the mobilization 
of all Kuwaiti political factions, culminating in the presentation 
of a petition in the spring of 1991, did the emir agree to hold 
parliamentary elections in October 1992.
After years of limited political activity, the election campaign 
was very lively.36 Despite the non-existence of formal political 
parties, individual candidates in their diwaniyyas as well as various 
voluntary and professional associations were effective in articulating 
critical views, helping to increase political awareness and activities 
o f different groups of society. In effect, the election brought to the 
parliament a majority of opposition and independent deputies.
Right after the election the opposition called for the separation 
of the previously combined offices o f prime minister and crown 
prince, as traditionally in Kuwait, the crown prince (as well as the 
whole al-Sabah family) was not subject to any criticism or control. 
Only when in a conciliatory move, the Emir appointed several 
members o f parliament (who retained some credibility due to the 
fact that they had been popularly elected) as ministers for the first 
time, the opposition eventually gave up and accepted the status 
quo. Nevertheless, parliamentary committees initiated a series of 
investigations including inquires into the events leading to the
36 Shafeeq Ghabra, “Kuwait: Elections and issues o f democratisation in 
a Middle Eastern state”, International Journal of Islamic and Arabic Studies, No. 1 
(1993).
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Iraqi invasion, government responsibility for the Kuwaiti defeat, 
alleged corruption and mismanagement in the Kuwait Investment 
Office (which manages the country’s overseas capital), and the cost- 
effectiveness of arms-deals with Western powers. These were very 
sensitive issues whose investigation led to confrontation with top 
government officials, including members of the ruling family. This 
was the first time in the history of the G C C  countries that such 
people were publicly questioned, strongly criticized and forced to 
take responsibility for their actions. The whole term of parliament 
was alive with heated debates over the issue of power and wealth 
sharing, corruption and waste in defence expenditure, the way 
the privatisation was conducted, and other important issues. The 
parliament also decided to broaden the base o f its electorate, 
extending the right to vote to the large number of sons of naturalized 
Kuwaiti citizens (naturalized men are eligible to vote only if they 
have held Kuwaiti citizenship for at least 20 years).
After tough experiences with dealings with the opposition, the 
government made serious efforts to influence the results o f next 
elections, and the parliament chosen in October 1996 was not as 
confrontational as the previous one had been. Nevertheless, tensions 
between Islamist groups in the assembly and the government 
did not subside. In effect, in 1998, the parliament blocked the 
government deal with the US to buy the so-called Paladin artillery 
due to irregularities in the procurement process. Then, in 1999, the 
Islamists attempted to bring down Sheikh Saud Nasser al Sabah, the 
Minister of Information. His ministry had permitted books critical 
of Islamic orthodoxy to be displayed at the international book fair 
in Kuwait. The minister had to resign. The government perceived 
the action of the opposition as a breach of the unwritten agreement 
that Islamists would never attack members of the ruling family. 
The Crown Prince and Prime Minister, Sheikh Saad al Abdallah 
al-Sabah warned that criticizing the ruling family jeopardizes the
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security o f the country, and that this security would be always put 
“over and above democracy”.37 The Islamists, however, continued 
to criticize the government. In turn, they attacked the Minister 
of Religious Affairs for publishing a version of the Koran with 
typographical errors. Tensions increased. When the whole cabinet 
threatened to resign, the Emir dissolved the parliament and called 
for new elections.
Tire election campaign was again characterized by intense activity 
on the part o f various political groupings, which in meantime 
had grown in popularity.38 During traditional political meetings 
in diwaniyyas, candidates openly charged the government with 
conspiracy, interference in the elections, incompetence, corruption, 
etc. Women’s political rights became a central issue in the campaign 
as the Emir, in a surprising move, announced his intention to 
award women the right to participate in future elections. Islamist 
groups opposed the decision and the Emir’s decree was eventually 
defeated in the all-male parliament. Another highly debated issue 
was the suspended right to hold tribal primaries, whose results had 
significantly affected previous general elections.
Altogether, 288 candidates competed for the 50 parliamentary 
seats during the elections o f July 3,1999. Nevertheless, only 113,000 
men out o f the total Kuwaiti population of 793,000 cast their 
ballots, showing a relative lack of interest in political proceedings. 
Six groupings played a crucial role in the election campaign and 
won seats in the parliament: the Islamic Constitutional Movement 
(closely connected to the Muslim Brotherhood), the Kuwaiti 
Democratic Forum (the alliance of liberals, Arab nationalists, 
leftists, and independents), the Islamic Popular Bloc (an orthodox 
Salafi group demanding strict implementation of the Islamic
37 Youssef Alaonueh, “ Islamists Movements” , Arabies Trends, June 1998, 
pp. 15-16.
38 Alnajjar: “The Challenges Facing Kuwaiti Democracy” .
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law), the Salafi Movement (a splinter of the Popular Bloc), the 
National Islamic Alliance (a Shiite Islamist group) and the National 
Democratic Bloc (a liberal group connected with the academic 
and business communities). In the elections the Islamists won 18 
seats altogether: six went to Shiite candidates and remaining 12 
to Sunnis. The main losers were the pro-government candidates, 
with 11 major incumbents losing what earlier had been considered 
secure seats.
The winning Islamists, in a short period of time, undertook 
a number of actions in the new parliament. In effect, an entirely 
new Sharia-inspired version of the penal code was adopted together 
with a ban on festivals and concerts “that are against tradition and 
morality” . Later the Islamists also managed to force the government 
to re-introduce gender segregation at Kuwait University. In general, 
Islamists have wanted to widen the role of the Islamic law. They 
would like to amend the constitution, changing the clause that Sharia 
is “a main source of legislation” for “the source of the legislation”. 
They also requested the right that no law may be promulgated by 
the Emir unless it has been passed by the National Assembly first.39 
Finally, they would like to get Kuwait’s political parties licensed 
and formally written into the country’s legal system. These motions 
were re-introduced in the following years, but not approved yet.
In 2002 a new crisis between parliament and the government 
occurred when the Finance Minister, Youssef al-Ibrahim was 
accused of abuse of power and misappropriation of public funds. 
In particular, Islamist and independent deputies wanted him to 
acknowledge officially that senior ruling family members authorized 
the expenditure o f billions o f dollars without the supervision of 
the Audit Bureau, the legislature watchdog for monitoring state 
finances. The interpellation proceeded to a vote o f confidence. But
39 Wendy Kristianasen, ‘“ We don’t want to box Islam in’. Kuwait’s Islamists, 
officially unofficial” , Le Monde diplomatique, June 2002.
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when Sheikh Sabah, the Acting Prime Minister, threatened that 
the whole cabinet would resign if the minister lost the vote, the 
majority of deputies decided not to support the no-confidence 
motion. Another crisis was avoided.
The following parliamentary elections were held on July 5, 2003. 
They were affected by the political situations in the region.40 The 
removal o f Sad dam Hussein influenced the campaign, as government 
could not use the Iraqi threat any more to secure support for its 
own candidates. In times o f change in the Gulf, liberals pushing for 
modernization of the country expected to obtain more seats in the 
assembly. On the other hand, Shiites also hoped to do better thanks 
to internal mobilization of the group, caused by developments in 
Iraq, where the Shiite majority began gaining power after years of 
discrimination. Tensions between the US and Iran, in the period 
when Kuwait was improving its relations with the Islamic Republic, 
were also expected to influence the election results. The issue of 
extending vote to women became again important in the campaign, 
especially among liberals. Some women voted in a mock election 
as a demonstration of their desire to obtain more political rights in 
the country.4'
The election expectations proved wrong. First of all, liberals 
suffered a stunning setback. “Shock and horror. Parliament topples 
liberals” was the headline in the daily AlAnbaa. Both members of 
the Democratic Platform present in the previous assembly, including 
prominent opposition leader, Abdallah al-Nibari, lost their seats.
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AL-Hayat, June 30, 2003.
41 Some Kuwaiti women have fora long time been involved in political activity. 
For example, Rasha Al Sabah, a cousin o f the emir, has held her own diwanyyas for 
years. Several have been active in business and in professional associations. One 
Kuwaiti ambassador is a woman, there are also a few women undersecretaries in 
the government. In the 1990s, the Kuwaiti University had a woman president.
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Independent liberals went down from six seats to four. In turn, the 
Islamist traditionalists, both Sunni and Shiite, became the election 
winners, taking 21 of the 50 seats. At the same time, the members 
of parliament affiliated with existing political groupings went down 
from 32 to 25, probably due to government’s efforts to weaken all 
the unofficial political parties. The so-called “service” candidates, 
who emphasized their constituent services rather than political 
or ideological platforms, did also well in a number of districts. 
Interestingly, two of three Islamist political groupings also lost 
seats. The Islamic Constitutional Movement (in the past connected 
with Muslim Brotherhood) went from five to two seats, while the 
National Islamic Alliance (Shiite) went from three seats to one. In 
turn, the salafi groupings gained seats, with the Salafi Movement 
rising from a single seat to three. Independent Sunni Islamists went 
up from five seats during the previous term to six and independent 
Shiite Islamists -  from two to three. In general, the Assembly 
became rather equally divided between pro-government lawmakers 
and Islamist-dominated opposition, with a very small presence of 
liberals. The defeat of liberals was probably much influenced by the 
American politics in the Middle East. President Bush’s initiative to 
bring democracy to the region while occupying Iraq “sends many 
native liberals and democrats under their beds”, worrying of being 
labelled as American puppets.42
Elections were not completely clean: there were accusations of 
increased vote buying, switching districts and registering in different 
areas.
Right after the elections, Kuwait’s Emir, Sheikh Jaber, appointed 
Sheikh Sabah al-Ahmad al Sabah to the post o f prime minister.
42 Rami G. Khuri, “Kuwait’s election and the freezing o f Arab politics” , Daily 
Star, July 10, 2003.
43 Saad Al Ajmi, “Gerrymandering and reform in Kuwait” , G ulf News, June 
25, 2004.
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For the first time in the history of Kuwait, the post o f the prime 
minister was separated from the post of Crown Prince, officially as 
a response to the public demand, in reality maybe only due to the 
poor health of the Crown Prince. The decision had a significant 
meaning as in this way the prime minister can now be placed before 
legal inquires in the parliament, which had been impossible in the 
past as the Kuwaiti constitution grants full immunity to the ruler 
and the Crown Prince.
The first major clash between the new parliament and the 
government occurred in March 2004. Many deputies tried to force 
the resignation of the Minister of Finance, Mahmoud Al Nouri 
over allegations o f mismanagement and squandering public money. 
Eventually, the minister won the non-confidence vote; nevertheless 
the opposition accused the government of applying pressure on 
numerous deputies to achieve that goal.
In May 2004, the government introduced a bill allowing 
women to vote and to stand for election. The parliament, however, 
remained divided on the issue of women’s suffrage and did not take 
action on the bill at the time. In a survey conducted by the Islamic 
Constitutional Movement, the Kuwaiti chapter of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, showed that 80 per cent of those polled believed 
that women should only be allowed to vote, but not to become 
candidates; apparently only five per cent supported the notion that 
women must participate fully.'*4
At the same time, the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, responding 
to pressure from Islamist parliamentarians, announced a fatwa 
“forbidding women singing to men, reveal part of their body 
and using vulgar words and dancing”.45 To attend or watch such 
concerts and provide any assistance or investment in them was 
also forbidden. Several Islamist deputies have also been trying to
44 “Majority favours only right to vote”, G ulf News, November 10, 2004.
45 BBC News, May 24, 2004.
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ban musical education from schools as anti-Islamic activity. In 
December, Islamist deputies accused the Information Minister, 
Mohammed Abu Al Hasan over allowing “immoral” Western-style 
concerts in the country, seen by them as violating Sharia law. To 
avoid questioning in the parliament over the issue the Minister 
resigned. The situation created additional tensions, as Mohammed 
Abu Al Hasan was the only Shiite member of the cabinet and was 
“grilled” by the Sunni lawmakers. Many Shiites, who constitute 
about 30 per cent of the Kuwaiti population, perceived this move 
as discriminatory.
Tensions between the government and the opposition occurred 
also in mid-2004, when voting on a long debated bills on reducing 
the number of electoral districts from the current 25 to 10 in 
order to make them more broadly representative (and less based 
on sectarian or tribal factors) and to discourage vote buying and 
changing residency, allowing servicemen to vote and lowering 
the voting age from 21 to 18 were postponed.46 Liberal deputies 
then accused the government and many of their colleagues in the 
assembly of trying to maintain the undemocratic status quo.47
These reforms have been connected to the issue of women’s 
suffrage. The government anticipates that on the whole, women 
constitute a moderate, pro-government force, which can mitigate 
the destabilizing effects that the above mentioned electoral laws 
would have on Kuwait’s complex political scene.48
46 There has been also a pending motion calling to raise the number o f deputies 
from the current 50 to 60, to reflect the population growth and to allow the 
cabinet to expand from its current 15 to 20 members as according to Kuwaiti law, 
the number of cabinet ministers, who are ex officio members o f the parliament 
cannot exceed one-third o f the parliament; now many o f them have multiple 
portfolios, which hampers effective governance. The last call requires however, to 
amend the constitution, much more difficult proposal to conduct.
47 Al Ajmi: “Gerrymandering” .
48 Haya Abdulrahman Al Mughni, “The politics o f women’s suffrage in
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On May 16,2005, somehow surprisingly, the Kuwaiti parliament 
accepted the long pending ruler’s initiative and voted to give women 
full political rights, giving women the right to vote and stand in 
parliamentary and local elections. The last-minute amendment 
was introduced to require women voters and candidates to abide 
by Islamic Law, as an attempt on the part of the ruling family to 
reassure Islamists, which in the past had opposed women suffrage, 
arguing that Islamic law prohibited them from taking positions 
of leadership. The bill was nevertheless passed with a comfortable 
majority o f 35 votes, with 23 against and one abstention.
Using the momentum, government begun to appoint women to 
the administrative posts.
On June 2, 2005 the long-delayed ninth municipal elections 
took place, originally scheduled for summer 2003. Around 50 
percent o f 130,000 thousands eligible male voters choose 10 
councillors responsible for planning and public services from among 
55 candidates. Tribal candidates won six of the 10 seats; two seats 
were claimed by Islamists while the rest were won by liberal-leaning 
businessmen. Few days later, the government named two women as 
members of the municipal council. They were among six appointed 
members o f the 16-member municipal body.
On June 12, 2005, Prime Minister Shaikh Sabah Al Ahmad Al 
Sabah appointed Maasouma Al Mubarak as the Minister of Planning 
and Minister of State for Administrative Development Affairs. 
This first woman minister in Kuwait is a liberal Shiite academic 
with a degree from the University of Denver and veteran women’s 
rights activist. Tribal and Islamist parliamentarians protested 
the government’s decision, calling it unconstitutional. But the 
appointment o f Mubarak, served the Kuwaiti government well: it
Kuwait”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July 19, 2004; Mary Ann 
Tetreault, “Women’s rights and the meaning o f citizenship in Kuwait”, Middle 
East Report Online, February 10, 2005.
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addressed aspirations of Kuwaiti women, and also satisfied Shiites, 
who criticized the lack of their representatives in the Cabinet.
Allowing women to vote will significantly change the Kuwaiti 
electoral system and parliamentary politics. First o f all, the number 
of eligible voters will increase from current 145,000 to over 300,000 
in the next parliamentary elections scheduled for 2007, i.e. more 
than a third of Kuwait’s native population (from about 15 percent 
now). Secondly, Kuwaiti women will become a majority in future 
elections.49 Many believe that this will reduce corruption and vote- 
buying in elections. Moreover, liberal members of parliament who 
supported giving women political rights may lose their seats to 
women eager to run for office. In turn, tribal and Islamist members 
who opposed political rights for women may gain more votes as 
women normally vote for conservatives because they focus more on 
family issues.50
At the beginning of 2005, a large confusion in the Kuwaiti 
political scene was caused by establishing the Hizb Al Ummah 
political party by the hard-line branch of the Sunni Islamist salafi 
movement. Neither constitutional provisions nor regulatory laws 
deal with the issue in a satisfactory manner, and so far the 
government always opposed the idea. Hizb Al Ummah sent letters 
to the Prime Minister, the speaker of Parliament and lawmakers 
urging them to amend Kuwaiti law to explicitly permit functioning 
of political parties, saying it intends to promote pluralism and the 
peaceful rotation of power. Members of the organizing committee 
of the party were interrogated and later put on trial with charges of 
plotting to overthrow the government. The move created a heated 
debate as, on one hand, all political groupings would have liked
,9 Ali Taqi, “Kuwaiti women voters have the upper hand”, G u lf News, May
22, 2005
50 Abdullah Alshayeji,“Womens suffrage means deep change in Kuwaiti 
politics”, Daily Star, July 27, 2005.
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to obtain a chance to transform themselves into formal political 
parties, institutions necessary in each mature democracy, but, on the 
other hand, liberals and moderate Shiites have been afraid that the 
move in that direction done by radicals Islamists can backfire and be 
dangerous for political stability of the country. Kuwaiti Parliament 
Speaker Jassem al-Khorafi called for legalizing political parties in 
the emirate as part o f democratic reforms: “Democracy in Kuwait 
cannot continue without political organization based on parties.”51 
Pressure to legalize political parties will likely increase in Kuwait in 
future with the large influx of women voters, possible lowering of 
voting age to 18 years and allowing military personnel to vote, what 
all can triple the electoral base. In such a situation political parties 
will be necessary to organize and channel increased participation.
Despite all these developments, the mood at the beginning 
of the 21st century in Kuwait, in contrast to its Bahraini and 
Qatari neighbours, is not very optimistic. Many Kuwaitis feel that 
their country is stagnating, that authorities and parliamentarians 
are caught up in endless squabbles over minor issues, instead of 
transforming the country, in the same way as many young, innovative 
rulers o f the neighbouring G C C  states already did.52 There are 
voices questioning any possibility o f further democratisation of 
the state. Ghanim Alnajjar believes, that “structural and political 
weaknesses in the Kuwaiti political system continue to hinder the 
spread of democracy, and may yet cause its failure, which might 
result in a major future political crisis” .53 According to many, the 
reasons for limited progress toward more participatory government 
is the ruling family’s tacit alliance with Islamic fundamentalists (for
51 “ Kuwaiti political parties must be legalized” , Agence France Presse, July 4, 
2005.
52 Neil MacFarquhar, “ Infirmity o f its senior sheiks ieaves Kuwait stagnating”, 
The New York Times, June 13, 2002.
53 Alnajjar: “The challenges facing Kuwaiti democracy”, p. 258.
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example, to please them the government in recent years established 
a committee on Islamization of the law, refused to register civil 
society institutions except Islamic charities and expanded religious 
instruction in school curricula).54 “We have lost the 12 years since 
the liberation because of the resistance of the political Islamic 
movement” said Saud Nasir Sabah, oil minister and former 
ambassador to the United States.55 In general, many believe that 
Kuwaiti democracy is in trouble. “There is not a democratic system 
in Kuwait, there is not democracy here”, said Mohammed Qadiri, 
a former diplomat, who quit the foreign service over the dissolution 
of parliament in 1986.56 Similarly, Nasr Yousef al-Abdali, one of the 
leaders of the newly launched Justice and Development Movement, 
noted that “Democracy in Kuwait is a lie. The whole process has 
been hijacked by the fight between the Islamists and liberals who 
are not really looking to the future o f the country.”57
The situation in Kuwait has been, o f course, a complex one. 
By many measures Kuwait has had a more developed civil society 
than found elsewhere among the G CC states. It has critical press 
enjoying relative freedom, a tradition of public debate in the 
diwaniyyas, established political groupings and active parliament, 
which exercises significant influence and control over governance 
by the ruling family. On the other hand — a fact emphasized every 
year by the US State Department report on human rights — there 
is a restricted freedom of assembly, as well as discrimination of 
women, Shiites and foreign residents, censorship of “morally 
offensive” materials, and lack of the independence of the judiciary,
M Glaser: “ Democracy in Kuwait is promise unfulfilled” . Since the late 1970s, 
the Kuwaiti ruling family have courted the Islamists, perceiving them as safer for 
the regime than the secular Arab nationalist or other liberals.
”  Ibid.
56 Ibid.
57 G ulf News, December 19, 2004.
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to mention a few problems only. Altogether, so far, the country 
remains a tightly controlled hereditary emirate, where the al Sabah 
family still wield undeniable power.
Bahrain
Bahrain has been a state vulnerable to political conflicts. First of all, 
the country is relatively poor when compared to its oil-rich neighbors; 
therefore rulers cannot offer their subjects as much as in the neighboring 
countries and the unemployment in the country has often been high. 
Secondly, it is ruled by a Sunni minority, and the Shiite majority in the 
island have often considered themselves discriminated against. The al- 
Khalifa family ruling the country had a monopoly on power until the 
adoption of the constitution in 1973, which provided for a partially 
elected National Assembly. The Assembly was short lived though. In 
1975 the emir called its activities “obstructionist” and dissolved it. 
With the Iranian revolution of 1979 and the accompanying spread 
of its Islamic ideas, resentment among Bahrain’s Shiite population 
against the regime intensified. Since then the Shiites clashed with 
the government numerous times. In particular, they demanded the 
restoration of the National Assembly through direct and free elections 
as mandated by the constitution, hoping that in such a way they may 
have more to say in the country’s affairs.
Tensions grew also after the Second Gulf War. In July 1992 over 
200 Bahrainis, both Sunnis and Shiites, signed and submitted to 
the Emir a petition demanding liberalization of the regime. Rather 
than complying with their demands, Emir Sheikh Isa bin Sulman 
al-Khalifa established the appointed Consultative Council. Like 
its Saudi or UAE counterparts, the Bahraini Council could only 
review legislation sent to it by the government. Nevertheless, in an 
attempt to improve relations with the opposition, 30 members of 
the Council were divided between Sunnis and Shiites, and a Shiite,
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former minister of transportation Ibrahim Hamidan, became its 
President. Despite that, protests continued. When the Committee 
of the Popular Petition, created in 1994, sent another petition to 
the Emir calling for greater popular participation in government, 
the leaders of the Committee were arrested, leading to a two-year 
long wave of demonstrations and riots.
The situation began to change only in 1998 when, after the 
death of Sheikh Isa, his son, Sheikh Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa, 
decided to liberalize the system. In the beginning of the year 2000, 
he appointed new members to the Consultative Council, including 
non-Muslims for the first time: a Jewish, a Christian and an 
Indian Bahraini, as well as four women. Then, the Emir abolished 
the emergency laws that were in the force in the country for 25 
years and pardoned more than 900 prisoners and exiles; in effect 
many prominent figures of the former opposition, mostly Shiites, 
returned to the country. At the same time Sheikh Hamad promised 
to grant nationality to several thousand of bidoon, mostly Shiite 
stateless inhabitants, which became another source of tension. The 
Emir decided also to compensate government employees, mostly 
Shiites, for salaries lost while they were detained without a trial 
in connection with the political unrest of the 1990s. As all these 
measures were welcomed by the Shiite majority, the Emir became 
ready to reform his country significantly.
In December 2000, the special committee operating under 
Emir’s instructions proposed far-reaching changes to the political 
system of Bahrain. “The National Action Charter” proposed by 
the Committee, stated that “there is agreement on the need to 
modernize the constitution of the country to benefit from the 
democracy experiences o f other peoples in expanding the circle o f 
popular participation in the tasks of ruling and administration”.58 
The Charter, a constitutional declaration, made Bahrain a con-
58 Quoted after Khalaf, “Bahrain: democratisation by decree” p. 4.
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stirutional monarchy; Sheikh Hamad -  the King, and the al- 
Khalifa family hereditary rulers of the island. A parliament was to 
be established with two chambers with equal legislative powers: 
Council of Deputies consisting of 40 members elected by popular 
vote, and a consultative council, the Shura Council, also composed 
of 40 people but appointed by the King. The executive power, the 
legislature, and the judiciary were to be separated. All citizens were 
made equal in the eyes o f law regardless of their religion, sect or 
social class. Constitutional Court and Audit Bureau were to be 
established and enjoy full independence.
The changes proposed in the National Action Charter were 
submitted to a referendum and on February 14,2001 overwhelmingly 
approved by the Bahrainis (98.4 per cent), including the Shiite 
opposition.
On the first anniversary of the referendum, on February 14, 
2002, Sheikh Hamad issued royal decrees reinstating the suspended 
1973 constitution and amending it to implement the above- 
mentioned changes, which practically meant the promulgation of 
the new constitution.
The opposition was not happy with this development. It 
complained about the way the reforms were introduced; the 
King unilaterally made constitutional changes, contrary to the 
unambiguous provisions of the 1973 constitution itself, and in 
the absence of an elected legislature. The opposition would have 
preferred the restoration of the old constitution without changes and 
reinstatement of the elected parliament. It objected to the situation 
when most powers remained in the rulers hands, including full 
control o f the government, the right to dismiss the prime minister, 
and to dissolve parliament for any “sufficient reasons”, as well as in 
case o f “emergencies” .59 Moreover, the opposition criticized the fact,
59 Hamza S. Olyan, “Royal Bahrain’s journey to democracy”, Daily Star, 
February 24, 2002.
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that the appointed chamber would have a direct legislative role equal 
to that of the elected chamber and even taking certain precedence 
over the elected one, as its chairman was to be the speaker of the whole 
new bi-cameral National Assembly (the government argues that the 
appointed Shura Council is needed to guarantee that experienced 
and highly educated public figures would be able to take part in the 
process of policy making). In general, the kings unilateral decree 
revived deep-seated distrust among the politically active citizenry of 
the state’s intentions and suggested that in spite of assurances, power 
and resources would remain firmly in Al-Khalifa’s hands.60
Despite the shortcomings of the introduced reforms, in the 
new situation in the country numerous political groups -  the so- 
called “societies” — ranging from Islamic fundamentalist to liberals 
and Marxists, came into being. The Bahraini law does not allow 
establishing a political party in the country, but these societies quickly 
begun to play the role of full-fledged parties. The government tolerates 
the existence of the opposition holding open forums and issuing 
weekly magazines. Moreover, non-governmental organizations of 
all types: cultural, religious, and civic as well as trade unions have 
mushroomed.61
After amending the constitution, the King called for the first 
elections: at the municipal level. Women as well as foreigners who 
owned property and were legal residents on the island were allowed 
to participate. Political groupings actively engaged themselves in the 
election process. The authorities were criticized for redrawing the 
map of electoral constituencies to moderate, if not totally eliminate, 
the effects of the Shiite majority in most regions o f Bahrain. 
Shiites voiced their grievances that “the government is playing the
60 „Bahrain’s Sectarian Challenge”, Middle East Report no. 40, May 6, 2005; 
www.merip.org
61 Interview with the Minster o f Labour and Social Affairs, G ulf News, June 
29, 2003.
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sectarian card and trying to derail the democratic process through 
gerrymandering”.62 To calm down the existing tensions, King 
Hamad decided that all members of the Bahraini Defense Force, 
the National Guard, the police and security services would not be 
eligible to vote. Therefore, a solid bloc of approximately 15,000 
Sunni voters was removed from the scene, giving more chances 
to Shiite candidates. The King, addressing the public before the 
Election Day, called on his subjects “to exercise their constitutional 
right in complete freedom and responsibility To exercise this right is 
a duty because without it democracy will not be able to survive.”63
The elections took place on May 9 and 16, 2002, in two 
rounds o f voting. Over 300 candidates, including 31 women, were 
registered for five 10-seat councils. Voters’ turnover was substantial: 
40—80 per cent, depending on the district. Religiously affiliated 
candidates became the major winners, obtaining 38 out of 50 seats 
(remaining candidates were considered independent runners). The 
Shiite Islamic National Wafaq Society, generally in opposition to the 
King, succeeded in placing most o f its candidates in the councils. 
The failure of liberal and leftist candidates to win a single seat meant 
that they were unable to present themselves to the public as a viable 
alternative to candidates supported by the clerical establishment. 
The poor turnout o f women was not really surprising in the 
traditional, male-dominated society, especially as in most cases they 
ran against male candidates from the same political organizations. 
Nevertheless, after the elections, all o f women candidates urged the 
King to order an investigation into the “transgressions” witnessed 
during the elections and to take the necessary steps against those 
behind them/’4 They complained that some male candidates 
used mosques and religious community centres to launch attacks
62 Abdulhadi Khalaf in Daily Star, May 20, 2002.
63 Daily Star, May 8, 2002.
64 G ulf News, May 20, 2002.
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on female candidates. The leading leftist group, the National^ 
Democratic Action Society also criticized undemocratic practices 
exercised by many candidates on the polling day, including illegal 
campaigning and vote buying.
The municipal elections were not that important in themselves, 
as the municipal councils are responsible only for public works and 
roads, but everybody perceived them as the “dress rehearsal” for the 
forthcoming crucial polls to elect members to the new parliament.
When the parliamentary elections were approaching, in 
August 2002, 78 Bahraini intellectuals presented the King with a 
petition, protesting against the ban on the participation of political 
associations in the elections campaign. Then, four major opposition 
groups (the Islamic National Wafaq, the National Democratic 
Action, the Islamic Action and the Democratic Nationalist 
Tajammu) sent a letter to the King demanding again the restoration 
of the un-changed 1973 constitution. In response to these protests, 
the King allowed political associations to participate in the election 
campaign. Nevertheless, as other demands were not met, major 
opposition groups decided to boycott the elections.
In such circumstances, only 190 candidates registered, much 
fewer than for the far less important municipal elections. Eight 
women decided to run in the elections, receiving highly publicized 
support from the Kings wife.
The first round of parliamentary elections took place on October 
24. Despite calls from the opposition to boycott the elections, 53.2 
per cent voters went to the polls, well above most expectations. 
Nineteen candidates who obtained more than 50 per cent o f the 
vote were elected to the 40-seat Parliament in the first round, 
including three who ran unopposed. The remaining 21 seats were 
decided in the run-off elections on October 31.
Elections went smoothly. The Bahraini Human Rights Society 
was allowed to monitor the polls. Nevertheless, opposition groups
- 8 7 -
said that the government used authoritarian tactics to thwart the 
boycott. Moreover, voters had their passports stamped, leading to 
fears among citizens that they might suffer consequences if they did 
not have the stamp.
Sunni Islamists became the winners o f the election, obtaining, 
together with their sympathizers, a majority in the lower house. 
Two Shiite Islamists were elected as well, despite the fact that their 
numerous co-religionists stayed home obeying the boycott call 
from their party leaders. Both woman candidates who made it 
to the second round run-off were defeated. Therefore, to balance 
the composition of the state bodies and to lower future potential 
problems in the legislature, the King himself appointed a large 
number of pro-government “secularists” , “liberals” and women 
to the upper house. In particular, he nominated several defence 
officials and public servants, whose number included six women 
and a Jewish trader.
Political life in the country intensified further after the 
parliamentary elections.
The Council o f Deputies demanded more legislative and 
monitoring powers for itself.65 Several members of the Council 
submitted a proposal to legalize political parties. The deputies 
formed a commission to investigate the collapse of two government- 
managed pension funds. The Commission, despite government 
objections, submitted in January 2004 a report providing infor­
mation of extensive mismanagement and corruption by the funds’ 
senior staff. In result, the deputies questioned the Minister of 
Finance, the Minister of Labor, and Minister of State on the matter. 
It was a significant move as it established a parliamentary tradition.66 
The government, however, managed to gain the upper hand in the
House seeks more powers” , G ulf News, January 22, 2003. 
i Khalaf, “Bahrain’s parliament: The Quest for a Role”, Carnegie
International Peace, May 16, 2004.
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proceedings which could lead to no-confidence vote using legal 
technicalities and ministers remained in their posts intact.
In turn, the nominated Shura Council, trying also to stress 
its role in the country’s political system, urged the media to 
play a greater role in the democratisation process, and asked the 
government to draw up a comprehensive national strategic plan of 
social and economic developments for the next 20 years, to establish 
the Financial Monitoring Bureau to help combat corruption, and 
the Administrative Monitoring Bureau to verify the soundness 
and legality o f administrative systems and their compatibility with 
international quality standards in this regard.67
In another important development, six of Bahrain’s major political 
groups, religious and secular, signed in March 2003 a “charter of 
unity”, aimed at coordinating their opposition to the kingdom’s 
amended constitution, which they claimed had eliminated the 
principle of separation of power. There were three Islamists groups: 
The Islamic National Wefaq Society, the Islamic Arab Wasat Society, 
and the Islamic Action Society as well as three secular groups with 
left-wing inclinations: the National Democratic Action Society, the 
Progressive Democratic Minbar Society, and the Nationalist Block. 
All these groups boycotted the parliamentary elections as they 
insisted that the elected council should have exclusive legislative 
powers. In April, they started a campaign of collecting signatures on 
a petition to the King to change the constitution. In their opinion, 
the government controls the parliament, and the elected house is 
unable to respond to the public needs.68 The Bahraini royal court 
warned organizers that what they were doing was illegal, and that 
only the National Assembly and the King himself had the right 
to propose or endorse constitutional changes. Eventually, several
67 “Bahrain Shura Council urges press to play greater role” , Kbaleej Times, 
January 31, 2003.
68 “Bahrain warns opposition groups”, Gulf News, April 28, 2004.
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activists collecting signatures were arrested. In February 2004, 
four of these societies (the Wefaq, the Islamic Action, the National 
Democratic Action and the Nationalist Bloc) organized a controversial 
“Constitution Conference” to discuss the issue of establishing a 
genuine constitutional monarchy in Bali rain and restricting the 
powers o f the Shura Council to solely consultative. Later in the year, 
the government began talks with these societies aimed at ending the 
stalemate over the constitutional issue and convince them to take 
part in the next parliamentary elections. The talks were, however, 
suspended by the government. In response, these groups decided 
to resort to “pressure tactics” to achieve their demands. In February 
2005, they sent to the Kinga petition signed by approximately 75,000 
people calling again for restoration of the 1975 constitution/’9 They 
planned to organize peaceful rallies and sending delegations to other 
countries, especially in the West, to meet their legislatures and rights 
organization in order to explain the whole picture of the Bahraini 
situation. The government strongly criticizes these actions as meant 
to involve foreign actors into Bahrain’s domestic politics.
The fall of 2004 brought numerous tensions between different 
actors on the Bahraini political scene. The arrest of human rights 
activist Abdul Hadi al-Khawaja after his public criticism of the 
Prime Minister, the King’s uncle, and closure o f his Bahrain 
Centre for Human Rights brought opposition protests and street 
demonstrations. Then, a parliamentary committee has rejected a 
draft law proposed by the government to regulate street protests 
and public meetings, saying it was “unconstitutional” as it would 
severely restrict freedoms. On the other hand, a new draft press 
law, proposed by the Shura Council, was warmly greeted by the 
opposition as a progressive one, improving protection of journalists 
and granting them better access to information.
Mohammad Almezel, “Groups ‘will resort to pressure tactics to achieve 
their demands’”, G ulf News, February 19, 2005.
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A possible future source of tensions can be the growing power of 
religious fundamentalists, both Sunni and Shiite. Some Bahrainis 
worry that the radicals may eventually move to restrict personal 
freedoms and attempt to amend the constitution to make Sharia 
the sole source of the legislation. Religious fundamentalists already 
demand greater public observance of Islamic practices. The first 
indication of this was their proposal to ban alcohol sales to Muslims, 
closing down hotels catering for weekend tourists from the G CC 
states, restricting the mixing of sexes at Bahrain’s University and 
stop public concerts o f Westernized Arab singers.
To summarize, while many praise King Hamad’s actions as 
really introducing some democracy in the Kingdom, the opposition 
claims that they have just been a window-dressing, calculated to 
deflect domestic and international criticism.70 The Bahrain Human 
Rights Society acknowledged that Bahrain has taken “a giant step” 
in liberalizing its political system and extending personal freedoms 
but stressed that much more needs to be done: “Political rights 
have been restricted to candidacy and voting in the municipal 
and parliamentary elections when the issue is much broader.”71 In 
particular, the parliament is so weak that it was unable to pass even 
a single law in the first years of its existence. In even a more sober 
note, The Middle East Report no. 40 from May 2005, wrote that 
four years after Sheikh Hamad announced a sweeping reform plan, 
“Bahrain’s fragile liberal experiment is poised to stall, or, worse, 
unravel. The overlap of political and social conflict with sectarian 
tensions makes a combustible mix. If steps are not urgently taken 
to address the grievances of the large and marginalized Shiite 
community... Bahrain, which is often touted as a model o f Arab 
reform, could be in for dangerous times.” But one has to remember
70 Abdulhadi Khalaf, Daily Star, December 3, 2002.
71 “Bahrain needs to do more to provide equality”, G ulf News, February 21, 
2003.
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that Bahrain is one of the most difficult countries in the region to 
introduce democracy. If the ruling family allows a powerful Shiite- 
dominated parliament to emerge, it would put at risk its own 
position in the country.72
Qatar
Qatar, the smallest G C C  country, is ruled under the 1970 
constitution by male representatives of the Al-Thani family. The 
Emir holds absolute power, though he consults with leading 
Qataris on policy issues, and works to achieve consensus with the 
appointed 30-member Consultative Council (whose members have 
not changed since 1975).
In January 1992, 54 leading citizens presented the Qatari Emir 
with a petition criticizing the lack of freedom of expression in the 
media and unclear laws regarding citizenship and naturalization, 
as well as demanding the establishment o f a new consultative 
assembly with “wide legislative and investigative authority through 
which actual political participation is provided”.73 The authors 
of the petition called for this body to prepare immediately a new 
constitution “that guarantees the establishment of democracy”. The 
petition did not bring any results. The old Emir, Sheikh Khalifa 
bin Hamad Al-Thani had rejected any liberalization of the regime, 
and the broadening of political participation did not begin until his 
son, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa, assumed power in 1995 (staging a 
successful coup against his farther).
The new Emir abolished the Ministry of Information, a move 
calculated to demonstrate his willingness to limit government 
censorship of the media. Then, in the new atmosphere, the now
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73 F. Gregory Gause III, Oil Monarchies. Domestic an d  Security Challenges 
in the Arab G u lf States (New York, Council o f  Foreign Relations, 1994).
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famous al-Jazeera satellite TV  channel was opened. The channel 
introduced controversial and provocative new programs and news 
bulletins that criticize Arab rulers, governments and policies as 
well as the lack of rights and freedoms in Arab countries, and 
advocate the need for significant change in Islamic law. Opposition 
figures and women often participate in al-Jazeera programs, which 
quickly became the most popular TV  program in the whole Arab 
world.
The next move by Sheikh Hamad was to call for general elections 
for the Central Municipal Council, a 29-member advisory body that 
oversees the work of nine municipalities. The Emir allowed women 
to vote for and run as candidates for seats in the Council.74
This latest move faced certain opposition. Eighteen noted Islamist 
figures presented a petition to the Emir that criticized the idea, 
given that this election would afford women “public authority” and 
the potential for “leadership over men”.75 The petition, however, 
did not have any effect on Emir’s policies.
The first election in Qatar, even before the one to the Municipal 
Council, was for the board of the Chamber of Commerce, whose 
members had previously been nominated by the Emir. Close to 
3,700 Qatari businessmen cast secret ballots in April 1998, electing 
17 members of the board. In turn, the Ministry of Education called 
for the establishment o f elected student unions in all schools. In 
another exercise o f democracy, in November 1998, the Ministry of 
Finance and Economy cancelled the elections for the board of al- 
Muntazah Consumer Association after it had been discovered that 
the number of ballots cast was higher than the number of eligible 
voters; new elections were simultaneously called for.
74 Bahry: “Elections in Qatar” . In fact, this was not the first experiment in 
Qatar with elections to the Municipal Council. The first elections o f  this kind 
took place in 1963 and lasted for a few years.
75 Bahry: “Elections in Qatar”, p. 126.
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The elections to the Central Municipal Council took place on 
March 8, 1999.76 On the ballot were 227 candidates, including six 
women. About 95 per cent o f eligible voters participated in election 
in Doha, with only a slightly lower percentage participating in the 
rest o f the country (though the number of registered voters was 
only 22,225 people, which accounted for a small percentage of 
the total local population of approximately 160,000). The winners 
o f the elections were mostly young technocrats and professionals, 
elected on the basis of personal preference or family and tribal 
ties. Significantly, two noted political figures, often critical of 
the government: Najib Muhammad al-Rubai, a former Minister 
o f Justice, and Muhammad Salih al-Kawari were lost in the 
election. No women were elected, suggesting that Qatar remains 
a traditional society.
The successful municipal elections made Sheikh Hamad easier 
about conducting the next step: introduction of a permanent 
constitution (a temporary one has been in effect since 1972) 
providing for the establishment o f an elected parliament to be 
chosen by all Qataris, regardless of gender. On July 2, 2002, the 
committee preparing the new constitution presented a draft of the 
document. On April 29, 2003, in a popular referendum, more than 
96 per cent Qataris voted in favor of the constitution (but only 
24,000 people registered for voting).
The constitution describes Qatar as a democratic state, grants 
universal suffrage, and confirms the role o f the state in providing 
for the social, economic, and educational well being of its citizens. 
It also confirms Qatar as a hereditary state and specifies the Sharia as 
the main source of legislation. The constitution creates a 45-member 
council (M ajlis a l Shura) to legislate, vote on the state budget, and 
monitor government activities with the right to question ministers
76 Ibid.
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and to vote them out of office through a vote of no confidence. The 
30 members o f the council are to be elected and the remaining 15 
are to be appointed by the Emir. All Qataris of over 18 years o f age 
are eligible to vote and run for office. The constitution provides also 
for freedom of association, expression and religious practice, as well 
as an independent judiciary.
Shaikh Hamad promulgated the constitution on June 8, 2004, 
and it finally came into effect a year later.
There are at least two reasons why Shaikh Hamad decided 
to broaden political participation in Qatar. First, having some 
problems with the support from members o f the older generation, 
he wanted to obtain it from younger Qataris, many of whom had 
obtained Western education and become more cosmopolitan. For 
many of them, democratisation means making Qatar prominent 
among its neighbours, and obtaining a dynamic and leading role in 
the region.77 Secondly, Hamad wanted to win friends in the West, 
to oppose threats from his ousted father and to balance off pressures 
from his more powerful G CC neighbours, especially Saudi Arabia.
Although Qatar is sometimes described as being at the vanguard 
o f democratisation in the Arab world, one has to be aware of the 
shortcomings of its constitution.78 It qualifies the right o f people to 
assembly and does not allow operation of political parties. The Emir 
appoints the government and controls its agenda, has the power 
to block any legislation, can implement laws by decrees, and can 
dissolve the parliament at will. The legislation becomes law only 
with the vote o f two-thirds majority and the emirs endorsement. 
But this has to be understood in the country’s context. Qatari society 
is free of sectarian, ethnic, or even significant political divisions.
77 Andrew Rathmell and Kirsten Schulze: “Political reform in the Gulf: The 
case o f Qatar” , Middle Eastern Studies, No. 4 (2000), p. 15.
7S Amy Hawthorne, “Qatar’s New Constitution: Limited Reform from the 
Top”, Carnegie Endowment — Arab Reform Bulletin, June 11, 2003.
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There is no questioning of the legitimacy of the ruling Al Thani 
family. Therefore, reforms have been promulgated from the top and 
not as a response to popular discontent.
Reforms in Qatar did not end with the introduction of a new 
constitution and organization of a municipal election. In particular, 
women were allowed to enter the political process. In 2003, Shaikh 
Hamad nominated a woman to become the Minister of Education
-  the first female cabinet minister in the G C C  states. At the same 
time he appointed Sheikha Abdullah al-Misnad from the ruling 
family as president of Qatar University and another woman as 
public prosecutor -  the first woman to hold such a post in the GCC 
states. The Emir’s wife, Sheikha Mouza Bint Nasser al-Misnad, has 
been strongly involved in the promotion of education and women’s 
rights.
Oman
Oman has been ruled since the 18th century by the al bu Said 
dynasty. After a series o f internal and external conflicts in the 
1950s and 1960s, and most significantly the Dhofar rebellion, 
Qaboos bin Said al-Said carried out a coup in 1970 against his 
unsuccessful father. Supported by the British, Qaboos won and 
became the Sultan. He quickly proved to be an effective and 
modern leader. Under his rule, the country advanced economically 
despite limited oil reserves, relations with the neighbours were 
normalized, etc.
In the 1990s Oman made several strides towards broadening 
o f the political participation; this happened on the sole initiative 
o f the ruler, without any demands from the public. First, in 1991, 
Sultan Qaboos established the new Consultative Council (Majlis 
al-Sbura), replacing the old State Consultative Council (M ajlis al- 
Istishari lil-Dawla) existing since 1981. The 59-seat Council was
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granted the right to debate on economic, social and development 
issues, review laws, evaluate government plans and question 
ministers, and hold joint meetings with the government twice 
a year. At the same time, it has no right to be heard in Oman’s 
foreign, defence, and security policies. The Sultan’s decree provided 
that elders, prominent businessmen and intellectuals from each of 
Oman’s 59 provinces choose two potential assembly members and 
the Sultan appoints one of those two nominees to represent that 
province. The president of the Council is appointed by a Royal 
Decree, while his two deputies are elected by the members o f the 
Council in a secret ballot.
After the end of the first three-year term, in 1994, the Council 
was expanded to 80 seats, giving the Sultan a chance to nominate 
more people, especially former government officials, to it. In a 
groundbreaking decision, the Sultan appointed the first two women 
members of the Council. It was the first case in which women were 
allowed to participate in a political process o f any kind in all G CC 
states.71''
Membership of the Council was expanded to 82 persons in 
1997, and to 83 in the year 2000 because of the increase in the 
country’s population. Moreover, the Sultan allowed women to 
stand for election and to vote for candidates to the Council. Over 
20 women were among the several hundred nominees in the 1997 
elections, and the Council had eventually two women members.
In 1997, Sultan Qaboos established a new 41-seat consultative 
body, the all nominated State Council (M ajlis al-Dawla). This 
Council, akin to an upper house, reviews the proposals o f the M ajlis 
al-Shura and forwards those it deems important to the government 
or to Sultan Qaboos; it can also deal with more important political
79 Abdullah Juma Alhaj, “The politics o f participation in the G ulf Cooperation 
Council States: The Omani Consulatative Council” , Middle East Journal, no. 4 
(1996), pp. 560-571.
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matters. M ajlis al-Shura and M ajlis al-Dawla together constitute 
the M ajlis Oman, or Council of Oman.80
One of the reasons to establish the new council was to give the 
Sultan a chance to accommodate those who were unsuccessful 
in the elections to the M ajlis al-Shura and to eliminate potential 
tensions between rival clans, tribes and businessmen created by 
the election results. This was clearly visible in the formation of the 
first M ajlis al-Dawla, whose nominated members became former 
ministers, under-secretaries, ambassadors, judges or retired officers. 
Five women were selected to it as well.
Sultan Qaboos, further supporting the idea o f introducing 
women to the country political life, appointed in 1998-99 the 
first woman ambassador and named three women deputy ministers 
in the cabinet. He also included the first woman to the board of 
directors o f the Omani Chamber of Commerce. In March 2003 he 
appointed a women to become President of the Public Authority 
for Craft Industries at the rank of a minister. Finally in 2004, he 
appointed three other women to the Cabinet, to manage the Higher 
Education, Tourism and Social Development Ministries.
The electoral body has been progressively expanded; in 
September 2000 elections to M ajlis al-Shura the electorate was 
raised to 175,000 people, a quarter of Omani adults (as compared 
to only 51,000 in 1997 elections, about three per cent o f the 
population, and 5,000 in 1991), with women accounting for 
some 30 per cent o f the participants. Voters were chosen by tribal 
councils selected by the walis or governors and their representatives 
in the country’s 59 wilayats. Out of them 114,567 -  or 65 per cent
-  registered for voting, with 87.8 per cent actually casting their 
ballots. The total o f 541 candidates, including 21 women, were 
in the fray (but only two women were successful, both from the
80 Abdullah Juma Alhaj, “The political elite and the introduction o f political 
participation in Oman”, Middle East Policy, No. 3 (June 2000), pp. 97-110.
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Muscat governorate). In a move towards the goal o f having the 
whole M ajlis al-Shura elected directly, in 2000, candidates with 
the highest numbers o f votes were for the first time automatically 
given seats on the Council, rather than being picked from among 
the top scores by the Sultan.
In the 2003 elections, for the first time, all Omani citizens who 
have attained the age of 21 (approximately 822,000), both men 
and women, were eligible to vote. Nevertheless, only 262,000 (i.e. 
32 per cent) registered, and only 74 per cent o f the registered, 
that is around 194,000 actually cast their votes on October 2. The 
elections did not bring much change in the composition of the 
M ajlis al-Shura. Only 15 women stood for election, out o f 506 
candidates, and, as before, only two (actually the same as during 
the previous term) were elected, despite even the fact that a third of 
registered voters (95,000) were women.
Consultative councils play certain role in the country’s political 
life. They meet regularly, debate important social and economic 
matters, review new laws, question government’s officials. Certain 
hearings at the M ajlis al-Shura have been broadcasted live on 
television.
Another action of crucial importance for the development of 
democracy in Oman was the introduction of the Basic Law — the 
first de facto constitution — in 1996. It promulgated the principles 
governing the Sultanate, highlighted the rights and responsibilities 
of citizens, and, above all, defined the powers and duties o f the 
executive. It provided for an independent judiciary, due process 
of law, freedom of the press and of assembly, and prohibition of 
discrimination of any kind. Several laws and regulations required 
to implement these provisions were enacted in the following years. 
In particular, the Supreme Court in Muscat as well as courts of 
appeals in various wilayas were established, and the new press and 
publication law was introduced.
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Oman has a relatively liberal environment, although the sultanate 
is an absolute monarchy with no political parties.81 All matters are 
subject to the Sultan’s interpretation and decrees. He has complete 
authority over all decision-making. The Sultan is both the head 
of the state and the prime minister, as well as the commander-in- 
chief o f the armed force; moreover, he controls the portfolios of 
defence and foreign affairs. But at the same time, Sultan Qaboos is 
usually perceived as a fair-minded ruler who tries to maximize the 
support base for his policies by taking advice from a broad spectrum 
o f people, but especially from tribal leaders, in accordance with 
Omani tradition. There is practically no opposition in the country, 
although in 1994 and 2005, the authorities arrested large number 
of people for allegedly plotting to destabilize the regime.
The United Arab Emirates
The United Arab Emirates is a federation of tribally based 
sheikhdoms, established as a unified state structure in 1971. Thanks 
to huge oil revenues, the UAE managed to transform itself in a short 
period of time into a very modern and wealthy country. Under 
the constitution, rulers o f the seven emirates make up the Federal 
Supreme Council, the highest legislative and executive body. The 
Council elects a state president and the president appoints the 
prime minister and cabinet. Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan, 
the ruler o f Abu Dhabi emirate, was the President o f the country 
from 1971 till 2004. When he passed away, the presidency was 
taken over by one of his sons, Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed.
The UAE have the least developed system of political 
representation among the G C C  states. The male-only, ruler-
81 “ Oman — Ruling Structure”, APS Review Gas Market Trends, February
23, 2004; J. E. Peterson, “Oman: Three and a half decades o f change and 
developments” , Middle East Policy, 2 (Summer 2004), pp. 125-37.
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nominated, 40-person-strong Federal National Council plays 
only an advisory role, cannot introduce bills or debate any matter 
of public concern if the government objects (that is, “if it is 
detrimental to the higher interest of the union”).82 Nevertheless, 
in the late 1990s, the number of issues discussed by the Council, 
and the number of cabinet ministers appearing before it (including 
some members o f the ruling family) increased. In some emirates, 
Sharjah in particular, local consultative bodies to advise rulers have 
also been developed.
For approximately a quarter of a century, the UAE did not have a 
permanent constitution, as numerous attempts to approve one failed 
due to lack of agreement among the emirates on the prerogatives 
of the federal authorities; small emirates have traditionally worried 
that large and rich emirates, like Abu Dhabi, would dominate them. 
The temporary 1971 constitution became eventually permanent in 
1997, though practically no changes were introduced to it at that 
time, despite the criticism that it contains outdated laws.
Like in all other G CC states, the judicial system comprises both 
Sharia and the secular courts. The judiciary is not independent; 
its decisions are subject to review by the political leadership, but 
the basic due process of law does exist. Media are controlled by 
the government but non-censored foreign television broadcasts via 
satellite and Internet are widely available. The government limits 
freedom of assembly and association. Nevertheless, in general, the 
country, especially the highly cosmopolitan emirate of Dubai, has 
been much more liberal and open to the world than other G CC 
states.
Women are well represented in the workforce and are well 
educated. Until recently they did not hold any high-level positions 
in the government. Only the progressive ruler of Sharjah, sheikh
82 Hassan Hamdan Al-Alkim: “The prospect o f democracy in the G C C  
countries”, Critique. Journalfor Critical Studies o f the Middle East. Fall 1996, p. 34.
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Sułtan bin Mohammed al Qasimi, appointed in the early 2000s 
several women to his local consultative council. In the interesting 
occurrence, the Crown Prince of the emirate of Ras Al Khajmah 
was dethroned by his father in June 2003, apparently largely due 
to the activity o f his wife, criticized by conservative members of 
the ruling elite for being a women’s rights activist.83 Finally, in 
November 2004, a woman was appointed the UAE Minister of 
Planning and Economy.
Among limited recent political moves, the UAE, under pressure 
from the International Labour Organization, have initiated 
measures to allow formation of workers’ organizations in the 
country. Moreover, the election of officers was allowed in certain 
public institutions, including the Chambers of Commerce and 
Industry, suggesting that authorities are testing the possibility of 
introducing such democratic procedures in other public bodies.
The issue of the establishment of an elected parliament in the 
UAE has been put forward only very recently. Earlier, there was 
no pressure from the public at large to change the situation as the 
enormous wealth of the country had continued to make most 
people satisfied; there has been no opposition or any political 
groups operating in this rentier state. It was only after the Saudi 
municipal elections and the Iraqi expatriates’ voting organized in 
the UAE (the out-of-country voting managed by the International 
Organization of Migration for the Iraqi elections of January 30, 
2005) that some members o f the Emirates’ Federal National 
Council and the country’s academics raised the issue. They stressed 
that when millions o f Arabs in Palestine, Iraq, ąnd even Saudi 
Arabia had gone to the polls, the UAE could no longer continue 
to lag behind.84 Thus, they begun calling for elections to the 
consultative council and municipalities as well as for transparency
83 G ulf Studies Newsletter, June 2003.
81 Khaleej Times, February 24 and 27, 2005.
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in the government, freedom of expression and independence of the 
judiciary. These calls were encouraged by the decision of the ruler 
of Sharjah who, in February 2005, announced the establishment of 
nine local municipal councils, with members who at the moment 
are still appointed but are promised to be elected in future. Finally, 
in December 2005, President Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan 
announced that half of the members of the Federal National 
Council would be elected.
Gulf parliament
At the G CC level, the Consultative Council (often called the 
Consultative Commission) has functioned since 1997. It consists 
of 30 appointed members (five from each of the G CC states) and is 
charged with studying matters referred to it by the G C C  Supreme 
Council. Nevertheless, so far it has been a meaningless body. 
During the December 2004 G CC summit, Bahrain submitted a 
proposal from its country’s Council o f Representatives to establish 
a G CC parliament to replace the current Consultative Council. No 
decision on the matter has been taken yet.
Summary
Summing up, the Gulf monarchies -  notwithstanding the actions 
and achievements mentioned above — do not have yet a fully 
developed and truly democratic electoral process, or properly 
empowered bodies representing the people. In particular,
•  Rulers can amend constitutions at will and pass laws by 
decree.
•  In the UAE there are no elections at all; In Saudi Arabia, only 
municipal elections are on the agenda.
•  In Saudi Arabia, women still cannot participate in the 
elections.
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•  In Bahrain, electoral districts are drawn with the intention 
of under-representing the country’s majority Shiite population; In 
Kuwait, small electoral districts make vote-buying easier and favor 
certain candidates.
•  In Oman and the UAE, the consultative councils can neither 
introduce legislation nor dismiss ministers, nor can the Saudi Shura 
Council dismiss Cabinet members.
•  In Bahrain and Qatar, the elected lower chamber can dismiss 
ministers only with a two-third majority, which is very difficult to 
attain.
•  Bahrani and Qatari parliaments need a large majority to block 
legislation, and the Omani and the UAE Consultative Councils 
cannot block legislation at all.
In most cases, changing these realities would require constitutional 
revisions, which are very difficult to carry out. Michael Herb, 
recently summed up the state of affairs in a commentary simply 
titled, “Parliaments in the Gulf monarchies are a long way from 
democracy”.85
At the same time, however, Herb underlined that “Gulf elections 
are much fairer than those organized by most authoritarian regimes.” 
In particular, “Kuwait’s elections compare well to those of many 
emerging democracies” . Furthermore, the Kuwaiti parliament is 
able to successfully block legislation, and has the power to mount 
a very serious challenge to the primacy of the ruling family, as it 
can remove any minister through a no-confidence vote. Therefore, 
a Gulf monarchy can implement a system, which has a number of 
typically democratic futures; the Kuwaiti way can be, and probably 
will be, gradually adopted by other G CC states.
85 Herb: “Parliaments in the G ulf monarchies are a long way from demo­
cracy”.
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Prospects for further broadening of political participation 
in the Gulf monarchies. The G CC and the Western (American) 
democratisation agenda
Will the broadening of political participation in the G CC 
states continue? Can the occurrences presented above actually lead 
towards the Western type of democracy?
On the one hand, there are many obstacles to the democratisation 
process.
First of all, as time has shown, Gulf monarchies are quite stable 
regimes, contrary to stereotypical views in the West, where they are 
frequently seen as anachronistic systems and destined to disappear 
with modernization. Thus, rulers do not always see the necessity to 
transform their regimes quickly and extensively to stay in power. 
Moreover, they do not think they need the support of their people 
to govern; constitutions and traditions legitimize their positions. 
They also feel secure given that the United States and other Western 
countries, despite their occasional rhetoric o f criticizing non- 
democratic regimes, do not like to de-stabilize the region further 
after the Iraqi experience and with few exceptions continue to 
be committed to the maintenance of the G C C  countries’ status 
quo due to the strategic importance of oil they posses. In such 
circumstances, rulers often perceive the broadening of political 
participation in their countries as another gracious gift they may 
offer their subjects, rather than an action required to satisfy the 
vital needs of their populations. The circumstances have seemed 
different only in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Kuwait, where pressure 
from the West and the al-Qaeda terrorist attacks in the first place, 
the demands of the Shiite-led opposition in the second, and the 
activities of political groupings in the third, are factors strongly 
influencing the change.
In turn, the “subjects” at large, maybe except for the Shiite 
population, so far do not look for major political reforms
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themselves, being worried that change could negatively affect 
their socio-economic situation. They have generally been satisfied 
with what they get from their governments, and even the existing 
extensive control the regimes exercise over them do not dispose 
them negatively to their rulers. This is why, for example, even the 
demands of opposition groups have only called for reforms, not 
for revolution: the opposition has wished to improve the operation 
o f the existing regimes, not to overthrow them.86 The middle class 
in the G C C  states — usually the main reformist, pro-democracy 
grouping in other parts o f the world -  has little reason to support 
the downfall of the monarchy, which allows the monarchies to 
prosper. Similarly, the military and majority o f tribal sheiks, large 
beneficiaries of the existing regimes, usually strongly support the 
rulers. So far, there has been no “revolutionary proletariat” in the 
G C C  states; in future, only a growing number of young, unemployed 
school graduates may lead to the establishment of such a group. 
Last but definitely not least, most people lack political awareness; 
civil society, the ultimate source of political change, is in the very 
preliminary stage of development.
On the other hand, there are many factors which can further 
enhance the broadening of political representation and the “demo­
cratisation drive” .
First o f all, as has already been mentioned, in several GCC 
states: Kuwait, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, there are significant 
groupings pushing for democratisation. Moreover, the presence of 
active parliaments and free meciia, wherever they are present, boosts 
democratisation process.87
86 Gawdat Baghat: “The G ulf monarchies: Economic and political challenges 
at the end o f  the century” , The Journal o f  Social, Political and Economic Studies, 
No. 2 (1998).
87 Michael Herb, “Emirs and parliaments in the G u lf", Journal o f Democracy, 
vol. 13, No. 4 (2002), p. 47.
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Then, the economic situation can have a significant impact on 
the process. At the beginning of the 21st century, the G C C  countries 
were earning far less than they used to during the oil bonanza three 
decades earlier. While these states are still relatively rich, several are 
running budget deficits, borrowing nationally and internationally, 
and are turning to expense cutting. Moreover, while until recently 
many services were free in the G C C  countries, some regimes have 
begun to charge their citizens for them, and have even considered 
introducing income taxes. Should citizens be obliged to pay for the 
running of the state, the state will be forced to open up to their 
scrutiny. “No taxation, no representation” rule began to change 
already to “some taxation, some representation” . The situation has 
changed, however, with very high oil prices dominating the market 
since 2004. The increased revenues considerably improved the 
economic situation in the oil-producing G C C  states, thus giving 
governments possibility to postpone certain reforms.
Another factor that can influence the change is the population 
of the G CC countries: not only is it growing at a rate that makes 
the maintenance of so generous welfare states problematic, but it 
is also becoming more literate, educated, and urban: features that 
are characteristic for other societies that, in similar conditions, 
have usually experienced a political upheaval leading to further 
democratisation.
Young new leaders, who may replace old rulers o f Saudi Arabia 
and Kuwait, but also o f the UAE and Oman in the not so distant 
future, may also speed up reforms, as occurrence in Qatar and 
Bahrain showed already.
Events in the neighbouring states: Egypt, Iran, Yemen, and the 
new Iraq, which all have more political representation of citizens 
in the process of governance, indirectly influence also the peoples’ 
thinking across the borders; mostly through media reports but also 
through their citizens living in the G C C  states in large numbers.
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Finally, there have been numerous attempts coming from the 
West, and the United States in particular, to democratise the Arab 
world. They relates to the situation in the G CC states as much 
as in other Arab countries. After 9/11, there have been a number 
of voices in the United States linking lack of democracy with 
the roots of terrorism and calling Washington to “save the Arabs 
from corrupt autocrats and radical Islam as it once was engaged in 
saving the world from communism” and to “pressure Arab states 
to democratise rather then shielding them”.88 For example, Rohan 
Gunaratna in his book Inside a l Qaeda expressed a common belief 
that there have been so many terrorists produced by Saudi Arabia 
because its not democratic; government is not representative of 
the people.89 In turn, commenting on elections in Bahrain, S. Rob 
Sobhani wrote in the Washington Times on November 25, 2002, 
that “the United States has a vested interest in the success of King 
Hamad’s reform movement because tiny Bahrain can be a model for 
the rest of the Arab world, especially in neighbouring Saudi Arabia. 
Shi’ite comprise a majority in the oil-rich eastern province of Saudi 
Arabia, where 25 per cent of the world’s remaining oil reserves is 
located. Therefore Bahrain should be rewarded and singled out for 
its bravery, friendship and pursuit of democracy” (and it has become 
one of the closest non-NATO ally o f the United States, a seat of the 
US Army Central Command, and a free-trade agreement partner).
Since 9/11 the goal of democratising the Arab Middle East has 
become elevated by the American government from a rhetorical 
ideal to national security imperative.90 Therefore, the administration
88 Susan Sachs, “Remembering how to rig a democracy” The New York Times, 
June 30, 2002.
K’’ Rohan Gunaratna, Inside al-Qaeda: Global Network o f Terror (New York, 
Columbia University Press, 2002).
90 Andrzej Kapiszewski, “Democracy Promotion in the Arab Word: The Bush 
Agenda”, 77)e Polish Quarterly ofInternational Affairs, No. 3 (2004), pp. 65-92.
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decided to reorient US diplomacy and American foreign aid policy 
to lend more support to pro-democracy movements in the region. 
In January 2003, the United States introduced the “US-Middle East 
Partnership Initiative”, which was aimed to spread democracy and 
political reforms in the Middle East. Then, in March, President George 
W. Bush decided to go to Iraq, believing, among other things, that 
overthrowing Saddam Hussein would allow rapid democratisation 
of the country, which, as a result, would produce a democratic boom 
in the Middle East, comparable to the successful one which occurred 
earlier in Eastern Europe and put the end to the Cold War.
Many Arab leaders were unhappy with the US pro-democracy 
initiatives. In response to them, in January 2003, Saudi Arabia’s 
Crown Prince Abdallah proposed his own “Charter to Reform the 
Arab Stand,” which was meant to encourage regional economic 
development and peoples’ participation in politics. It was briefly 
discussed at the Arab leaders summit in Cairo in March 2003, 
devoted generally to the Iraqi problem on the eve of the US military 
intervention, and later at the Tunis summit, in May 2004 (although 
Saudi Arabia did not attend).
On November 6, 2003, President Bush delivered the now- 
famous address on the need to strengthen democracy around the 
world and, in particular, to support its development in the Middle 
East. He called to end “sixty years of Western nations excusing and 
accommodating the lack of freedom in the Middle East” and to 
adopt “a new policy, a forward strategy of freedom in the Middle 
East” . In the follow-up, US authorities began working on the 
details of what later became known as “The Greater Middle East 
Initiative”. The project called for economic transformation “similar 
in magnitude to that undertaken by the formerly communist 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe”.
The leakage of the draft version of the project to the London- 
based Al Hayat in February 2004, was met with strong criticism
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from Arab governments, intellectuals and media, who all saw in it 
an unacceptable interference with their internal affairs, another sign 
of Western imperialism.91 In particular, Bahrain’s Prime Minister, 
Sheikh Khalifa bin Salman Al Khalifa, asserted that “the imposition 
of any foreign view is not in the interest o f the countries of the 
region”. The Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister, Prince Saud al-Faisal 
said that the US proposal did “include clear accusations against the 
Arab people and their governments that they are ignorant of their 
own affairs... those behind this plan ignore the fact... that we are 
able to handle our own affairs”.92
In such a situation, facing all this criticism, the US government 
scaled down the original proposal and presented it under the new 
name “The Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative”
Nevertheless, the plan did provoke debates concerning the 
need for change. Most Arab rulers adopted a “middle-of-the-road 
position,” supporting reforms and democratisation gradually 
emerging from within the system, but rejecting their imposition 
by outside powers.93 They attacked the paternalistic way in which 
the US plan was introduced, while not entirely rejecting some of 
its content. Several Arab governments and civil society activists 
produced declarations on the need for broad political, social, and 
economic reforms, which were directly inspired by the G-8 plan.94 
Some G C C  states became a venue for such an activity as well.
91 As reported in Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 17, 2004.
92 As quoted by K. Gajendra Singh, “America’s democracy initiative in Middle 
East” , South Asia Analysis Group, paper No. 1052, www.saag.org.
93 Elie Podeh, „Between stagnation and renovation: The Arab system in the 
aftermath o f the Iraqi war” , MERIA, The Middle East Review o f  International 
Affairs, vol.9, no. 3 (September 2005); www.http://meria.idc.ac.il
94 Main conferences were held in Saana, Yemen and in Alexandria, Egypt. 
Moreover, the Arab League for the first time took a position on the political reform 
issue at its summit in Tunis in May 2004. See Kapiszewski: “ Democratizing the 
Arab states” , pp. 127—129.
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In particular, on June 3—4, 2004, the Qatar University hosted a 
conference of Arab democracy advocates: civil society activists, 
professors, journalists and members of political movements from 
across the region. The Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al 
Thani, in his widely reported speech opening the event stated that: 
(1) Arab states should consider US proposals for democratic reform 
rather than reject them outright; (2) there are many problems “of our 
own creation that have nothing to do with the outside world”, and 
that in particular “do not spring only from the Palestinian cause”; (3) 
many Arabs have claimed that “if popular participation is broadened 
it would only result in bringing in those who would endanger peace 
and put an end to security. Yet, the adoption of reforms has always 
been the right way to stability”.95 There are not many Arab leaders 
who would so openly say such things, opposing the popular Islamist 
standpoint. The conference adopted “The Doha Declaration for 
Democracy and Reform”, calling all Arab states to get modern, 
democratic institutions; hold free, fair and regular elections; place 
limits on executive powers; guarantee freedom of association and 
expression; permit the full participation of women in political life; 
and end extra-judicial procedures, emergency laws, and torture. It 
also called for the creation of a body to monitor Arab governments’ 
progress on reform and to track the fate o f other reform initiatives 
launched recently in the region. Finally, the declaration stated that 
“hiding behind the necessity of resolving the Palestinian question 
before implementing reform is obstructive and unacceptable”.
The issue was also raised during the Arab summit in Tunis in 
May 2004. In the final declaration Arab states pledged (although 
vaguely) to carry out domestic reforms such as expanding political 
participation, increasing the role of civil society, widening the role 
of women in social and political spheres and promoting educational 
reforms, and enhancing research.
,>5 Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani: “Out o f the fog through Arab reform” .
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The Bush plan was discussed at the G-8 summit at Sea Island, 
Georgia, on June 8—10, 2004.96 The resolution adopted there called 
for “partnership lor progress and a common future with the region”. 
In particular, that goal is to be achieved through the establishment 
o f the ‘Forum for the Future’, a framework for regular ministerial 
meetings as well as parallel meetings of civil society and business 
leaders to discuss political and economic reforms.97 A call to settle 
down the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the idea conspicuously absent 
from the earlier version of the plan, causing wide criticism, was 
that time included in the document. The plan acknowledged that 
reforms cannot be imposed from outside and that different societies 
will change at different rates. The summit also welcomed the Tunis 
declaration, in which Arab leaders expressed their readiness to 
implement democratic reforms.
Despite a new form, the G-8 reform plan initially received a 
cold reception in the Arab world. Only five Arab countries accepted 
President Bush’s invitation to its launch at the summit (from among 
the G C C  states, only Bahrain). The most important Arab countries: 
Saudi Arabia and Egypt (as well as close US allies: Kuwait and 
Morocco) turned the invitation down, making it clear that they would 
have nothing to do with the project. Only the Emir of Qatar, Sheikh 
Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani (who, by the way, was not invited to 
the summit due to controversies related to his Al JazeeraTV station’s 
anti-American reporting) stated cautiously that “the calls for reform 
coming from abroad need reflection by the people of our region”.98
96 The term “greater” in the draft version was changed for “broader”, as some 
countries objected to the first one as having some negative political connotations.
97 Marina Ottaway, “The Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative: 
A hollow victory for the United States” , Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, June 12, 2004.
98 Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, “Out o f the fog through Arab reform”, Daily 
Star, June 21, 2004.
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Following the G-8 plan, the issue of reforms was discussed next 
on the Forums for the Future, which took place in Morocco in 
December 2004 and Bahrain in 2005. Foreign and finance ministers 
from about twenty countries in the Middle East and North Africa, 
representatives o f the G-8 countries, as well as members o f various 
Middle East N G O s attended it. Forums did not bring meaningful 
results and the one in Manama even ended without any result as 
Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Tunis expressed reservations to wording of 
the final declaration in which states pledge to expand democratic 
practices, to enlarge participation in political and public life, to 
foster the roles o f civil society, including NG O s and to widen 
women’s participation” in all fields and reinforce their rights in 
society.
Thus, an expansion of a reformist discourse and the introduction 
of certain liberal measures that may eventually bring about some 
political changes have been observed in the Arab world. Only 
time can show whether those actions will have any effect on the 
democratisation of the G CC states. It remains to be seen whether the 
rulers of these countries will be ready to introduce further reforms. 
Democratisation is always a long lasting process. One can foresee 
future developments in the G C C  states, which can lead towards that 
goal, but there are also many obstacles, which can slow it down, or 
even reverse. One can agree with the opinion of Hassan Hamdan 
al-Alkim that “although democracy may not be realized within the 
coming decade, it is acquiring a significant importance in the G CC 
states political life. Thus, its realization becomes a matter of time”.99 
A thought that, however, should always be taken into account, is that 
democratisation may not immediately produce more peaceful and 
stable G CC regimes. The political reforms can weaken the existing 
regimes, or even de-stabilize the countries. The opposition forces 
in the G C C  states, where they exist, are to a large extent rooted
w Al-Alkim: “The prospect o f democracy”, p. 41.
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in Islamic fundamentalism, which, if coming to power through 
otherwise praised democratic elections, can reform the political 
system into a much less democratic — of the religious theocracy 
type -  than the present one. An indication of such approach can be 
found in the latest parliamentary elections in Kuwait and Bahrain 
where the Islamists won the majority and continue to press for 
Islamisation of the countries.100 So far, however, the development of 
the electoral process in the G CC states, as well as the enhancement 
of their parliaments’ activity, as compared to political reforms, or 
rather lack of them, in many other Arab countries, allows to look at 
the future o f the democratisation process in the monarchies of the 
Gulf with cautious optimism.
100 Marina Ottaway, Thomas Carothers, Amy Hawthorne, Daniel Brumberg, 
Democratic mirage in the Middle East (Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, Policy Brief, October 2002); Vahan Zanoyan, “Time for making historic 
decisions in the Middle East” , Kuwait, Center for Strategic and Future Studies, 
November 2002.
Saudi Arabia: Steps toward 
democratization or reconfiguration 
of authoritarianism?
Introduction
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is one of the most conservative 
monarchies in the world, and, according to Western standards, a very 
authoritarian regime. The King rules by decrees. Political parties, trade 
unions, collective bargaining, and strikes are prohibited. Freedom 
of expression is severely restricted, in particular by prohibitions of 
criticism of the government, Islam, and the ruling family. Public 
demonstrations are forbidden. Women are denied many basic rights 
and segregated. Judicial independence is undermined by the influence 
of the royal family and its associates. In general, the Saudi political 
system constitutes the most complete expression of the so-called 
‘Islamic exception’, the general rejection of the Western system of 
law and support for the view that all legitimacy should come from 
the Koran and the Sunna. The country does not have a constitution 
to regulate affairs of the country, believing that Sharia determines all 
aspects of not only private but also public life. On the highly publicized 
(although controversial) Freedom House democracy scale Saudi Arabia 
is not only usually considered as a “not free” country, but in 2002 was 
even labeled one of the world’s ten most repressive regimes (Freedom in
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the World, 2003). Similarly, the Economist Intelligence Unit’s political 
freedom indicator named Saudi Arabia in 2005 the least free country 
in the Arab world (EIU  Special Report, 2005: 3).
The country was established and has been ruled by the al- 
Saud family with the support o f the religious authorities. The 
relationship between the two dates back to the 1744 alliance 
between Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab and Muhammad ibn 
Saud, a sort o f merger o f religious legitimacy and military might (Al- 
Raheed, 2002). The descendants o f al-Wahhab have authority over 
theological, social and cultural affairs, still dominate the religious 
institutions o f the state and issue fatwas that justify the policies 
of the Al Saud. Today, however, the alliance between the regime 
and clergy is much contested by dissidents because the parties no 
longer serve as “checks” on each other. Moreover, as the Kingdom 
provides the West with the uninterrupted deliveries o f oil, Western 
governments, first the British and later the United States, guarantee 
the security o f Saudi Arabia and also the position of the ruling 
family. That “evil” relation makes Saudi rulers a subject of strong 
criticism from part o f the religious establishment and the people.
Petitions to the King in the 1990s. 
Introduction of the Basic Laws
Despite the autocratic character of the regime, since the beginning 
o f the 1990s, in the aftermath of the Second Gulf War, which 
showed vulnerability o f the country and doubtful ability o f the Al 
Saud to lead the state, Saudi Arabia has witnessed political activity 
that, while not directly questioning the Islamic base o f the country’s 
identity and people’s integration, has called for changes in the 
manner in which the state is governed. Political criticism became 
public, especially during Fridays sermons in mosques, while 
opposition became organized and demanded specific reforms.
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First, in December 1990, a group of 43 ‘liberals’ and ‘secularists’ 
(academics, writers, businessmen, and government officials) 
circulated a petition in which they called upon King Fahd to 
introduce basic laws regulating the functioning of government, and 
for the strengthening of the principle of equality o f all citizens, as 
well as for the elimination of discrimination based on religion, tribal 
affiliation, family background and social status. The petitioners 
urged the King to establish the long-proposed Consultative Council 
and provide it with broad powers, including the right to oversee the 
work of executive agencies (Gause, 1994: 94-7; Kramer, 2000: 263- 
4). They advocated also the establishment o f consultative councils 
in the Saudi provinces, more independence of the media and the 
legal system, as well as the introduction of a framework for issuing 
fatwas, which, as they suggested should be subject to evaluation, 
discussion, and response without restriction.
In turn, in May 1991, over 400 Islamists, including leading 
ulama, presented to the King a memorandum also demanding 
extensive reform of the political and judicial system but calling for 
strict application of Islamic norms and values in public life as well 
as in economic and foreign policy issues. It criticized the corruption 
of government officials and called for greater consideration to be 
given to qualifications and merit than to kinship in the government 
appointment process. It also stressed that the planned consultative 
council should be completely independent and should have broad 
powers. Moreover, the memorandum called for a buildup of the 
strong army and for a ‘national’ foreign policy, not based on foreign 
alliances not sanctioned by the Sharia.
This memorandum was followed by another one, the ‘Memo­
randum of Advice’, dated July 1992. It was signed by a large group of 
more than a hundred lower-level ulama, including many academics 
at Islamic colleges and universities and sent to Sheikh Abd al-Aziz 
Ibn Baz, the head of the Council o f Senior Scholars and Secretary
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General (with the ministerial rank) of the Administration of 
Religious Studies, Legal Opinion, Mission and Guidance.(Kostiner 
and Teitelbaum, 2000: 142-3; Kramer, 2000: 264) The
memorandum repeated many themes from the earlier petitions, 
such as the criticism of corruption, nepotism and favoritism, lack 
o f respect of individual rights, the denial of freedom of expression 
(for Islamic preachers, teachers and activists) and close cooperation 
and dependence on Western powers. It requested independent 
judiciary and establishment of a consultative council. At the same 
time the memorandum called for strict application of the Sharia, 
the abolition of all un-Islamic laws and revision of treaties with 
non-Muslim and un-Islamic states and institutions. The signatories 
complained that the ulama were not being consulted by the state 
authorities in crucial economic, political and military issues and 
demanded that more power be given to them. All together, the 
memorandum requested the creation of much more purely Islamic 
state.
Leaders of the large Shi’ite population also wrote a petition 
to the King in which they strongly supported the establishment 
o f a consultative council. At the same time, they demanded the 
discontinuation of discrimination against Shi’ites in the country, 
especially in the labor market, universities and the army, as well as 
the cessation of the harassment they faced while performing their 
religious rites.
All these developments were a sign of serious tensions in the 
country. Therefore, on March 1, 1992, King Fahd decided to 
take some actions to calm down the situation. He decreed the 
long-promised Basic Laws -  a constitution-like document, the 
statute for a new consultative council, and a system of regional 
government for the kingdom’s 14 provinces. The Consultative 
Council was established as a debating assembly consisting of 60 
members appointed by the King. The Council was to study all
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government regulations, treaties and international accords before 
they are promulgated through royal decree, and deliberate on and 
evaluate economic and social development programs. It was also 
to discuss annual reports submitted by ministers and state-owned 
organizations and present recommendations, and was empowered 
to question the cabinet members. The Council cannot, by its own 
constitution, initiate debate on issues; it has to await the submission 
from the government, or obtain permission from the King to do 
so. While the verdicts of the Council are neither binding on the 
King nor on the government, usually either the ministers accept 
the recommendations of the Council or the two parties reach a 
compromise (Jahel, 1998: 26-31). The King retained the power to 
dissolve or reorganize the Council at will.
King Fahd decided also to accommodate the Shi’ites. He 
invited their leaders to Jeddah and listened to their grievances. In 
exchange for ending anti-Saud Shi’ite propaganda from abroad, the 
government released Shi’ite political prisoners and allowed exiles 
to return; Shi’ite leadership was also assured that their social and 
religious demands would be addressed as well.
The Consultative Council finally set to work in mid-1990s. 
Members of the Council have been chosen from among the country’s 
regions and important constituent groups: religious establishment, 
government bureaucracy and the business community, followers 
of both conservative and liberal ideologies. They have usually been 
highly-educated and experienced people, considered experts in their 
respective fields (academics, retired senior officers, ex-civil servants and 
private businessmen).1 Sheikh Mohammed bin Ibrahim bin Jubair, 
a respected Hanbali jurist and former Minister of Justice became 
the President of the first State Council and of successive ones (to be 
replaced after his death in 2002 by Saleh bin Abdullah bin Homaid).
The Council quickly established itself within the Saudi political 
system. This is why the Council was enlarged from 60 to 90
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members in 1997, to 120 in May 2001 and to 150 members in 
April 2005. Its influence, not necessarily grounded in law, has 
been a function of its members prominence and diversity. It also 
reflects the tradition of governance, which “prizes consensus, strives 
to maintain harmony through consultation and is deeply averse to 
conflict” (International Crisis Group, 2004: 6). Only occasionally 
the Council’s members have been seriously divided over certain 
issues: for example, in 2005, they disagreed over women’s rights to 
drive cars. While the verdicts of the Council are neither binding on 
the King nor on the government, usually either the ministers accept 
the recommendations o f the Council or the two parties reach a 
compromise.
Despite establishment o f the Consultative Council and agree­
ment with Shi’ites, political tensions in the Kingdom did not come 
to the end.
In May 1993, several prominent Islamist scholars and academics 
established the Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights, 
the first ever opposition organization in the Kingdom openly 
challenging the monarchy, accusing the government and senior 
ulama for not doing enough ‘to protect the legitimate Islamic 
rights o f the Muslims’. Skillfully using the new media (faxes and 
Internet) the Committee members for the next few years, from 
the Kingdom and later from the exile in London, questioned the 
very foundation of the regime: the contract between rulers and the 
religious establishment, and criticized the behavior and decisions 
taken by Saudi authorities, and King Fahd in particular2 (Kostiner 
1997; Teitelbaum, 2000).
The government strongly responded to this action. In particular, 
in September 1994, two leaders of the Committee, Salman al-Awda 
and Safar al- Hawaii were arrested together with a large number of 
their followers, in the city of Burayda, Qasim region. Moreover, 
Sheikh Abd al-Aziz Ibn Baz, issued a fatwa, that unless al-Awda and
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al-Hawali, repented their former conduct, they would be banned 
from lecturing, meetings and cassette-recording.
In the late 1990s Crown Prince Abdullah became de facto ruler 
of the Kingdom, due to the deteriorating health of King Fahd. 
Abdullah has been perceived as a more pragmatic leader than many 
other, top-positioned members o f the ruling family, the man who 
well understands challenges lacing the Kingdom in modern times. 
He began to enact reforms to offset economic problems, budgetary 
deficit and unemployment. He also started to work carefully to 
defuse the biggest potential threat to al-Sauds legitimacy: educated 
middle-class Islamists, who for years, with the increased intensity, 
have loudly been denouncing corruption and demanding a change 
in the country. For that purpose, he released several radical Sunni 
fundamentalist prisoners, hoping to calm down existing tensions.
In the aftermath of 9/11: 
Further demands for reforms
The attacks on the New York’s World Trade Center and the Pentagon 
with hijacked planes on September 11, 2001, had a profound 
impact on Saudi political scene. Out o f 19 hijackers, 15 were 
Saudis. Then, it occurred that majority of the al-Qaeda soldiers, 
arrested in Afghanistan and brought to Quantanamo were Saudis. 
Osama bin Laden used to be a Saudi citizen and his organization 
was supported by contributions from Saudis. Thus, many people in 
the West started to believe that Saudis “waged war” against them 
(Pollack, 2003), that they were “financing the spread of the idea 
that free societies must be overthrown and totalitarian Wahhabi 
Islam must be imposed by force”(Barone, 2002). “The country’s 
rulers, its religious beliefs, social customs and educational curricula 
became targets of many hostile commentary. The Kingdom came to 
be portrayed as “a breeding ground for terrorism, an anachronistic,
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backward country (...) teaching its children to hate the West” 
(International Crisis Group, 2004: 8). Rohan Gunaratna in his 
book “Inside al Qaeda” expressed a rather common belief that there 
have been so many terrorists produced by Saudi Arabia because 
it is not democratic, and therefore does not represent the people 
(Gunaratna, 2002).3 Dore Gold, former Israeli ambassador to the 
United Nations, wrote a book “Hatreds Kingdom. How Saudi 
Arabia Supports the New Global Terrorism” (Gold, 2003). In such 
an atmosphere, in November 2003, members o f the U.S. Congress 
went as far as to introduce a draft o f the Saudi Arabia Accountability 
Act, which would impose sanctions on the Kingdom unless the 
U.S. President certified that Riyadh continued to make maximum 
effort to fight terrorism. (The legislation eventually went on voting 
as an amendment to the foreign aid bill requesting to add Saudi 
Arabia to the list of countries which “have funded terrorists and 
fostered hatred o f the West”, and was rejected, 231-191 as the State 
Department declared that Saudi Arabia had taken actions to disrupt 
domestic al-Qaeda cells and improved anti-terrorist cooperation 
with the U.S.) At the same time President Bush announced the 
new American policy towards the region, admitting that 60 years 
o f supporting dictatorships in the region had not made Americans 
safe (Kapiszewski, 2004). In the carefully chosen words he also 
encouraged political reforms in the Kingdom, saying that “by 
giving the Saudi people a greater role in their own society, the 
Saudi government can demonstrate true leadership in the region”. 
In another speech he added, with an obvious reference to Saudi 
Arabia, that a different approach, “suppressing dissent”, can only 
increase radicalism (Washington Post, 30 June 2004).
In the wake of a possible Western intervention in Iraq, the 
action aimed to replace Saddam Husseins regime with a democratic 
government, Saudi Arabia Crown Prince Abdullah decided to make 
a move by himself and called for reforms in Arab states. In January
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2003, he proposed his own “Charter to Reform the Arab Stand,” 
which was meant to encourage regional economic development 
and popular participation in politics. He noted that “internal 
reform and enhanced political participation are essential steps for 
the building of Arab capabilities and for providing the conditions 
for a comprehensive awakening and development o f Arab human 
resources” (Arab News, January 16, 2003). Abdullah’s plan was 
briefly discussed at the Arab leaders summit in Cairo in March
2003, devoted generally to the Iraqi problem on the eve of the U.S. 
military intervention, and later on the Tunis summit, in May 2004 
(although Saudi Arabia did not attend it). In general, however, 
Abdullah’s plan did not bring any concrete results.
Accusations of supporting terrorism as well as the U.S. pressure 
to reform their system enraged many Saudis. They accused the West, 
the U.S. in particular, of staging a propaganda war against them. 
They were right at least to some extend. Al Qaida terrorism was as 
much a threat to them as to the West. Most o f them did not hate 
America, had positive feelings toward the country and only totally 
rejected Washington’s policies in the Middle East. Nevertheless, 
as their anger could easily turned against Saudi authorities closely 
cooperating with the U.S. government on various issues, Prince 
Abdullah met with the ulama and warned them against preparing 
any campaign on the matter.
At the same time some reformists decided to use the tense 
situation in the region and in the Kingdom itself to intensify 
pressure for political, social and educational changes. In 2003, they 
submitted several petitions to the King calling for reforms.
The first one, called “A Vision for the Present and the Future of 
the Nation”, was prepared in January, among others by Abdullah 
al-Hamed, an Islamist from Riyadh, Mohamed Said Tayyeb, a 
liberal lawyer from Jeddah and Jaafar al-Shayeb, a Shi’ite activist. It 
was signed by 104 academics, businessmen, religious scholars and
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professionals from various regions and representing different religious 
and political orientations (Dekmejain, 2003; Russel, 2003a). 
Staying within the framework of Sharia, the signatories called for 
the convening of an “open national conference” to discuss existing 
problems, providing the Consultative Council with legislative and 
control powers and made it an elected body, and for an independent 
judiciary, freedom of expression and the establishment of civil society 
institutions. They also requested fair distribution of wealth among 
different regions and introducing measures to fight corruption, 
bribery and the abuse of official powers. The petition, despite its non- 
confrontational tone and respectful language towards the monarchy, 
essentially suggested the establishment of institutions to curb the 
power of the ruling family and guarantee popular participation in 
decision-making, replacing a system with the rulers absolute power 
with a constitutional monarchy where power is shared with elected 
representatives (International Crisis Group, 2004: 14).
The end of April witnessed the second petition, prepared in turn 
by the Shi’ite community and signed by 450 men and women. It 
was entitled “Partners in One Nation” to reaffirm the Shi’ite loyalty 
to the state (often questioned by radical Sunni Islamists). It followed 
the spirit o f the January petition but urged government particularly 
to end the discrimination of Shi’ites in employment and let them 
practice their religious rites (Jones, 2003). The petition appealed to 
put an end to “fanatical sectarian tendencies stimulating hatred”, 
unlawful arrests, the deprivation of the right to travel, etc., as well 
as a public announcement by country’s leaders to respect Shi’ite 
rights and equality with other citizens. (Shi’ites are often perceived 
by Wahhabi religious establishment as infidels, and their veneration 
of saints and shrines, celebration of the prophet Mohammed’s 
birthday and other rituals as sinful).
The Shi’ite petition should be understood in the context of 
sectarian tensions existing in Saudi Arabia. What has happened
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across the border after the beginning of the Iraqi war has an impact 
on the situation in Saudi Arabia (as well as in other countries with 
major Shi’ite populations, i.e. Kuwait and Bahrain). Clashes between 
Shi’ites and U.S. troops in Iraq inspired feelings of solidarity there, 
while the vision of a future Shi’ite-led government in Baghdad 
made some people anxious, as such a development could strengthen 
demands for far-reaching political reforms in Bahrain or in Shi’ite- 
dominated Eastern provinces o f Saudi Arabia. Just before the Iraqi 
war, on February 3, 2003, an article in the Wall Street Journal, 
subsequently translated into Arabic and reprinted in the region, 
suggested that the Shi’ite in Al-Hasa region would be willing to 
secede from the Kingdom, seeking to re-establish their state in 
that part of the Peninsula. That was accompanied by rumors that 
“liberating” the Eastern Province in such a way had in fact became 
an official U.S. policy (Jones, 2003). To calm down tensions, Prince 
Abdullah met with the Shi’ite reform group and listened to their 
complaints, while the nation’s most senior religious leader, Sheikh 
Abdul Aziz bin Abdullah al-Sheikh, declared that accusation of other 
Muslims, who may obey a different doctrine, o f being disbelievers 
is not permitted under Islam and such an approach “results in 
murdering innocent people, destroying facilities, disorder, and 
instability” (Murphy, 2003).
The lack of visible results o f the January petition prompted new 
appeals. In September 2003, more than 300 Saudis (including this 
time 50 women), Sunnis and Shi’ites from all parts o f the Kingdom, 
signed a petition entitled “In Defense o f the Nation”. In it they 
basically repeated the demands from the previous petition but in the 
view of the emergence of terrorist activity in the Kingdom, openly 
blamed the existing political restrictions for its development. “Being 
late in adopting radical reforms and ignoring popular participation 
in decision-making have been the main reasons that helped the fact 
that our country reached this dangerous turn, and this is why we
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believe that denying the natural rights of the political, cultural and 
intellectual society to express its opinions has led to the dominance 
of a certain way of thinking that is unable to dialogue with 
others... which is what helped create the terrorist and judgmental 
mind that our country is still plagued with.’’(www.arabrenewal. 
com) Moreover, the signatories of the petition criticized “unilateral 
and judgmental thinking, pretending to hold and monopolize the 
truth” and called for “nurturing a pluralistic atmosphere that paves 
the way (...) towards the acceptance of the different.”
The Saudi government, to improve its image, organized in 
October 2003, the international human rights conference, first of 
its kind in the Kingdom. During the conference, on a call from 
the dissident, London-based Movement for Islamic Reform in 
Arabia, a hundred or so Saudis, men and women, went into the 
streets o f Riyadh in the first in decades large-scale protest in the 
country. They demanded political, economic and administrative 
reforms. Saudi police fired warning shots, used tear gas and arrested 
many demonstrators. Next week, only a heavy police presence 
thwarted further demonstrations in several cities. As the follow-up 
of the conference, the quasi-independent National Human Rights 
Commission was established in March 2004. It was composed of 
41 male and female members, headed by Abdullah ibn Saleh Al- 
Obaid, former secretary-general o f the Muslim World League and 
member of the Consultative Council. It is supposed to monitor 
the human rights situation in the Kingdom, including violation of 
women’s rights (Ghafour, 2004).
As many reformers who signed the January 2003 petition 
decided not to sign the September one as too liberal and anti- 
Islamic, another petition was prepared in December, this time 
again jointly by a diversified group of Islamists, liberals and 
Shi’ites. It was titled “An Appeal to the Leadership and the People: 
Constitutional Reform First” . Calling for the implementation of
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the reforms outlined in the January petition, the signatories this 
time went further, demanding adoption of the constitution, which 
would construct “a modern Arab Islamic state”.
"National Dialogue"
A response of the government to petitions of the early 2000s 
was the organization of broad debates, the so-called “National 
Dialogue” sessions. The first one, held in Riyadh in June 2003, 
gathered religious leaders from various Islamic currents and sects: 
ulama from the official religious establishment, popular salafi 
preachers3, Shi’ites and Sufis. The presence of the last two was o f a 
particular note, as they are not considered brothers in faith by the 
dominant Wahhabis. The meeting was probably aimed at bringing 
some Sunni-Shi’ite understanding, the issue of special significance 
in times of change in neighboring Iraq, where Shi’ites were growing 
in power (International Crisis Group, 2004: 16).
The second session took place in Mecca in December 2003. 
Entitled “Extremism and Moderation, a Comprehensive View”, 
it gathered 60 intellectuals, clerics and businesspeople, including 
10 women (seated in a different room). Problems with the rise of 
Islamic militancy as well as various political, social and educational 
issues were openly discussed at the meeting. The meeting ended in 
the formulation of 18 recommendations which were later formally 
presented to Prince Abdullah. They included holding elections 
for the Consultative Council and local consultative councils, 
encouraging establishment of trade unions, voluntary associations 
and other civil society institutions, separating the legislative, 
executive and judiciary powers, developing new school curricula 
promoting spirit of tolerance, dialogue and moderation as well as 
broadening freedom of expression (Al Sharq Al Awsat, January 4,
2004).
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The third “National Dialogue” session was held in Medina in 
June 2004 and was devoted to “Rights and Duties of Women”. 
Although every other o f the 70 participants was a woman, the 
meeting was dominated by conservative men. In effect, controversial 
topics, like lifting the ban on women drivers, or allowing them to 
travel without a male guardian, were avoided. This was also why a 
delegation of women went separately to see Prince Abdullah and 
submitted to him an alternative set o f specific recommendations, 
which he promised to consider (Al Hayat, 15 and 18 June, 2004). 
It is worth noting that a few days before the session, a group of 
nearly 130 religious scholars issued a joint statement asserting that 
total equality between men and women would contravene Islam. 
The statement also criticized several Saudi newspapers for being 
“proponents o f Westernization” in relation to women {Al Qtids Al 
Arabi, June 9, 2004).
Although in Saudi Arabia’s political and cultural environment 
organization of such sessions was 3 definitive opening of the 
authorities to a dialogue with the opposition, the impact o f the 
said sessions should not be overestimated. They were government- 
sponsored and controlled events, and recommendations adopted by 
the participants are unlikely to be implemented soon, if at all. Some 
even believe that the sessions “were essentially gimmicks meant to 
co-opt critics and project a more acceptable face of the regime to 
both domestic and international audiences” (International Crisis 
Group, 2004: 18). In February 2004, 880 participants in the 
“National Dialogue” meetings along with the petition-writers, 
frustrated with lack of any signs of reforms, sent Prince Abdullah a 
letter urging him to announce a timetable for the implementation 
of the recommendations adopted at the second session (www. 
arabrenewal.com).
Organizing the “National Dialogue” sessions, meeting with 
signatories of ’’memorandums” to discuss their demands and in­
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eluding some of them in the “National Dialogue” debates were not 
the only reactions from the authorities to petitions.
First of all, in general, the government, allowed Saudi dissidents 
to speak more openly in public ‘to let off the steam’, and let 
newspapers publish articles criticizing government (though no 
criticism of the royal family or publication of the texts o f petitions 
was still allowed). One of the prominent Islamist dissidents, Ahmad 
al-Tuweijeri, received an appointment to the Consultative Council. 
Many others have been rewarded with audiences with members of 
the royal family to air their gripes.
Secondly, the high-ranking officials for the first time began to 
talk about broadening political participation. That topic used to be 
taboo among the ruling family (Al-Dakhil, 2004). For example, 
the Foreign Minister, prince Saud Al-Faisal, remarked that Saudi 
Arabia “has reached a stage in [its] development that requires 
expanding political participations,” while Prince Turki al-Faisal 
said that “reforming the Kingdom is not a choice, it is a necessity” 
(Jones, 2003). Moreover, Prince Sultan bin Abdel Aziz, the minister 
of defense and a key figure in a ruling family told the Consultative 
Council, that the country leadership agrees with demands that this 
body should be developed and given further powers, to ‘monitor’ 
and ‘supervise’ the government in particular.
Finally, in this liberalized mode in the country, also the issue of 
elections became discussed widely. The Islamist reformer, Abd al- 
Aziz al-Qasim noted: “It is hard to overestimate the importance 
of this step in a society where non-interference in politics is 
considered the condition of good citizenship” (International Crisis 
Group, 2004: 19). While reformers were demanding elections, 
many Saudi officials, were afraid o f such a move. They believed 
that this would pose too great a risk to stability o f the country 
and strengthen the hand of radical Islamists. According to some 
of them “because conformity to strict religious dogma remains
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the principal criterion for judging matters public and private (...) 
political debates could potentially turn into religious clashes”, 
while “the culture of democracy accepts the pluralism of opinions 
and relativity in all things. How can you reconcile relativity with 
a society that is governed by religion?” and “democracy right now 
will produce something very similar to the Taliban” (International 
Crisis Group, 2004: 19-20).
Municipal elections
In response to internal and external pressures, but in a surprise to 
many, the government decided to go ahead with some elections, 
although, facing opposition, only with relatively un-important one 
to municipal councils (following a well tested pattern in neighboring 
Bahrain and Qatar). In October 2003 it announced that municipal 
elections will be held within the next twelve months. In August
2004, the government made crucial decisions about them; first, 
that only half of the seats would be filled through elections (the 
remaining were expected to be made of nominated incumbents 
with the experience to assists the new members), second, that 
elections in 178 municipalities would be held in three phases: in 
mid-November, after Ramadan, in Riyadh, and before and after 
hajj in other parts o f the country, ending in January 2005. That 
was to let the authorities take a single step and evaluate the impact 
o f elections before proceeding to the next phase. At the same 
time the Saudi government depicted the whole process leading to 
municipal elections as being wholly compatible with Islam. This 
was an important matter as many Islamists considered the elections 
un-Islamic. In particular, Osama bin Laden in the message released 
on December 16, 2004 criticized the elections, noting “it is haram 
(forbidden) to participate in legislative bodies ... because Allah is 
the only lawgiver” (Henderson, 2005).
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Despite such criticism even Islamists participated in elections in 
large number. In the first round, which took place in the Riyadh 
region on February 10, 2005, Islamists won and took all of the seven 
available seats. Only around 140,000 men had registered to vote out of 
400,000 eligible voters in the area; 65 per cent of them eventually went 
to the pools in the capital, while in other districts the turnout often 
exceeded even 80 per cent (Agence France Press, February 11, 2005). 
Six hundred and forty-six candidates were on the list. Immediately 
after the results were announced, many loosing candidates accused 
the winning seven of illegal formulation of an Islamist alliance, using 
the backing of Saudi religious establishment to get votes, and breaking 
election laws for campaigning on the election day. (MacFarquhar, 
2005) The winners denied all the allegations. Interestingly enough, 
the winners used neither ads in the Saudi dailies, nor posters, nor did 
they set up “discussion tents” where they could meet potential voters, 
as all loosing candidates did. Instead, they skillfully used Internet and 
mobile phones (short text messages), the tactic often used by Islamist 
groupings in the region to promote their ideas.
The situation repeated during the final round of voting on April 
21: there was not much interest in elections {AssociatedPress, April 23,
2005). In the Kingdom’s commercial capital o f Jeddah, only 55,000 
men, or 22 percent of the city’s eligible voters, registered. Similarly 
low turnout was observed in Mecca and Medina. Islamist candidates 
obtained most votes. In Jeddah, the most liberal Saudi city, all the 
seven winning candidates were those whose names had appeared 
on what was dubbed the ‘golden list’ -  the picks o f prominent 
conservative religious scholars from among 530 candidates. Five of 
the six winners in Buraydah, capital o f very conservative Qaseem 
province, had been given a similar clerical support. Islamists won all 
the seats in the holy cities o f Mecca and Medina as well.
Only in the voting which took place on March 3 in eastern 
regions, in some Shi’ite-majority areas, several non-Islamist were
-131 -
Saudi Arabia: Steps forward democratization.
elected and the turnout was significant (Reuters, March 6, 2005). 
For example, Shiites swept the board in the town of Qatif and 
won five out of six seats in Al Hasa. But in the urban centres of 
Dammam, Dhahran and Al Khobar inhabited by significant Shi’ite 
population, these were Sunni candidates who won with apparent 
backing from fundamentalist clerics.
The low turnout was caused by several factors, including 
restrictions on campaigning, an inexperienced and poorly informed 
electorate, and the low stakes: voters were choosing only half the 
seats on city councils: bodies with limited responsibilities anyway. 
The strong showing of the Islamist candidates was credited to 
the fact that as non-government political activity is forbidden in 
the Kingdom, religious gatherings are the only ones allowed and 
clerics can speak there publicly. Nevertheless, most of the elected 
Islamists represent the moderate religious stand and many of them 
are graduates from Western universities.
Establishing the municipality councils through elections has 
been an innovation for this deeply conservative country used to 
tribal and extended-family system of politics. Yet since elections 
to fill out half o f the municipal councils went smoothly, it can 
be expected that elections for the whole municipal councils can 
be announced in a year or two, then for regional councils, and 
eventually for the Consultative Council. Some reformers, however, 
have been afraid that municipal elections were an isolated incident 
made by the government just to please the outside world and will 
not be followed by other democratic reforms.
Broadening the scope of reforms
There were other decisions of political nature taken by the Saudi 
government in the early 2000s. The royal decree of November 
29, 2003, enhanced the Consultative Council rights to act as a
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partly legislative as opposed to purely advisory body. In particular, 
individual members were granted authority to propose new 
legislation and to have more power in disputes with the cabinet. At 
the same time, it was decided to begin, for the first time, televised 
coverage of the weekly sessions o f the Consultative Council. That 
became an important decision, as Saudis have a traditional aversion 
to public debate, preferring to settle matters behind the closed doors 
instead. The Shura members and Saudi intellectual elite welcomed 
these steps, although they clearly wanted further enhancement o f the 
Council’s role, in particular, following the Kuwaiti parliamentarian 
model, to make it an elective assembly, with power to pass the 
budget, and to give or withdrew confidence from ministers; their 
claims included also separation of the office of prime minister from 
that of the King (International Crisis Group, 2004: 21). In response 
to such proposals, the Council was further reformed in the spring 
of 2005: its members were allowed to have access to information 
on state revenues, discuss the state budget and question ministers. 
Prince Sultan dismissed, however, calls for an elected Council, 
saying that voters may choose illiterate and unqualified candidates 
to it and that the move would not serve national interests. “In some 
countries there are political parties and elections but the result is 
nothing, because of their quarrels and conflicts between them” 
(Reuters, January 26, 2004). As mentioned already, in April 2005, 
the Council was expanded to 150 members. In May, 210 members 
of local consultative councils in the Kingdom’s 13 administrative 
regions were appointed by the authorities.
Some reforms were introduced to the judiciary system. A new 
bill regulating the rights of defendants and suspects before courts 
and police came into effect, in particular allowing lawyers to present 
arguments in criminal courts. In February 2004, an international 
organization -  Human Rights Watch, was granted access to the 
Saudi judicial system, including its prisons. In October 2005, the
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Human Rights Commission was granted more rights, including 
the right to access prisons and detention centers and submit reports 
directly to the prime minister. The Commissions new president, 
Turki ibn Khaled Al-Sudairi obtained the rank of a minister (Jabarti 
and Mubarak, 2005).
Steps were also taken to change the situation of women. In the 
year 2000, Saudi Arabia finally ratified the UN convention on 
elimination of all forms of discrimination against women. Thanks 
to the efforts o f Prince Abdullah, women were for the first time 
allowed to present their grievances to the Consultative Council, 
in particular complaints about their marital status and dowries. A 
female member of the royal family was appointed Undersecretary at 
the Ministry o f Education -  the highest position ever held by a Saudi 
woman. The government began issuing identity cards to women 
thus allowing them to be listed as citizens rather than dependents 
on husbands or father’s cards. Responding to long-time popular 
pressure for reform of the neglected female education, the control 
o f the General Presidency for Girl’s Education, run by the religious 
establishment before, was transferred to the government’s Ministry 
o f Education, which added prestige and financial capacities to the 
education of girls. In May 2003, the Council of Ministers issued 
a decree allowing women to obtain commercial licenses in their 
own names, without the need for a male guardian permission. At 
the same time, the document appealed to government departments 
and Chamber of Commerce to create more jobs for women. That 
was especially important as, according to official figures, only about 
5 per cent o f Saudi working age women were employed.
On the other hand, conservative forces continued to oppose 
any changes in the status of women. In particular, Saudi women 
were not allowed to vote or to stand in municipal elections. The 
officially cited reasons for not allowing women to participate in 
the elections were of administrative and legislative character and
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also the result o f the Kingdoms limited experience in conducting 
elections. They did not stress religious norms or Saudi customs, 
just created a window of hope for many liberals.5 Many believe 
that women may be allowed to vote during the next elections in 
four years.
Surprisingly, in late November 2004, the government allowed 
women to participate in the elections for the first time: they were 
to choose board members of the Saudi chambers of commerce and 
industry (in the past, men voted on behalf of women members). 
Nevertheless, only a small number of women used that opportunity 
(Arab News, December 1, 2004).6 In September 2005, government 
for the first time allowed Saudi women to be elected to Jeddah 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry, reserving two places for 
them. At the same time, however, Saleh bin Humaid, speaker of 
the Shura Council, stated that talk about women members o f the 
Consultative Council “was premature” (Salil, 2003).
On January 17, 2004, there was an interesting incident at 
the Jeddah Economic Forum, attended by such personalities as 
Bill Clinton. The keynote address was given by Lubna Olayan, 
a leading Saudi business woman, connected to the ruling family. 
She was introduced by Prince Mohammed Al Faisal, the grandson 
of King Faisal. Women attending the Forum were separated from 
their male colleagues by a partition only (i.e. not segregated into a 
separate room as it has been usually the case). Pictures of Olayan s 
unveiled face appeared next day in some Saudi newspapers, making 
her the first Saudi women appearing in such a way in the media.7 
In reaction to that incident, the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia, the 
Kingdom’s leading religious official appointed by the government, 
strongly condemned such a behavior. Yet at the same time, Akbaria,. 
an all-news Saudi TV  channel began featuring three non-muhajaba 
women anchors, and Okaz, a popular Saudi daily ran a photo of 
them. Another cultural border was crossed.
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All of these, in the Saudi context, were significant moves. The 
government cannot go much further now with granting women more 
rights as the “women issue” as such is so emotional and symbolic that 
is always ready to mobilize wide opposition (Gause, 2004: 4).
The Saudi press, to a great extent privately owned, plays an 
increasingly important role in the political discourse. In last years, 
newspapers although did not go that far as to publish or discuss any 
o f the reform petitions, but opened their columns to unprecedented 
criticism of such matters as education (accused of backwardness 
as well as o f not promoting tolerance), poverty, unemployment, 
drug use or the mistreatment of foreign workers. Some called into 
question elements of the Wahhabi discourse, suggesting a link 
between certain attitudes promoted by the religious establishment 
and the rise o f violent extremism (Gause, 2004: 4). A good example 
o f the openness of newspapers was a commentary written on the 
first anniversary of the September 11 attacks by Rasheed Abu- 
Alsamh in the Arab News:
First, we must stop denying that any of the hijackers were Saudis or 
even Arab. We must also stop saying that the September 11 attacks 
were a CIA-Zionist plot to make the Arabs and Islam look bad. 
That is utter nonsense. We must be mature and responsible enough 
to admit that these sick minds that hatched and perpetrated these 
dastardly attacks, were, sadly, a product of a twisted viewpoint of 
our society and our religion ... We must stop the hatred being 
taught to our children in schools.
Nobody would dare to publish such comments before. 
Following the suicide bombings of Western residential 
compound in Riyadh on May 12, 2003, in which 35 people died, 
newspapers ran a series o f unusually bold editorials on the problems 
of Saudi society (Blanford, 2003). An extraordinary article was
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published by Prince Bandar bin Sultan, the Saudi ambassador to 
Washington, in Al-Watan, on June 1, 2004. The Prince recognized 
the Saudi effort against terrorism as ‘feeble’, and went on saying 
that terrorism “has nothing to do with America or Israel or the 
Christians or Jews... So let us stop these meaningless justifications 
for what those criminals are doing and let stop blaming others 
while the problem comes from within us.” Elsewhere in the article 
he noted that the Kingdom’s religious scholars “have to declare 
jih ad  against those deviants and to fully support it, as those who 
keep silent about the truth are mute devils.” The Saudi-owned, 
but London-based, Asharq al-Awsat followed the line o f that 
argument. Turki al-Hamad wrote in it: “the official clergy in Saudi 
Arabia denounce violence, but theoretical base o f Wahhabism is a 
problem. It is not enhancing or encouraging violence directly, but 
if you analyze the creed itself, you will reach these results” {Time,
2003).
The religious establishment and those members of the ruling 
elite who follow their guidance promoted a different viewpoint. 
According to them, “the perpetrators of these heinous crimes are 
influenced by ideologies alien to our country and to the nature 
of our people, who throughout the ages advocated tolerance and 
coherence” {Time, 2003). Prince Mohammed bin Fahd, governor 
of the Eastern Province and the son of King Fahd, was quoted as 
saying after the Khobar attacks: “Those militants are the outcome 
of Guantanamo, Abu Gharib, Sharon and the American policy 
of the region; they are angry against anything foreign and want 
to retaliate against anything foreign” {Time, 2003). For Muhsen 
Awaji, a prominent Islamist lawyer, “it was not Wahhabism 
which produced them, they were the other circumstances in the 
region” {Time 2003). Such views were prevailing among the Saudis. 
Most of them greatly resent the implication that their religion has 
any connection to terrorism.
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Under such circumstances, broadening the freedom of the 
press was, o f course, possible only because its criticism of certain 
matters, especially terrorism, coincided with the official viewpoints. 
But when the un-written boundaries were violated, journalists 
continued to pay a heavy price. For example, a well-known editor of 
Al-Watan was dismissed in May 2003 after the newspaper aroused 
the religious establishment by publishing a series o f articles critical 
o f the clerics.
Altogether, the press scored certain victories in recent years. In 
March 2002, press criticism of behavior o f the head of religious 
institution in charge of girls’ education forced him to resign, the 
first such case in the history of the Kingdom, after the scandal 
surrounding the death of 15 schoolgirls in a fire in Mecca. In turn, 
in 2004, the government, approved the establishment of a long- 
sought Saudi Journalists’ Association, an organization aimed to 
protect the rights o f reporters.
Determinants of reforms
The road towards the broadening of political participation in Saudi 
Arabia is not straight.
First o f all, as time has shown, Saudi monarchy is a fairly stable 
regime, contrary to stereotypical views in the West, where it is 
frequently seen as an anachronistic system destined to disappear 
with modernization. Thus, its rulers do not always see the necessity 
to transform their regime quickly and extensively to stay in power. 
In the past, they were successful at managing challenges, both 
liberal and conservative. Moreover, they do not think they need the 
support o f their people to govern; their positions being legitimized 
by tradition. They also feel secure, given that the United States 
and other Western countries, despite their occasional rhetoric of 
criticizing non-democratic regimes, do not like to de-stabilize the
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region further after the Iraqi experience and — with few exceptions
-  continue to be committed to the maintenance of the status quo 
due to strategic importance of oil the Kingdom posses. In such 
circumstances, Saudi rulers often perceive the broadening of 
political participation as another gracious gift they may offer their 
subjects, rather than an action required to satisfy the vital needs of 
their population. Only occasionally do they feel pressure for change 
coming from the West, the al-Qaeda, Shiites or other politicized 
groups.
Secondly, the royal family has been divided on the issue. Many 
of its members have totally opposed reforms, especially such 
proposals as independence of the judiciary, redistribution of wealth 
or transparency of public finances, as reforms in these areas would 
seriously jeopardize their socio-economic position in the country 
(Russel, 2003b). Prince Nayef, the Minister o f Interior, when asked 
about the January 2003 petition remarked: “no to change, yes to 
development” (Jones, 2003). “Change means changing something 
that already exists. Whatever exists in the Kingdom is already well- 
established; however, there is a scope for development- development 
that does not clash with the principles of the nation.” With such 
an opinion prevalent in the government, it became obvious that at 
certain moment the authorities must restrict actions o f the reformers. 
It happened in December 2003, when Prince Nayef summoned 
a group of opposition figures and threatened them with arrest if 
they continued their activities (Financial Times, January 17, 2004). 
A few weeks later, Crown Prince Abdullah, usually perceived as 
more open and pragmatic person than the other members o f the 
ruling family, also warned the reformers that “the state will not allow 
anybody to destroy national unity or disturb the peace of its people 
under the pretext of reforms [...] We will not leave the security of 
the nation and the future o f its people to the mercy of opportunists, 
who start with provocation and end with arbitrary demands” (Arab
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News, January 15, 2004).8 In turn, Prince Nayef, the minister of 
interior, ordered in March 2004 the arrests, trial and imprisonment 
o f 13 reformers including al-Hamed and Tayyeb, who a year earlier 
were warmly welcomed by Prince Abdullah after submitting to him 
a reform petition (Yamani, 2005). Ten of them later submitted to 
Nayef s demand to stop asking for reforms and were released, the 
remaining three who refused to do so were sentenced to several 
years o f prison. Only when Abdullah became a King, were they 
pardoned.
On the other hand, some members of the royal family are ready 
to allow further broadening of political participation. In June 2005, 
the Crown Prince Abdullah, now the country’s King, apparently 
promised Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to introduce reforms 
that could give the Kingdom an elected government within 10 to 
15 years (Kralev, 2005). Also Prince Talal bin Abdel-Aziz, brother of 
King Abdullah, and one of the closest people to him, has called to 
adopt a constitutional kingdom system similar to those of Jordan, 
Bahrain, and Kuwait, and, in particular, give the Shura Council 
privileges to question and supervise the executive power and issue 
electoral laws (Al Quds A l Arabi, 29 August, 2005). It appears that 
King Abdullah considers nominating Prince Talal to the position of 
second deputy prime minister, i.e. the third in line to the throne. 
Talal insists, however, to get this post only through ballots.
Whatever the current or predominant mode in the royal family 
is, the government does not have much flexibility in terms of 
reforms. As it is engaged in a fight against extremists who accuse 
it o f deviation from the path of Islam, the regime cannot afford 
to jeopardize its relations with religious forces that also oppose 
violence, justify its legitimacy and are supported by the majority 
o f conservative Saudi society. These forces strongly oppose certain 
reforms, and in particular any dialogue with various groups and 
elections. The domestic pro-reform movement and external pressures
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do not seem to be strong enough to enforce far-reaching changes. 
The old age of the rulers and problems with succession additionally 
limit the potential for change. Only some young new leaders, who 
may replace old rulers o f Saudi Arabia in the not so distant future, 
may speed up reforms, similarly to recent developments in Qatar 
and Bahrain.
Then, it needs to be emphasized that, at least to some extent, 
the issue of reforms in Saudi Arabia is not so much between those 
who want them and those who do not. The problem hinges on 
the kind of reforms that different groups want. Here, the key issue 
(and disagreement) are the relations between reforms and secular 
modernity. A large part of the Saudi religious establishment, in 
the tradition of the conservative reformist, Sheikh Muhammad 
ibn Abd al-Wahhab, believes that modernization comes only at the 
cost of secularization and for that reason must be rejected. Some 
reformers believe however, that it is possible to have modernization 
without secularization and therefore call for enhancing political 
participation, greater transparency, rights for women, etc., claiming 
at the same time that it can be done within the framework of 
their conservative, Islamic values. Yet, as nobody talks about 
secularization of public life, Western type of political reforms are 
very unlikely. Pessimists go even further. “No matter what happens 
in Saudi Arabia, whether the insurgents actually unseat the ruling 
family, or the Sauds manage to accommodate the militants, there 
will be no ‘liberal reform’ in the Kingdom for a long time”, wrote 
Lee Smith (Smith, 2004). “In all likelihood, that country is going 
to become even more conservative.”
It is difficult for the royal family to move against the Islamists. 
After the Islamic militants took over the Grand Mosque in Mecca 
in 1979 and held hundreds of pilgrims hostage, to avoid similar 
occurrences in future, the authorities decided to accommodate the 
Islamists. “The royal family handed over education, the courts and
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Saudi life: no women on television, no music in any media, an 
overdose o f religion in schools, stores closed during prayer times, 
increased powers for the religious police were passed in the early 
1980s” (Zakaria, 2004). Now the authorities are afraid that if they 
take on the religious establishment, “the imams will stop preaching 
about infidels and start talking about royal family decadence”.
The radical Islamists are generally against reforms. They are 
afraid that reforms may de-Islamize the Kingdom. A good example 
o f that attitude was a statement released by 156 Salafi scholars 
and judges in December 2003 (and released on 1 January, 2004), 
protesting against the educational reform, meaning mostly a 
deletion of material offensive to Christians and Jews (Reuters, 3 
January, 2004). They accused the government of capitulating to 
American pressure on the matter and called teachers and parents to 
oppose the new curriculum.
Nevertheless, there is an agreement between moderate Islamists 
and secular modernists that what Saudi Arabia needs are some 
political, economic and social reforms. According to these factions, 
these could “head off the collision between the two extremes — Bin 
Laden’s Islam and George Bush’s America — that could ultimately 
destroy it” (The Guardian, 14 May, 2003) The trouble is that the 
terrorist attacks in the Kingdom make significant reforms unlikely 
because the regime is afraid to make any moves which could 
potentially destabilize the situation even further. On the other 
hand, terror makes reforms more necessary, because it has been 
causing exodus o f the now dramatically targeted foreign nationals, 
which results in the drying up of foreign investment, and can — in 
consequence — bring worsening of the socio-economic situation, 
which in turn can further help to breed the militants.
What also weakens the chances for substantial reforms is that 
those who stand for them are mostly intellectuals and academics
Saudi Arabia: Stops forward democratization...
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-  not a strong political force in the Saudi society. The Saudis at 
large, maybe except of the Shiite population, so far do not look for 
major political reforms themselves, being worried that change could 
negatively affect their socio-economic situation. They have generally 
been satisfied with what they get from the government, and even 
the existing extensive controls the regimes exercise over them do not 
dispose them negatively to their rulers. Even the demands of many 
opposition groups have only called for reforms, not for revolution: 
the opposition has wished to improve the operation of the existing 
regime, not to overthrow it (Baghat, 1998; Al-Dakhil, 2003). The 
middle class — usually the main reformist, pro-democracy grouping 
in other parts of the world — has little reason to support the downfall 
of the monarchy. The business community at large is not generally 
against reforms, which, if implemented, can give it a greater say in 
the economy of the liberalized country. At the same time, however, 
businessmen are often unwilling to get actively involved in the 
reform movement because of their dependence of the government 
and risk of losing the privileges they already possess. Similarly, the 
military and majority o f tribal sheiks, large beneficiaries of the 
existing regimes, usually strongly support the rulers. So far, there 
has been no “revolutionary proletariat”; in future, only a growing 
number of young, unemployed school graduates may lead to the 
establishment o f such a group. Last but definitely not least, most 
people lack political awareness; the civil society, the ultimate source 
of political change, is in the very preliminary stage of development. 
The majority of the Saudi people are not politically mature to the 
extent that as long as the government is not bothering them, they 
are going to go along with it; revolutionary change being therefore 
not inevitable.
On the other hand, there are many factors which can further 
enhance the broadening of political representation and the 
“democratization drive”.
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First, the phenomenon which can speed up the process is the 
Saudi changing society. In probably the first, relatively independent 
opinion pool on the matter conducted in the latter half of 2003, 
85 per cent of respondents thought that political reform would be 
beneficial for the country, 90 per cent wanted to grant more rights 
to women, and fewer than 59 per cent supported the official clergy 
(Obaid, 2004).9 Unemployment was the most pressing concern 
for respondents (80 per cent), while political reforms, corruption, 
education, or religious extremism did not exceed 10 per cent. 
Somewhat contradictory, only 12 per cent of respondents had a 
positive view of liberal reformers, probably because they associated 
them only with the writing of inefficient petitions.
Second, the economic situation can have a significant impact on 
the democratization process. In not so distant past, Saudi Arabia was 
earning far less than it used to during the oil bonanza three decades 
earlier. While the state was still relatively rich, it was running budget 
deficit, borrowed nationally and internationally, and had to turn to 
expense cutting. Moreover, while until recently many services had 
been free, the government began to charge their citizens for them, 
and even considered introducing income taxes. Should citizens be 
obliged to pay for the running of the state, the state will be forced 
to open up to their scrutiny. “No taxation, no representation” rule 
would than change. The situation has altered, however, with very 
high oil prices dominating the market since 2004. The increased 
revenues considerably improved the economic situation of the 
Kingdom, thus giving government a chance not to introduce certain 
reforms, at least in the near future. There are some analysts, however, 
who recommend the contrary. They believe that the moment is just 
right to introduce further reforms taking advantage of widespread 
public support for the new King and very good economic situation. 
(High oil prices have increased revenues in the worlds biggest oil 
producer to over $150 billion in 2005 from $106 billion a year
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earlier; the Saudi stock market has grown almost six-fold in the past 
three years, etc.) But for serious political reforms to take place, the 
royal family should be willing to give up some of their rights and 
privileges, which will be a difficult task to accomplish.
Another factor that can influence the change is the Saudi 
population: no t only is it growing at a rate that makes the maintenance 
of so generous welfare states problematic, but it is also becoming 
more literate, educated and urban: features that are characteristic for 
other societies that, in similar conditions, have usually experienced 
a political upheaval leading to democratization.
Finally, events in the neighboring states: Egypt, Iran, Yemen, 
and the new Iraq, which all have more political representation of 
citizens in the process of governance and conduct general elections, 
indirectly influence also people’s thinking across the borders; 
mostly through media reports but also through their citizens living 
in Saudi Arabia.
Conclusion
Democratization is always a long lasting process. One can foresee 
future developments, which can lead towards that goal, but there are 
also many obstacles which can slow it down, or even reverse. One can 
agree with the opinion of Flassan Hamdan al-Alkim that “although 
democracy may not be realized within the coming decade, it is 
acquiring a significant importance in the G CC states political life. 
Thus, its realization becomes a matter of time” (Al-Alkim, 1996). 
A thought that, however, should always be taken into account, is 
that democratization may not immediately produce more peaceful 
and stable regime. The political reforms can weaken it, or even de­
stabilize countries. The opposition forces are to a large extent rooted 
in Islamic fundamentalism, which, if coming to power through 
otherwise praised democratic elections, can turn the political system
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into one even more authoritarian. Political reforms introduced so 
far in Saudi Arabia can be the first steps o f the long way towards the 
creation of a democratic constitutional monarchy. At the moment, 
however, many of them are but a reconfiguration of the existing 
authoritarian regime. The current problem is whether Saudi Arabia 
can afford a lengthy debate on its reforms. Many believe that the 
rapid pace of globalization risks leaving the Kingdom behind the 
rest o f the world unless it accelerates the pace of change (Blanford, 
2003). Saudi Arabian author, Turki al-Hamad, remarked that “ten, 
twenty years ago, we had the luxury of time. We could choose the 
kind of reform pace we wanted. Now, we either reform quickly or 
collapse” {Associated Press, 9 February, 2003).
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Notes
1 In 2005, out of 150 members, 108 held doctorate degrees.
2 The Committee publications from England referred to the Saudi 
rulers as „pharaohs” and non-Islamic, while the regime as „as a mix of a 
mutilated form of Islam combined with tribalism and feudalism”, which 
“has even degenerated into a form of Mafia-like family rule”.
3 F. Gregory Gause III noted, however, that there is “no solid empirical 
evidence for a strong link between democracy, or other regime type, and 
terrorism, in either a positive or negative directions.” (Gause, 2005).
4 Salafis is the termed used commonly in Saudi Arabia for the orthodox 
Islamists, that have been termed “Wahhabis” in the West.
5 The reasons cited by the government were: lack of women to run
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womens only registration centers and polling stations as well as the fact 
that only a fraction of Saudi women have the photo identity cards needed 
to vote. Moreover, a Saudi law prohibits men and women to work together
-  a major problems if a woman became a council member.
6 Apparently, only 46 women out of 2,750 women members in the 
Riyadh Chamber of Commerce and Industry participated in the elections; 
Arab News, 1 December, 2004.
7 Earlier only pictures of non-Saudi women could appear in the 
media.
8 There is quite a disagreement among Saudi experts about divisions 
in the royal family into ‘pro-reformers’ and ‘conservationists’. See Russel, 
2003b and Doran, 2004.
9 The survey was conducted by the independent Saudi National 
Security Assessment Projects. See Obaid, 2004.
The Iraqi elections and their 
consequences. Power-sharing, a key to 
the country's political future
On January 30, 2005 the Iraqi people voted in three elections: 
for a country’s parliament (Transitional National Assembly), for 
18 district councils and, for voters in the three semi-autonomous 
Kurdish provinces in the north, for an Iraqi Kurdistan National 
Assembly. The most important for the future of Iraq were, o f course, 
elections for the National Assembly.
Last January was not the first time Iraq witnessed elections. The 
Hashemite monarchy, which ruled Iraq from 1921 until 1958, 
adopted a British-style parliamentary system. Opposition parties 
existed and participated in elections. Further, during Saddam 
Husseins rule elections were also organized, but as Hussein was the 
only candidate, they were in reality a referendum on his leadership. 
Thus, Iraq has no experience with democratic elections in the 
contemporary period, a reality that makes the events o f earlier this 
year even more significant and worthy of analysis.
Electoral rules
The rules for the 2005 elections were decided by the Iraqi Transitional 
Administrative Law (’’The interim constitution”), enacted in March
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2004, when the U.S.-led Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) 
was running Iraq. The elections were organized by the Independent 
Electoral Commission of Iraq, established by the CPA. U.N. 
election specialists provided legal and technical expertise.
With respect to voting rules, an Iraqi citizen of at least 18 years 
o f age could cast ballots. Voters for the Iraqi Kurdistan National 
Assembly had to provide proof of residence in one of the Iraq’s 
three northern provinces. The database from the U .N .’s Oil-for 
Food Program was used to prepare the voter registration lists. This 
induced some problems, however, for instance with regard to the 
more than 200,000 residents o f al-Falluja who were displaced during 
the U.S. offensive. Some complications with preparing voters’ lists 
occurred also in the Kurdish areas.
To run in the elections, a political entity had to provide a 
petition in support of its participation signed by at least 500 eligible 
voters. It had to submit the names of at least twelve candidates, one 
third o f whom had to be women (given the goal o f having the 
National Assembly consist of twenty-five percent women). In order 
to run in the elections, a candidate had to be more than thirty 
years o f age, have at least secondary school education, and not be a 
member of the armed forces. A candidate was also required to meet 
certain criteria regarding past affiliations and have a certain type of 
background. In particular, any Ba’th Party members could not be 
senior members of that party, and had to renounce their Ba’th Party 
membership and disavow all past links. Further, a candidate could 
not be a member of the “former agencies of repression,” could not 
have participated in the persecution of the Iraqis, must not have 
enriched himself or herself in an “illegitimate manner”, and must 
not have been convicted of a crime involving “moral turpitude.” 
Candidates were required to have a “good reputation” (whatever 
that might mean).
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Participation in the elections on the part of 
political groupings. Security problems
The lead-up to the elections was fraught with violence and security 
problems. On January 18, for instance, two candidates from the 
Iraqi National Accord were killed in Basra, and the following day, 
a candidate for the Constitutional Monarchy Movement was killed 
in Baghdad. Some female candidates were also attacked. What is 
more, Electoral Commission employees were the target o f threats, 
harassment and violence by insurgents. On December 19, 2004 in 
central Baghdad, for instance, a gunman shot three Commission 
employees. One important ramification of this violence was that 
political parties and individual candidates had little ability to 
prepare for the contest, and few opportunities to campaign. Very 
few groups had public meetings before the elections and most did 
not release the names of the candidates on their lists before voting 
day (except for the prominent individuals on the top of their lists).
Views on the election held by Iraqi political groups, as well as 
their willingness to participate, varied widely. In general, Shiites 
and Kurds wanted to take part in the elections, knowing they 
would emerge with power. In contrast, many Sunnis, knowing that 
the elections would ultimately result in the loss o f the beneficial 
position they had enjoyed for decades under the British and Saddam 
Hussein regimes, decided to boycott the elections. Doing so provided 
them with an excuse to subsequently question the credibility of 
the election results. In particular, the influential Muslim Scholars 
Association, an alliance of some 3,000 Sunni clerics, called for an 
election boycott to protest the U.S. occupation of Iraq in general, 
and the November 2004 assault of on Falluja in particular. The 
moderate Iraqi Islamic Party, the main Sunni faction in the postwar 
government, withdrew from the election, citing security concerns. 
Iraq’s interim President Ghazi al Yawir and Adnan Pachachi, head
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of the Independent Democrats, both Sunnis, several times called for 
the postponement o f the elections due to the dramatic instability 
that Iraq was experiencing.
Further, Kurdish political parties also threatened to boycott 
the elections to protest the fact that Kurdish residents who had 
been expelled from Kirkuk during Saddam Husseins “Arabization” 
program in the 1980’s and 1990’s were forbidden to vote in the 
provincial elections. They decided to participate in the election 
only when the Electoral Commission finally allowed them to vote 
locally for the al-Tamim provincial government. Arab and Turkmen 
leaders in Kirkuk, fearing that this decision might give Kurds the 
upper hand in the debate about the future of the area, condemned 
it and considered boycotting the elections as well.
Finally, radical Islamic groups, such as the al-Qaeda linked 
Ansar al-Sunna, had warned that the elections were “farcical and 
un-Islamic” and threatened to punish those who participated.
On the other hand, the leading Shi’ite cleric, Grand Aytollah 
Ali al-Sistani, issued an edict that called voting a “religious duty 
similar to prayers and fasting”, and stated that abstention from 
voting “constitutes disobedience of God Almighty”. Sistani and his 
faction believed that successful elections would be the best way to 
bring the U.S. occupation of Iraq to an end.
Election results
In the elections, Iraqis voted for 111 entities: Nine multiparty 
coalitions, 66 single parties and 36 individuals.
The main Shiite political parties, including the Islamic Da’wa 
Party and the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq 
(SCIRI), supported by Ayatollah al-Sistani, formed a coalition 
called the United Iraqi Alliance and presented voters with a list of 
228 of their candidates for parliamentary seats. The leaders of these
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parties, Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim from the SCIRI and Ibrahim al-Jafari 
from the Da’wa Party held the top positions on that list. Ahmad 
Chalabi’s secular Iraqi National Accord, an umbrella organization 
of diverse opposition groups (including Kurds, Shiites, and Sunnis) 
also joined the alliance.
The main Kurdish parties, the Kurdish Democratic Party 
and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan ran on a joint ticket, 
called the Kurdish list. Other multiparty coalitions included the 
Iraqi Independent Block led by Ghassan al-Attiya, and the Arab 
Democratic Front. Interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi and his 
party, the Iraqi National Front, presented a 240-candidate coalition 
list.Iraq’s Interim President Ghazi al-Yawir and his Iraqi Grouping 
ran an 80-person slate. Other single party lists included those 
presented by the Constitutional Monarchy Movement, the Iraqi 
Communist Party, the Iraqi Turkmen Front, and the Islamic 
Party. Finally, while most Sunni parties did not participate in the 
elections, some influential individual Sunni candidates did, most 
notably Adnan Pachachi.
According to the official results, 8,456,266 Iraqis cast their 
ballots, a total that represents 58 percent of the registered electorate 
of more than 14 million people. The International Organization 
for Migration arranged for ex-patriot Iraqis to cast their ballots in 
some 14 countries.
The elections were monitored by a number of Iraqi organizations. 
Foreign observers were not present in large numbers due to security 
concerns, and many tried to monitor the contest from neighboring 
Jordan. The elections were generally considered fair. Nevertheless, 
the release of the final results was delayed for some days because of 
complaints of some electoral irregularities.
Iraqis voted largely along sectarian and ethnic lines, with 
all the secular parties having far less success than their religious 
counterparts. The United Iraqi Alliance received 48.2 percent of
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the vote which translated into 140 seats in the parliament; the 
Democratic Patriotic Alliance of Kurdistan received 25.7 percent 
o f the vote and was consequently awarded 75 seats in the assembly; 
and the Iraqi List obtained 13.8 percent of the vote and thus won 
40 seats. The remaining 20 seats in the parliament were divided 
among nine other parties, which together received 12.3 percent of 
the vote.
The Shiite United Iraqi Alliance was unquestionably the winner, 
finally translating its demographic weight into political power after 
decades under the Sunni rule. Nonetheless, it failed to achieve the 
absolute majority that many had predicted.
Kurds swept into second place, thanks to the Sunni boycott, 
obtaining a higher percentage of votes than one might have expected 
given the Kurdish share of the Iraqi population (estimated below 
20 percent). They secured a major parliamentary presence and 
top government jobs, after decades o f struggle against successive 
Sunni regimes. One of the main reasons for their success was that 
Massud Barzani, the leader o f the Kurdish Democratic Party, and 
Jalal Talabani, head of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, were able 
to put aside years o f rivalry in the interest of combining forces on 
a joint ticket, which facilitated Kurdish success in the contest. In 
the disputed oil city o f Kirkuk, Kurds won an absolute victory in 
local polls.
With the United Iraqi Alliance mustering less than 50 percent 
o f the vote, and the Allawi-led Iraqi List coming in a distant third 
place, the Kurds became a powerbroker in national politics as a 
potential bridge between Shiite religious parties and secular Arabs.
Sunnis largely boycotted the polls. In the Sunni-dominated 
Anbar province, only two percent of eligible voters cast their ballots, 
and in Nineveh province, containing the flash-point city of Mosul, 
only 17 percent voted.
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Views on the elections
The elections were generally a success. Most importantly, they 
represented a triumph of courage for the Iraqis who went to the polls 
despite insurgents’ threats and violence. Further, they were a victory 
for the coalition forces, mostly the U.S. troops, and for the Iraqi 
police and military, who succeeded in controlling the situation in 
the country. They were also a success for the United Nations experts 
and the members of the Iraqi Electoral Commission who managed 
to organize the event despite all of the problems they faced. Finally, 
the elections signified a win for the Bush administration, which was 
happy to be able to show the world that at least one of the stated 
goals of the invasion of Iraqi -  bringing the democratic process to 
the country -  was fulfilled. (Indeed, the success of the elections 
positively affected President Bush’s approval rating in the U.S.)
There were, however, many who criticized the elections, in 
particular, many of Iraq’s Sunnis, and anti-American Arabs in the 
region. Several Islamist commentators in the media accused the 
US government of using the elections to legitimize the system it 
imposed on the Iraqi people. Al Qaeda’s Ayman al-Zawahiri called 
the elections as a “sham”. Most o f the neighboring states have 
been profoundly ambivalent about, if not hostile to, a successful 
democratic experiment in Iraq, either because they are concerned 
about the effect on it on their own citizens, or because they fear 
the emergence of another Shiite dominated neighbor (a problem 
for Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Bahrain, states with significant Shiite 
population, often opposing the existing regimes) and/or autonomous 
or quasi-independent Kurdistan (a major problem for Turkey, but 
also for Iran and Syria, all with large population of Kurds). Some 
shared the view that former president of the Soviet Union Mikhail 
Gorbachev expressed publicly -  that the elections were futile: 
“I don’t think these elections will be of any use. They may even have
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a negative impact on the country. Democracy cannot be imposed 
or strengthened with guns and tanks.” 1
In turn, a well known U.S. political analyst, Marina Ottaway, 
wrote that such elections could never be considered “a triumph of 
democracy”.2 According to her, “never have elections been held 
under such difficult conditions, with a level of violence so high 
that the country had to be locked down for several days in order 
for the vote to be held.” She also expressed the view that, as Iraqis 
had voted along sectarian lines, the results could only strengthen 
conflicts and tear the country apart. She believed that elections 
were grossly premature. “They were held before major actors had 
reached any agreement about -  indeed before they had even started 
discussing — the principles that should underlie the future political 
system of Iraq. And elections without broad agreement about basic 
issues, experience shows, are dangerous. They deepen rifts. They 
create winners and losers, making winners more arrogant and losers 
more resentful.”
Post-election dynamics: the formation 
of the new government
Although such pessimism may eventually prove founded, the first 
weeks after the elections led towards inter-party agreements rather 
than new conflicts. Such agreements were necessary as the interim 
constitution requires a two-thirds majority in the parliament to 
elect the presidential council (composed of the president and his 
two deputies).3 Given the election results, such a majority could 
only be produced through the formation of a coalition of the Shiite 
United Iraqi Alliance and the Democratic Patriotic Alliance of the 
Kurdistan.
Further, all key politicians in these parties have sought means 
to integrate Sunnis (with no presence in the parliament) into the
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political process, knowing that otherwise there is no chance for 
stability in the country. Sunnis, Iraq’s second-largest community, 
were alienated by the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime and 
the concomitant loss of the power they had possessed since the 
establishment of the country; they are widely believed to support 
the continuing insurgency. Thus, a gentleman’s agreement o f the 
kind functioning for years in Lebanon is being struck through 
the creation of an extra-official formula to guarantee proper 
representation of the three main groups, and to minimize conflict 
among them.4
On April 3, after lengthy negotiations, the National Assembly 
voted to appoint a speaker and two deputy speakers, taking the 
first step, though a largely symbolic one, toward installing a new 
government. Hajim M. al-Hassani, a prominent Sunni Arab and 
the Minister of Industry in the old interim government was elected 
speaker of the parliament, while Hussain al-Shahristani, a nuclear 
physicist and leading Shiite Arab, and ArabTaifur, a Kurd, became his 
two deputies. The speaker of the assembly is a high profile but largely 
ceremonial post. Nevertheless, to elect a Sunni to such a position was 
an important gesture and required support of rival groups.
Hassani has a doctorate from the University of Connecticut 
and lived in Los Angeles for 12 years. He became a member of 
the interim government as a member of the Iraqi Islamic Party, 
a religious Sunni group rooted in the Muslim Brotherhood 
movement. When his party decided to stop supporting the interim 
government after the American assault on Falluja, Hassani , who 
supported U.S. goals and strategy in Iraq, left the party (but 
remained in the government). Thus, he may not be the ideal person 
to try to persuade disillusioned Sunni Arabs to resist the insurgency 
and support the new government.
On April 6, the parliament elected Kurdish leader Jalal Talabani 
as the country’s new Interim President. Shiite Adel Abdul-Mahdi
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(the Finance Minister), and Sunni Arab Ghazi al-Yawer (a former 
Interim President) were elected to the Vice Presidential posts. 'The 
three, were agreed upon in inter-party negotiations and no other 
candidates were proposed. Although the presidential post is much 
less important than that of prime minister, Talabani’s appointment 
was a major political victory for Iraq’s Kurdish community, which 
was discriminated against lor decades and suffered greatly under 
Saddam Hussein. Further, it was the first time that a non-Arab 
became the head of the Arab-majority country.
Talabani, a leader o f the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (one of 
the two major Kurdish parties) is one of the longest-serving figures 
in Iraqi Kurdish politics. He is a shrewd politician with a history 
of changing alliances. Ghazi al-Yawer is a leader of the powerful 
Shammar tribe. A Georgetown University graduate and long time 
Saudi Arabia—based businessman, al-Yawer had few noticeable 
achievements while serving as Iraq’s Interim President. Adel Abdul 
Mahdi is an Islamist who fled Iraq in I960, escaping the death 
penalty to which he was condemned for his political activities. 
He has a Ph.D. in economics from France and his four children 
hold French nationality. He is one of the leaders of the SCIRI. He 
hoped to become prime minister (the most important position in 
the country) but failed to obtain enough support.
Talabani’s presidential appointment in Baghdad made room for his 
long-time foe, Kurdistan Democratic Party chief Massoud Barzani, 
to head an autonomous government in Kurdistan, diminishing 
possibility for further leadership conflicts between the two.
On April 7, the Presidential Council, shortly after being sworn 
in, appointed Shiite leader Ibrahim Jaafari as the Prime Minister of 
the country’s new interim government.
Jafari, a 58-year-old physician, has been one of the leading 
figures in the Islamic Da’awa Party. That party, one of the oldest 
Shiite Islamist movements in Iraq, fought a bloody campaign
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against Saddam Hussein’s regime in the 1970s. When the rebellion 
was crushed, Jaafari went into exile, first in Iran and then in Great 
Britain. After returning to Iraq after the fall o f Saddam, he was 
appointed to the mainly ceremonial role of vice-president in the 
US-appointed interim regime. Nevertheless, he quickly became 
Iraq’s most popular politician; an opinion poll in 2004 suggested 
Jaafari was third behind Ayatollah al-Sistani and radical cleric 
Moqtada Sadr in the public’s esteem.
Nonetheless, it is not completely clear, where Jaafari stands on 
key Iraqi issues, in particular what role religion should play in the 
country. When the Iraqi interim government was drafting its basic 
law, he was one of the champions o f Islam as the only source of 
legislation. Consequently, some of his opponents accuse him of 
being secretly linked to Iranian hardliners and fear he may now 
push for a similar theologically-based system of government. So 
far, however, there are no signs o f that. Despite his soft-spoken 
diplomatic charm, he does not appeal to all, especially to those 
Iraqis who never accepted the US-appointed interim administrators, 
and to the so-called outsiders, people who spent the harsh years 
of Saddam Hussein’s rule abroad. In his acceptance speech in the 
parliament, Jaafari expressed his hopes that sectarian conflicts would 
not dominate the Iraqi scene in the following months, pledged that 
he would try to bring Sunni Arabs into the democratic process after 
their widespread absence from polling stations, and stated that 
he would aim to satisfy the Kurds’ thirst for autonomy without 
endangering the integrity of the country.
In an interesting developments, the former Prime Minister Iyad 
Allawi coalition, the Iraqi National Accord, predicted earlier to 
become a main opposition party in the parliament, decided to join 
the government. The inclusion of the secular Shiite politicians in 
the Iraqi government may help assuage Sunni fears about a cabinet 
dominated by Islamist Shiite Muslims.
The Iraqi elections and their consequences...
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The challenges ahead
With the appointment o f the prime minister, the complex process 
o f selecting the first democratic authorities in Iraq has drawn to 
a close. Nonetheless, this transitional government faces extremely 
difficult tasks: the drafting of a permanent Iraqi constitution by 
the quickly approaching mid-August deadline; its approval by more 
than 50 percent o f the voters in a referendum in October 2005; 
and the holding of final elections to parliament in December (that 
is, elections based on the constitution drafted and approved by the 
Iraqis, not by any occupation authority). Moreover, according to 
the still-valid interim constitution, the permanent constitution will 
fail if rejected by two-thirds of the voters of any three provinces. 
Kurds and Sunnis have such a majority, which could potentially be 
directed to reject the new charter, in “their” three provinces.
In spite o f the election, the U.S. retains a major behind-the- 
scenes role, not only through direct links to many key Iraqi political 
players, but also because all parties realize that, at least in the 
foreseeable future, only American troops are able to provide even 
minimum security in the country. Further, most are aware that, 
without political support from Washington, Iraq will be unable 
to obtain necessary economic assistance from the international 
financial community (for example new loans or the reduction of 
old debts).
In the coming months two issues will be of crucial importance for 
the newly elected Iraqi parliament: working out the federal system 
of the country and defining the role of religion in the state.5
While many mainstream Iraqi politicians agree that a decentra­
lized government is needed, they disagree about how much 
autonomy can be awarded to Kurds without jeopardizing the 
integrity o f the country. The two dominant Kurdish parties, the 
Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan,
The Iraqi elections and their consequences...
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call for a confederation between an Iraqi Kurdistan and an Arab 
Iraq. They would like recognition in the new constitution that Iraq 
is made up of separate Arab and Kurdish nations, and guarantees 
that Kurds will have complete autonomy (implying a great deal of 
authority for the Kurdish regional government). Kurds en masse go 
even further: they overwhelmingly support complete independence. 
During the January elections, an informal referendum was held in 
Kurdistan confirming general support for the idea. O f course the 
Arab majority in the country and several minority groups in the 
Kurdish north resist such an arrangement. The newly emerging 
Shiite majority in particular wants to govern a unified Iraq and 
will consequently seek to avoid such a division of the country. The 
Shiites and Sunnis also oppose other Kurdish demands, such as 
the proposition that 25 percent of Iraq’s oil revenues be allocated 
to Kurds, that Kurds be given veto power in parliament, and that 
they be allowed to keep their strong militia, the peshmerga. (The 
last request would make it impossible to disband other militias, like 
the Mehdi Aramy of Muqtada al-Sadr or the Sadr Brigade of Abdul 
Aziz al-Hakim).
The Kurds would also like to enlarge the territory they control to 
include Kirkuk and some surrounding areas, which they claim have 
a Kurdish majority. Other Iraqis, however, point out that Kirkuk is 
also home to a large number o f Turkomans, Christians, and Arabs. 
Moreover, whoever ends up representing the Iraqi Arabs in Baghdad 
(both Shiites and Sunnis) will not give up that province easily 
because o f its economically valuable and strategically important oil 
fields, refineries and pipelines. (In fact, negotiations to elect new 
Iraqi authorities were prolonged because o f disagreements about 
who -  Shiite or Sunni -  will get the oil ministry).
There are also other problems with creating a federalist Iraq. For 
such a system to work, strong local governments that reflect each 
province’s religious and ethnic composition must be established.6
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However, strong inter-group conflicts have begun to emerge in 
many provinces since the elections, weakening local governments. 
Moreover, deputies to the National Assembly do not represent 
specific districts or provinces as they were chosen in a nationwide 
ballot.
A second major debate in the parliament and in the country 
in the months to come will probably center on the role of Sharia 
(Islamic law) in the newly organized state. While it may be that 
few Iraqis want a theocratic country of the Iranian type with clerics 
governing, as noted above, Ayatollah al-Sistani stated right after the 
elections that Sharia must be the only source for the constitution 
and all laws in Iraq, and warned against the danger of changing the 
Iraqi identity by separating religion and politics.7 The key Shiite 
parties in the winning United Iraqi Alliance (the SCIRI and Da’wa) 
will push in that direction. The secular forces among the Kurds 
and some Western educated Sunnis and Shiites in the parliament, 
however, may try to achieve a compromise. They may get support 
from women deputies, who compose about one-third of the 
legislature, and may be worried about the islamization of the law 
and in particular about the effect the introduction of Sharia laws 
would have on family law.
Only reaching some compromise on these issues will guarantee the 
support o f different groups within the Iraqi political class needed to 
ratify the constitution. Achieving that consensus would require the 
revival o f a lost sense o f Iraqi identity, and a commitment to rebuild 
their torn country. Many doubt that such trust cooperation among 
groups — and perhaps within them — is currently a possibility.
The key for the success of democracy, or indeed any political 
process in Iraq, is the stability o f the country. Nonetheless, to date, 
insurgents, local and foreign, continue their attacks on Iraqi and 
American forces as well as on Iraqi government officials. Despite 
expectations to the contrary, violence did not diminish after the
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elections. The insurgents know that the emergence of any strong 
Iraqi government will further limit their potential for action, and 
as most o f them are Sunnis, their interest in destabilizing the new 
Shiite-dominated government is even greater. Thus, they continue to 
fight hard against the emerging authorities. At the same time, Iraqi 
citizens are growing increasingly frustrated because o f continuing 
high levels of unemployment, slow progress at rebuilding destroyed 
infrastructure and continued power outages and water shortages. 
The newly elected government must quickly and successfully deal 
with all these problems, or Iraq may face civil war on a large scale.
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Iran's new revolution? 
President Ahmadinejad 
and the power struggle in Tehran
Presidential elections 2005
On June 24, 2005, in the second round of voting, Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad, a hard-line Islamist was elected new president o f Iran. 
His victory was unexpected. A rather little-known person defeated 
Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, “an icon of the Islamic Republic” , 
a two-term president of the country (1989—1997), earlier speaker 
of the parliament (1980-1989). Ahmadinejad won by impressive 
62 percent o f the vote, with Rafsanjani taking only 36 percent. 
Turnout was very high at 59 percent.
However unknown, Ahmadinejad represented the Islamic 
Republic’s model ofan ideal layperson. He has gained all the necessary 
credentials to be trusted with a leadership job: participation in 
Islamic associations, serving in the military, fighting in the Iraq war, 
being a governor o f the Ardebil province, advisor to the Minister of 
Culture and Islamic Guidance, and mayor o f the capital, achieving 
the title o f science university professor, and a man living a simple 
Muslim life. He was a member of the ideological Revolutionary 
Guards, the paramilitary Basiji as well as a leader o f the Abadgaran 
(Developers o f Islamic Iran) movement, comprised of younger
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hardliners who feel that their elders and clerical establishment have 
lost revolutionary fervor. Voters perceived him as a young man (he 
was 49 years of age) running against an old one (Rafsanjani was 
71), an outsider worth trying after more than twenty-four years of 
clerical rule.1
Such election result should have been anticipated. First, no 
expected changes were brought by the pro-democracy reform 
movement that emerged with the election of President Mohammad 
Khatami in 1997 and was reinforced successively in the 1999 
municipal elections, the 2000 parliamentary election, and the 2001 
presidential election (when Khatami was reelected). In effect, large 
groups o f Iranians became disillusioned with Khatamis politics and 
thought it was worthwhile trying to return to the old revolutionary 
ideals. This is why in the 2003 municipal elections and the 2004 
parliamentary elections conservatives scored an impressive victory 
and a similar result could be expected in the 2005 presidential race.
Secondly, Ahmadinejad’s opponent, Rafsanjani, was a contro­
versial figure. On one hand, he was perceived as moderate reformer 
who once initiated some economic changes and tended to support 
centrist factions. On the other hand, he was often associated with 
much of the corruption and human rights abuse which occurred 
during his terms in office. In effect, his 1989 and 1993 election 
victories were not impressive; moreover, when he decided to re­
enter politics, taking part in the 2000 parliamentary election, he 
even suffered a humiliating defeat. Nor could he appeal to poor 
Iranians, being himself a very rich businessman and having a son, 
Mehdi Hashemi, linked to bribery scandals. Thus, Rafsanjani was 
not a candidate whose merits could have easily challenged any 
conservative candidate.
Ahmenidejad and Rafsanjani were the only two contenders in the 
second round of voting, and by the way, it was the first time in Iran’s 
history that presidential elections did not end in the first round.
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The conduct o f elections held certain features existing in free 
countries. For example, it included lively public campaigning by 
candidates. Ihe winner could not be predicted in advance: a rather 
unusual phenomenon in elections taking place in Middle Eastern 
states. But the elections were, of course, not truly free. The outcome 
was to a large extend predetermined by the Council o f Guardians 
who allowed only eight candidates (of whom seven eventually 
ran) to be put on ballot out of over 1,000 who were eager to 
enter the race. Those approved were the ones deemed sufficiently 
loyal by the regime. Among those disqualified was Mostafa Moin, 
former cabinet member, supported by leading reformist parties: 
Islamic Iran Participation Front and the Mojahedin of the Islamic 
Revolution; Ibrahim Yazdi, the respected leader o f the banned 
Liberation Movement of Iran, and all female candidates. Moin’s 
disqualification caused a great public outcry leading Supreme 
Leader Ali Khamenei to instruct the Council to reinstate Moin 
(and a lesser-known reformist candidate, Mohsen Mehralizadeh). 
The reformist camp was also represented by Hojjatolislam Mehdi 
Karrubi, former speaker o f parliament, supported by Militant 
Clerics Association. In turn, the conservative camp was represented 
by Ali Larijani, a former head of Iran’s state-controlled radio and 
television monopoly; Mohsen Qalibaf, a former general and police 
chief; and Ahmadinejad. There was also the centrist Rafsanjani. 
Several other well-known public figures planned to participate in 
election but for various reasons dropped out from the race at an 
earlier stage. Among them was Ali Akbar Velayati, a former foreign 
minister, who resigned when Rafsanjani himself decided to run.
The first-round took place on June 17- Turnout was high: 63 
percent. There was no clear winner. Rafsanjani won that round 
but only with 21 percent of the vote. The biggest surprise was 
that Ahmadinejad came in second with 19 percent o f the vote, 
followed by Karrubi with 17 percent, and Qalibaf and Moin each
- 169 -
Iran's new revolution?
taking 14 percent. Larijani and Mehralizadeh took only 6 and 4 
percent, respectively. Four percent of the ballots were declared 
invalid. These figures indicated that the Iranian electorate was 
highly polarized, as 35 percent favored reformist candidates and 
39 percent voted for conservative candidates. It was a significant 
change from the height of the Khatami era, when over 50 percent 
of the electorate supported reformists and only some 20 percent 
supported conservatives. Nevertheless, the election might have 
had a very different outcome if the reformists had nominated an 
attractive candidate (e.g. Mir Hossein Musavi, a former prime 
minister), had their vote not been split among several candidates, 
or if Rafsanjani had not run.2 Moreover, the election results could 
have been influenced by President George W. Bush, who a few days 
before the first round of voting criticized the election process as not 
fulfilling requirements o f democracy. In doing so, Bush probably 
wanted to strengthen the reformist candidates but his comments 
backfired. It simply angered many Iranians, earlier ready to boycott 
the elections. In result they might have decided to change their plans 
and gone to polls in defiance of Bush’s statement. Many of them 
voted for more radical candidates, especially Ahmadinejad. West 
would have preferred Rafsanjani’s victory, believing that he will 
be more inclined to improve relations with Western governments, 
a very important issue in times o f the growing power of conservatives 
in Iran, tensions related to Teheran’s nuclear program and Shiite 
victory in the Iraqi elections. Among Iranians, however, there was 
a widespread opposition to Rafsanjani, being accused during the 
campaign for amassing a large fortune and committing various 
irregularities.
Ahmadinejad scored a decisive victory in the second round. His 
populist campaign, stressing the necessity to fight social inequalities 
and mass corruption, believed to emerge during the years of 
Rafsanjani or reformist Khatami, was a success. Ahmadinejad was
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presenting himself as a simple, deeply religious man who would 
guarantee the return to principles o f the Islamic revolution, improve 
the situation of the poor, and not look for compromises with the 
West. That gave him large number of votes from people o f different 
social strata, not only from the poor.
The reformists focused mainly on promoting modernity, 
democracy and human rights but their poor showing in the election 
indicated that these issues were not a high priority for most Iranians. 
In turn, Ahmadinejad’s victory meant that many Iranians opposed 
socio-cultural liberalization which had occurred in the country 
during Khatami’s years, like gender mixing and more relaxation in 
women dresses.
After the voting, statements were made that the election was a 
fraud. Karrubi, who was just two percent behind Ahmadinejad, 
declared that security forces had illegally called to vote for 
Ahmadinejad, intimidated voters at polling stations, used false 
identity cards to increase ballots, and even bribed voters. Interior 
Minister, Abdolvahed Musavi-Lari, confirmed those accusations, 
suggested that some votes were bought and a “smear campaign” 
was waged, clearly implying that hard-line conservatives tried to 
manipulate the vote in favor of Ahmadinejad. On the day before 
the second round, the ministry of the interior arrested 26 people 
for election violations. Moin and other reformists warned against 
the emergence of “fascism”. Nevertheless, the conservative Guardian 
Council, as expected, found no evidence of irregularities. In protest, 
Karrubi resigned from his positions on the powerful Expediency 
Council, of an advisor to Khamenei, and a leader o f the Militant 
Clerics Association. While it is possible that the organized vote by the 
Basiji, the Pasdaran, and other organs controlled by the conservatives, 
helped Ahmadinejad gain enough votes on 17 June to reach the run­
off, in the second round he won by such a large margin that electoral 
manipulation could not have a decisive impact on the results.
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Ahmadinejad’s election was a great success of Iran’s Abadgaran 
neo-conservative movement. In the past two decades they slowly 
gained positions o f power on different levels of government and 
now managed to elect one of its leaders a president of the Republic. 
(One has to remember, however, that in Iran’s political system, 
presidency is a very visible but not a very powerful position. With 
the veleyat-e-faiqih constitutional provision, for example Khatami 
during his two terms in office was unable to implement most of 
reforms because of lack of acceptance from the Supreme Leader and 
other sources o f power.)
Ahmadinejad’s victory signaled the fact that the reformists’ 
appeals did not attract people’s mind much any more. Their talk of 
political reform, human rights and civil society had done little to 
solve such problems as high unemployment or inflation. Reformers 
realized too late that they worked “behind close doors” and did not 
get their messages across. Only now, Mostafa Moin, the candidate 
o f the reformist Islamic Participation Party, along with members of 
the Iran Freedom Movement (of religious nationalists) announced 
the formation of the new Front for Democracy and Human Rights 
and a plan to engage in more “grassroots” work. Another failed 
reformist candidate, Mehdi Karroubi, has also unveiled plans for 
establishing a new National Trust Party as well as a satellite TV 
channel to promote its ideas.3
AhmadinejacTs politics
As A. Savyon noted, Ahmadinejad’s win in Iran’s presidential 
elections signaled the coming of the “Second Islamic Revolution.”4 
“Ahmadinejad’s public addresses attest to his religious commitment 
to the messianic ideas o f the Shi’a, and to the profound belief in 
the historic existential struggle between two civilizations, Islam and 
the West — in which Islam is bound to triumph. He perceives these
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principles as guidelines that his government and Iran should strive 
to realize.” According to the president,: “The people, in the last 
elections, proved their faith in the Revolution, and wish to see a 
revival o f the Islamic Revolution’s ideals... This revolution was in 
fact a continuation of the Prophets’ movement and, therefore, all 
political, economic, and cultural goals of the country need to be 
directed at materializing the Islamic ideals.” He added, “Followers 
of this divine school o f Islamic thought are doing their best to pave 
the way for the urgent reappearance [of the Hidden Imam]... It is 
our obligation to direct people back to those glorious ideals and to 
lead the way in the establishment o f an exemplary, powerful and 
progressive Islamic society. Iran must emerge as the most powerful, 
most advanced country.”5
Ahmadinejad first step after becoming president was to forbid 
the display of his portrait in public. The second step was to construct 
his Cabinet.
The proposed Cabinet has been young, like himself, and several 
of its members served, as he had, in the Revolutionary Guard.6 
The basis o f selection seems to be not practical competence but 
ideological commitment and political loyalty. The most controversial 
appointments were for the posts o f Interior Minister and Intelligence 
Minister. Mostafa Pourmohammadi, who became the Interior 
Minister, served as deputy intelligence minister during a series of 
killings of political dissidents that were linked to that ministry in the 
late 1990s, while the new Intelligence Minister, Gholam Hossein 
Mohseni Ejehei, acted as the judiciary’s representative to the ministry 
at that time. Both are clerics with a record of questionable human- 
rights efforts. Ahmadinejad’s foreign affairs team, led by Minister 
o f Foreign Affairs, Manouchehr Mottaki and the re-appointed 
Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, Ali Larijani 
are both considered hardliners. The new Minister of Islamic Culture 
and Guidance, Mohammad Hossein Saffar-Harandi, served as the
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ultraconservative editor o f the Kayhan daily newspaper. His rule 
may likely translate to more newspaper closures as well as a rigorous 
monitoring of cultural activities at large. In turn, in what many find 
a contrast to his own views, Ahmadinejad entrusted the economy 
to a free-marketeer, Davoud Danesh-Jafari.
During his term in office Ahmadinejad will most probably focus 
on domestic issues. Thanks to high oil prices he should be able to 
fulfill promises from his presidential campaign, which included low- 
interest loans for the people in need and increased subsidization of 
basic consumer goods. Indeed, one of the first acts o f Ahmadinejad’s 
government was to set up a $1.3 billion fund to help young people 
trying to get married. Another large package to lower unemployment 
is on the table, and the president wants to double teacher salaries. 
In general, leveling inequalities in wealth, and creating more 
opportunities for the poor top the government’s agenda.
What will be helping the new president is the economic situation 
of the country. It is not bad, to say the least. In the past five years 
Iran has experienced growth at 5.5 percent per year; the GDP per 
capita has doubled. U.S. sanctions have created problems, but 
the regime has used second-tier technologies from the east (from 
such countries as China, India, and Malaysia) to meet consumer 
expectations. On the other hand, the President faces difficult tasks: 
he will have to fight high inflation, budget deficit, large corruption, 
inefficient bureaucracy, and wastefulness of state subsidies. There 
is also a question about country’s further development as Iran’s oil 
production may drop under Ahmadinejad unfriendly approach 
towards foreign investors. In such a situation it was not unexpected 
that the stock market went down considerably since Ahmadinejad’s 
election (by 30% in mid-November).
On the socio-cultural front, Ahmadinejad will likely carry out 
at least token crackdowns on dress-code violations and gender-
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mixing, expand religious education in schools and strengthen media 
and art control. There will be more policing of decency, seeking to 
curtail what its agents perceive as “moral laxity” . In general, the 
government will probably be “tough on the elite and soft on the 
masses” . In one of its first announcements, the Minister of Culture 
criticized the former pro-reform government o f failing to protect 
Islamic values and employing literary censors that lacked the “will” 
to block offending texts. Thus, he decided to replace many of the 
ministry’s employees.
Iran’s relations with the West are likely to deteriorate further. 
Ahmadinejad’s attitude toward U.S. and Israel is clear: he said 
publicly on October 26, 2005, that he would be happy if Israel 
were wiped out from the map and the U.S. destroyed7 (moreover, 
he apparently stepped on a picture of an American flag on his way 
to vote8). So, he will probably put forward more aggressive policies 
and tougher negotiating tactics.
One of the first foreign policy decisions by Ahmadinejad was 
rejection of a European Union proposal on the nuclear issue 
(August 2005) and recommencement of uranium enrichment. 
The EU proposal ruled out enriching uranium and reprocessing 
plutonium, recommended allowing Iran to purchase nuclear fuel 
and send it elsewhere for disposal, and called for a continuation of 
Iran’s voluntary suspension of uranium-conversion activities.
Hie international community thought that Ahmadinejad 
would present a counterproposal while addressing the UN General 
Assembly on September 17th. However, Ahmadinejad instead 
aired grievances relating to events that took place more than half a 
century ago; discussed “a conspiracy theory” about the September 
11th, 2001 terrorist attacks, and accused the United States that 
its policies helped to create Al Qaeda. He spoke of the need for 
increased Third World representation in international bodies, 
decried Western countries double standards, and insisted that Iran
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has the right to pursue peaceful nuclear energy activities, calling 
attempts to deprive it o f that right a sort o f “apartheid”. Moreover, 
Ahmadinejad called for a nuclear-weapons-free Middle East and 
offered a “serious partnership” with other countries’ private and 
public sectors implementing uranium-enrichment programs. The 
speech was interpreted by most Western leaders and the press as very 
confrontational and even at home it was perceived as detrimental to 
Iran’s nuclear negotiating position.
As a consequence of Iran’s behavior, the IAEA governing board 
issued a resolution calling on Tehran to be more cooperative and 
transparent, and hinting that referral to the UN Security Council 
(which can easily mean introducing sanctions) could be next.
Iran’s policymakers, across the political spectrum, want Iran to be 
perceived as a regional power.9 Ahmadinejad himself has stressed 
that the world must deal with Iran as an equal. Iranian people also 
feel a sense of victimization. The Iran—Iraq war was a formative 
experience for Ahmadinejad. International treaties banning the use 
o f chemical weapons did not protect Iran from Saddam Husseins 
gas attacks. Moreover, Washington openly supported Iraq, a 
fact well remembered by Ahmadinejad and his generation. U.S. 
sanctions have reinforced the sense of victimization. In addition, 
Iranian elites believe that throughout the modern era Iran has 
been manipulated by the West; they still remember the overthrow 
of nationalist Prime Minister Mossadeq in 1953 by the CIA and 
restoration of the shah.
These beliefs reinforce a sense of constant insecurity. Both 
the United States and Israel are perceived as existential threats to 
the Islamic Republic. Possession of nuclear bombs by its eastern 
neighburs, Pakistan and India, also worries Iran. In this context, 
one should try to understand Iran’s approach to the nuclear issue. 
For majority o f Iranians, especially the elites and the parliament, the
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acquisition of a nuclear fuel cycle that provides a deterrent against 
potential attackers is a way to country’s security and respect from 
the international community. They believe that Iran has a right 
under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to develop 
civilian nuclear power and question why the West is not allowing 
Iran to do what other countries (as e.g. Brazil) are permitted. No 
one in Iran wants to give up its legitimate rights without any sort of 
guarantees or benefits in return.
Power struggle among Iran's political forces
Ahmadinejad’s plans in foreign as well as internal policy, may not 
fully materialize. Like any Iranian president, he is constrained by 
a complex and consensual foreign policy decision-making process. 
What has occurred already, Ahmadinejad and his supporters face 
strong opposition in the country not only, as expected, from the 
reformists, but also, to a surprise o f many, from several right-wing 
centers of powers and many ayatollahs.
The first signal of problems for the new president came from 
the parliament which did not approve all Ahmadinejad’s candidates 
for Cabinet ministers. Four of them, including the one for the 
important oil ministry were rejected. As much as parliament is now 
a hardliner, Ahmadinejad’s Pasdaran are not a majority in it.
Then, in October came the decision by Khamenei altering the 
country’s power structure by granting the Expediency Council 
new authority to supervise the executive, legislative, and judiciary 
powers, and also to originate top-down decision-making. The 
Council, an appointive body, was previously only empowered to 
settle disputes between the parliament and the Guardian Council
— another, more influential appointive body — and to advise the 
Supreme Leader. In even a more surprising move, Khamenei 
made Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani the president o f the Council.
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Thus, the person who lost the election to Ahmadinejad received 
at supervision over the administration put in place by the winner, 
President Ahmadinejad.
The expansion of the Expediency Councils power was widely viewed 
as an effort to balance the rise of hard-liners in the Iranian politics.10 
Ahmadinejad and the fundamentalist militaristic faction begun to 
pose an increasing threat to the position of veterans of the Islamic 
Revolution and to the economic power that they have accumulated 
over the years and “veterans” decided to counteract. Others saw in 
this action Khameneis gesture intended to restore some prestige 
to Rafsanjani who played a key role in elevating Khamenei to the 
position of supreme religious leader after the 1989 death of Ayatollah 
Ruhollah Khomeini. According to some sources, however, the 
Supreme Leader was forced to make such a decision by the Judiciary 
System chief Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi and Council of Experts 
head Ali Meshkini.11 These ayatollahs apparently came to Khamenei 
with a demand to fire Ahmadinejad, after the latter demanded that 
they produce financial reports on what was being done in their 
institutions. Khamenei rejected that demand. However, when the 
ayatollahs threatened to depose Khamenei himself, he agreed to an 
alternative move — empowering Rafsanjani over Ahmadinejad.
One of Rafsanjanis first decisions was to appoint the outgoing 
president, Mohammad Khatami -  identified with the reform-seekers
-  senior advisor to the council. Rafsanjani, also began to criticize 
Ahmadinejad’s foreign policy actions, in particular his speech at 
the United Nations General assembly on September 17, 2005, and 
lack of expertise and finesse of president’s experts, especially ones 
dealing with nuclear energy issues.12 Then, he attacked president for 
damaging “national unity and solidarity” and for “trying to remove 
and isolate invaluable individuals and efficient managers” 13 (for
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example, in November Ahmadinejad decided to replace o f 40 out of 
70 ambassadors, including some of Iran’s most seasoned diplomats, 
dozens of deputy ministers and fired seven managing-directors of 
state banks as well the heads of the state insurance and privatisation 
organisations). Also Khatami voiced concern that Ahmadinejad was 
exceeding his powers removing from the government large number 
of experts.
These developments indicate that there is serious concern 
among political establishment in Iran that some of Ahmadinejad’s 
actions have been too radical, in a sense that he has put Iran under 
an unnecessary scrutiny and criticism by foreign institutions and 
that perhaps his rhetoric is ill-serving some of the regime’s more 
practical, rational needs.14
Ahmadinejad’s main enemy at the moment can be found inside 
the country. As Alexander Adler rightly pointed out, calls to wipe 
out Israel and to break immediately relations with all the Muslim 
states that have hitherto recognized Israel, suggest that the president 
wants to become involved in dispute not only with Iran’s reformers 
but also with the theocratic structure initially established to 
counter Khatami’s liberalism (there has been an agreement between 
people like Rafsanjani and Khameni to have Iran cooperate with 
such countries as Egypt, Jordan or Turkey, which all have good 
relations with Israel).15 Now this structure has begun to clash with 
Ahmadinejad’s fundamentalist and militant Islamism. As William 
O. Beeman recently wrote “The clerics have discovered that they 
have a tiger by the tail. Mr. Ahmadinejad may be dedicated to
their eradication__He has rejected both the reformist politics of
President Khatami, and the establishment Islamic leadership of 
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei”.16
In a response of a kind, some sources close to the president 
begun to spread the information that a secret committee has been
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formed by Ahmadinezhad’s opponents with the aim of toppling 
the government. Apparently it has been supported by some 
political groups and newspapers. The information about “a secret 
committee” was probably only a propaganda but it only confirmed 
that a serious power struggle in the upper echelons o f the regime is 
underway. The traditional tensions on the reformist-conservatives 
axis have shifted to the right and is concentrated between “the 
reformist right” and the fundamentalist-militaristic conservative 
group. In the first one Rafsanjani, Shahroudi and Meshkini, heads 
o f powerful non-elected (or only partially elected) institutions of 
power play key role, while Ayatollah Mohammad Taqi Mesbah-e 
Yazdi, and on members o f the security establishment, particularly the 
Revolutionary Guards, the Basij, and the intelligence apparatuses, 
lead the other (this group controls the office of the president and 
have large representation in the parliament).
Ayatollah Khameni, trying to balance internal powers, stated 
first that there were certain “irregularities’ in the government 
actions, which should not be tolerated, but later went to defend 
Ahmadinejad. He said that he “heard unjust criticism of the 
government and the president” and that “the government must be 
supported”.17 Paradoxically, Ahmadinejad’s victory in the election 
did not strengthen Khameni position as the Supreme Leader; in 
contrary, it intensified the power struggle in the country which has 
weakened the ayatollah.
At the same time, Iranians are extremely nationalistic and would 
not accept any foreign-inspired change. Some despise the current 
regime for its corruption and repression, but Western pressure or 
military attack will only rally them around the government.
A short-distance future of Iran is difficult to predict. Some believe 
that the Iranian revolution begins anew.18 Other are more cautious. 
Certain change is naturally inevitable in Iran but will Ahmadinejad and
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his Pasdaran be able to change the constitution and make the country 
less theocratic, or will they leave the religious establishment intact 
and pursue more hard-line foreign and cultural policies, only with 
the improvement of economic position of the poor? Or maybe more 
moderate conservatives will manage to impeach him in the parliament? 
On the other hand, will Ayatollah Khatami survive, or be removed from 
his office of the Supreme Leader? Only time will allow to answer these 
questions. One of the main problem now is, however, that internal 
struggle in Iran complicate even more the very difficult talks between 
Tehran and the West over the country’s nuclear program.
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Arab vs. Asian migrant workers 
in the GCC countries
A difficult economic situation of many Arab and South East 
Asian countries in the last few decades has made labor emigration 
an attractive option for citizens of these states (Al-Najjar, 2001; 
Abella, 1995).* Such emigration has generally been supported by 
the governments o f these countries to ease the pressure on labor 
markets, reduce unemployment, and accelerate development. The 
migration of the workforce has become one of the most dynamic 
economic factors in the Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) 
countries; remittances from migrant labor back to these states 
exceed the value of regional trade in goods as well as official capital 
flows (Nassar and Ghoneim, 2002; Fergany, 2001). Similarly, the 
migrations to the Gulf states speed up the development o f certain 
regions o f India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, the Philippines or Indonesia 
(Amjad, 1989; Eelens et al., 1992).
One of the largest markets for Arab and Asian job seekers has been 
that of the Gulf states: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the 
United Arab Emirates and Oman: members o f the 1981-established 
the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Since the discovery of oil,
* An earlier version o f this paper was presented at the conference “Trans­
national Migration: Foreign Labor and Its Impact in the G ulf”, June 20—25, 
2005, Bellagio Center, Italy.
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these countries, lacking a local workforce, have been employing 
a large expatriate labor force. That process has had a very significant 
impact on the economy, politics, and the social structure of the GCC 
states. It has allowed for a rapid development o f these countries, 
but at the same time involved them in various foreign affairs 
developments and brought a number of negative cultural and socio­
economic consequences. Although foreigners in the G CC states 
have not created problems of the magnitude of those found in other 
immigrant countries of the world, different economic and political 
interests o f governments and individuals have brought numerous 
tensions and conflicts, which intensified in the post 9/11 era.
This paper analyzes the population dilemmas of the G CC states 
as well as the economic and political determinants of the labor 
policies. In particular, such issues as the heterogeneity of the local 
populations, the national composition of the foreign workforce, 
the segmentation of the labor market and the localization of the 
workforce are discussed.
Divided populations: nationals vs. expatriates
Since the discovery of oil political entities of the Persian Gulf have 
transformed themselves from desert sheikhdoms into modern states. 
This process has been accompanied by a rapid population growth. 
The population in the current G C C  states has grown more than 
eight times during 50 years; to be exact, from 4 million in 1950 
to 40 million in 2006, which marks one of the highest rates of the 
population growth in the world. This increase has not been caused 
primarily by a natural growth of indigenous population but by the 
influx of foreign workers. The employment o f large numbers of 
foreigners has been a structural imperative in these countries, as the 
oil-related development depends upon the importation of foreign 
technologies and requires knowledge and skills alien to the local
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Arab population. In consequence, unlike in Western Europe, where 
foreign workers have only complemented the national workforce, 
usually by filling lower-status jobs, in the G C C  states they have 
become the primary, dominant labor force in most sectors of the 
economy and the government bureaucracy. The percentage of 
foreigners in the G C C  populations has systematically been growing 
over the last decades, increasing from 31 percent in 1975 to over 
38 in the mid-1990s, leveling, and diminishing slightly at the 
beginning of the 2000s, to only grew again lately.1 Towards the end 
of 2004, the year of the latest relatively reliable statistics, the G C C  
states were inhabited by 12.5 million foreigners, who constituted 
37 percent of the total population (Table 1). In Qatar, the UAE, 
and Kuwait, foreigners constituted a majority; in the United Arab 
Emirates they accounted for over 80 percent of population. Only 
Oman and Saudi Arabia managed to maintain a relatively low 
proportion of foreigners: about 20 and 27 percent, respectively.
The dominance of foreigners has even been more pronounced 
in the workforce than in the total population. Non-nationals 
constituted a majority of the labor force in all the G C C  countries, 
with the average for the year 2004 being close to 70 percent. 
The lowest rates were recorded in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, but 
even there expatriates constituted above 50 and 65 percent o f the 
workforce, accordingly; in Kuwait 82 percent of the workforce were 
foreign, in Qatar almost 90 percent, and in the UAE: 90 percent 
(Gulf Cooperation Council, 2002; Human Rights Watch, 2004; 
Fasano and Goyal, 2004; Girgis, 2002).
This development has posed security, economic, social and 
cultural threats to the local population (see below). As a consequence, 
to maintain a highly privileged position of the nationals, numerous 
restrictions have been imposed: the sponsorship system, the 
rotational system of expatriate labor to limit the duration of 
foreigners’ stay, curbs on the naturalization and the citizenship
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rights o f those who have been naturalized, etc. However, many of 
these measures have not brought the expected results, especially, the 
planned rotation of the workforce has proved impossible to achieve. 
The free market economy has been more powerful than the policies 
the authorities have been eager to implement. The majority of 
expatriates have stayed beyond the term of the original contract as 
employers usually prefer to keep workers who have already gained 
some local experience rather than bring in the new ones. Moreover, 
importing a new worker involves additional costs to employers. As 
a result, the average period of time that foreign workers spend in 
the G C C  countries continues to extend, and the number o f ‘almost 
permanent’ foreign workers has increased, albeit not formally.
Table 1. Population of the G CC states, 2004 and latest (2005—2006) 
estimates
Nationals % Expatriates % Total
Current
total
Bahrain 438,209 62.0 268,951 38.0 707,160 707,160
Kuwait 943,000 35.6 1,707,000 64.4 2,650,000 2,992,000
Oman 2,325,812 80.1 577,293 19.9 2,903,105 3,102,000
Qatar 223,209 30.0 520,820 70.0 744,029 855,000
Saudi
Arabia 16,529,302 72.9 6,144,236 27.1 22,673,538 27,020,000
UAE 722,000 19.0 3,278,000 81.0 4,000,000 4,700,000
GCC 21,184,323 62.9 12,486,349 37.1 33,677,832 39,376,160
Source: Publications o f the government agencies o f the G C C  states for 
mid- or end 2004. See also: quarterly reports o f the Economist Intelligence 
Unit (London). Numbers in italics are rough estimates due to the lack of 
official data.
Notes: Various government agencies often present different data. The 
preliminary results o f the Saudi Arabia 2004 Census, presented above,
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contradicts other reports. For example, in May 2004 the Saudi Labor 
Minister said, that there are about 8.8 million expatriates in the Kingdom. 
Other reports suggested that the total Saudi population in 2005 crossed 
27 million, with some 20 million expatriates and 7,0 million nationals. 
In turn, in May 2005 the UAE Ministry o f Labor announced that at the 
end o f 2004 the population o f the Emirates reached 4.33 million and is 
expected to reach 5 million by the end o f 2005. Some reports suggest that 
the total Omani population exceeded 3.2 million already in 2004.
What makes the situation more difficult is the fact that that the 
exceptionally favorable situation which the nationals have enjoyed 
for decades has started to change.2 A growing number of them have 
experienced difficulties in finding the kind of employment they 
have been looking for. The public sector, in which most nationals 
used to find employment, has already become saturated, while the 
private sector has remained too competitive for the great majority 
of them.3 As the unemployment among nationals began to grow, 
which was a phenomenon unheard of in the past, the G CC 
governments decided to embark on the formulation of labor market 
strategies to improve this situation, to create sufficient employment 
opportunities for nationals, and to limit the dependence on the 
expatriate labor (the so-called localization, nationalization or 
indigenization of labor, depending on the country referred to as: 
Saudization, Omanization, Emiratization, etc.).
A number of measures have been proposed to achieve these 
objectives: some professions have been reserved as ‘for nationals 
only’, the employment quotas for nationals and expatriates have 
been introduced in certain professions, wage subsidies and state 
retirement plans for nationals in the private sector were established 
parallel to fees and charges on the foreign labor to make it less 
competitive (Kapiszewski, 2001, pp. 201-250). Private companies 
meeting quota requirements have been rewarded in public tenders.
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Moreover, large efforts have been made to improve the education 
and training of nationals. Nevertheless, all these measures have so 
far brought only limited results. Only the public sector has become 
successfully nationalized. In the private sector, the localization is 
still very low. In 2004, in Kuwait out o f total workforce o f 850,000 
in the private sector, Kuwaitis accounted for only 1.8 percent, i.e. 
ca. 16,000 (Jassen, 2004). In general, in Qatar, Oman and the 
UAE there were around 10 percent of nationals in the workforce; 
in Bahrain 27 percent, and only in Saudi Arabia in excess of 30 
percent (Fasano and Goyal, 2004). The unsuccessful nationalization 
attempts have been caused by the fact that employment in the 
private sector is usually unattractive for nationals. The salaries 
it offers are usually low, working hours long, and the work 
environment, with its competitiveness and the need to recognize 
an expatriate supervisor — difficult to accept. Moreover, working 
in the private sector, unlike in the public sector, is sometimes 
perceived as debasing the nationals’ social status. Another problem 
is that nationals are culturally disinclined to enter low-skilled posts 
while, at the same time, the educational systems are not properly 
prepared to deal with the problem of reorienting traditional work 
values. Finally, a forceful approach to localization, like the quota 
system, has encountered strong opposition from local businessmen, 
as potentially harmful, and adversely affecting productivity and 
profitability o f firms.
Women in the workforce
In the G C C  states there has been another very important 
determinant o f the situation in the labor market, namely the 
participation of women. In general, that participation has been 
limited due to religious norms and tradition (Kapiszewski, 2001, 
pp. 101-119). In Saudi Arabia, the law even forbids women to work
- 188 -
Arab vs. Asian migrant workers in the GCC countries
in the presence of men, and in effect women amount to only some 
10 percent of the Saudi labor force.4 Nevertheless, the improving 
education of women, the existing economic needs and changing 
attitudes to their work outside homes in the society at large are 
among the factors that have recently increased national womens 
participation in the workforce. Their presence in the labor market 
created a possibility to replace some foreign workers. Just the act of 
granting Saudi women the right to drive cars alone should result in 
removing around one hundred thousand foreign drivers from the 
labor force.
The issue of female employment poses a dilemma for the 
authorities: some would like to promote it but are often anxious 
to do so, as moves in that direction may strengthen radical anti­
government Islamic forces that oppose the emancipation of women. 
These movements are especially strong in Saudi Arabia but their 
power is also growing in Kuwait and Bahrain. Yet, in recent years, 
the rulers of many G CC states have made a number of symbolic 
gestures to support women’s position in the society: in Oman, 
Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates they have 
nominated a number of national women to ministerial positions. In 
Oman, Bahrain and Qatar they have allowed them to participate in 
local elections, in Kuwait they will be able to do so in next election, 
even in Saudi Arabia they have been allowed to participate in the 
election to the Chambers of Commerce and Industry.
The majority of women in the G CC workforce are foreign 
(Kapiszewski, 2001, pp. 107-109). Their ratio has varied: in the 
UAE, over 80 percent employed women have been expatriate, while 
in Bahrain only some 55 percent. In turn, national women has 
constituted between 2-10 percent of the total national workforce, 
while expatriate women between 10-25 percent o f the expatriate 
workforce. Most of the expatriate women have been Asian domestic 
workers.
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Arabs vs. Asians. 
De-Arabization of the labor market
Another problem which has developed in the labor market has been 
its controversial national make-up.
For historical, political and economic reasons, people o f various 
nationalities have traditionally searched for work in the G CC states. 
The composition of these foreign populations has been changing 
with time.
At the beginning of the oil era, the majority of the workforce 
migrating to the lower Gulf countries came from the poor neighboring 
Arab states. The largest groups among them were Yemenis and 
Egyptians looking for better employment opportunities, particularly 
in Saudi Arabia. There were also traditional local migrant laborers 
from the peninsula, Omanis in particular, who looked for jobs in 
more developed neighboring states. In various times, other Arabs 
used to arrive in the Gulf states, compelled to leave their home 
countries as a result of the domestic political situation. There were 
Palestinians, who began emigrating to the Gulf very early, after 
the Arab-Israeli War of 1948 and the occupation of Palestine, 
some Iraqis, following the 1968 Ba’ath party coup in Baghdad, 
and Yemenis after the civil wars in their country. For years, many 
Indian, Pakistani, and Iranian traders and laborers used to go to 
the Gulf as a result of their long-time ties that their countries 
had maintained with the region (developed especially during the 
British presence in the Indian subcontinent). A new phase in the 
migration started with the post-1973 economic boom. With the 
upsurge in oil revenues, the Gulf states made development efforts 
on an unprecedented scale, unmatched in other states o f the world. 
A total investment rose almost ten times between the first and the 
second half o f the 1970s. In Saudi Arabia alone, the growth of 
the capital formation averaged an incredible 27.8 percent a year
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during the whole decade (Abella, 1995, p. 418). A massive labor 
emigration followed these developments: Yemenis, Egyptians, 
Sudanese, Jordanians/Palestinians, Syrians, Pakistanis and Indians 
began to arrive in the Gulf states in large numbers.
Initially, Arab workers were particularly welcomed. Their 
linguistic, cultural and religious compatibility with the local 
populations made them more attractive to nationals than other 
immigrants. The migrant Arabs set up a familiar Arab-type 
government administration and educational facilities, helped to 
develop health services, build the necessary infrastructure for these 
rapidly developing countries, and run the oil industries. Nevertheless, 
relatively quickly, the preference of the oil-states’ governments 
changed, and they began to be more open to Asian workers. There 
were several economic, political, social, historical and pragmatic 
reasons for this change.
First o f all, the Gulf authorities became worried about non-local 
Arabs bringing and spreading radical social and political concepts 
(in particular, the secularist and frequently pro-Soviet ideologies), 
and cultivating undesirable loyalties. The leftist, pan-Arab ideas 
promoted by Arab expatriates called for the abolition of monarchies 
in the Gulf. Some organizations o f the type of the Popular Front for 
the Liberation of Bahrain, the Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Oman, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied 
Arab Gulf were established and began anti-government activities 
in the Gulf states. In the 1970s and 1980s, numerous immigrant 
Arab workers were prosecuted, jailed, and deported because o f their 
participation in the activities of these organizations (Kapiszewski, 
2001, pp. 133-144). The internal stability o f some of the G CC 
countries, including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar, was 
also shaken by the Arab expatriate-led labor strikes.
Some other ideas promoted by expatriate Arab workers also 
worried the G C C  authorities. Many young Arabs regarded borders
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in the Middle East as artificial lines imposed by Western imperialists, 
and, consequently, expected them to be eliminated. Another 
popular pan-Arab view, that of a single Arab nation in which labor 
circulates’ freely, was also rejected by the Gulf governments for 
security reasons. Yet another problem was related to the regional 
distribution of the oil-generated wealth. Whereas the oil-producing 
countries which preferred to retain that wealth began to link the 
entitlement o f oil revenues to state sovereignty, poorer states 
increasingly stressed their Arab identity as a good reason to demand 
their share in the revenues: Iraq even used the oil-related arguments 
as a justification to invade Kuwait in 1990.
Another dimension of the Arab presence in the G CC states 
which worried many nationals was the supposed “Egyptianization” 
o f the local dialects and culture that were believed to have resulted 
from the predominance of Egyptians in the field of education (Graz, 
1992, pp. 220-221).
Finally, the presence of Palestinians, which pushed the GCC 
states into an involvement in politics related to the Arab-Israeli 
conflict, was also considered a problem.
The stereotypical attitudes o f the nationals towards the non- 
G C C  Arabs have not helped to promote them in the labor market, 
either. Their attitudes have often not been as positive as the cultural 
and religious bonds between the nationals and the non-GCC Arabs 
could suggest. Birks and Sinclair, noted: “Many G CC nationals feel 
a detachment from Palestinians and Jordanians, a lack of respect for 
Yemenis, and mistrust and dislike of Egyptians” (Birks and Sinclair, 
1980, p. 116). Mohammed Al-Fahim, a leading UAE businessman, 
presents the attitudes o f nationals towards non-Gulf Arabs in the 
following way:
Because we had a common religion and for the most part, a common 
language, we felt we were dealing with friends not foes. In the case
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of our neighbours, we shared the same Arab perspective on life 
and the world. Or so we believed. Unfortunately, we found to our 
dismay that it took more than such commonalties to build a solid 
foundation for trustworthy relationships (Al-Fahim, 1995, p. 160).
On the other hand, Asians did not represent any threat to the Gulf 
nationals and were preferred to Arabs for various other reasons.
First o f all, Asians were less expensive to employ, easier to lay­
off, and believed to be more efficient, obedient, and manageable 
(Ghobash, 1986, pp. 138-142; Girgis, 2002, p. 29). Secondly, 
they were used to leaving their families at home, whereas Arab 
immigrants usually brought their families to the Gulf with the hope 
of settling there permanently. This possibility was not acceptable 
to the G C C  authorities. Thirdly, in the post-1973 oil-boom, the 
demand for foreign workers in the G C C  states outstripped the 
Arab countries’ ability to supply them (Chuocri, 1983). In contrast, 
Asian governments became often involved in the recruitment and 
placement o f their workers, facilitating their smooth flow to the 
Gulf. Efficient recruitment agencies in Asia were able to provide 
a constant supply of manpower, fully satisfying the needs o f the 
Gulf employers. Moreover, at that stage of the G CC countries’ 
development, the so-called ‘turn-key’ projects, in which Asian 
contractors specialized, were implemented with an increasing 
frequency. In many cases, Asians were also logistically easier to bring 
to the GCC states as this region had closer historical links with 
some parts of Asia than with many, more geographically distant, 
parts of the Arab world.
Finally, many Asians were Muslims too, so the religiously- 
sensitive Gulf Arabs felt more comfortable having such people 
around.5
For all these reasons the number of Arab workers in the G CC 
countries went considerably down over the years, although there
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were never any official policies announced to sanction such an 
approach. Arabs were replaced not only by workers from the states 
already well established among the G C C  workforce, as e.g. India or 
Pakistan, but also from such countries as the Philippines, Thailand, 
Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Indonesia.
The percentage of an expatriate population represented by 
Arabs in the G C C  countries decreased from 72 percent in 1975 
to 56 percent a decade later (Table 2). In turn, in 1970, non-Arabs 
constituted only 12 percent o f all workers in the Gulf, yet by 1980 
their number had grown to 41 percent, and by 1985 Asian workers 
had reached the figure of 63 percent o f the Gulf workforce (Russel 
and Teitelbaum, 1992).
There was some concern about the possible social consequences 
of the de-Arabization of the population as a result of the Asian 
influence. For example, in 1982, Abd al-Rahman al-Dirham from 
the Qatari Ministry o f Labor, noted that:
The question o f foreign labor is o f great concern. Our social 
customs are threatened by foreigners. The problem is not just in 
Qatar but also in other G ulf countries. We prefer it if we can get 
suitable people from Arab countries who can live in the Gulf area 
without changing it {M EED, August 1982, p. 40).
The labour laws enacted in most o f the G CC countries stressed 
that employment should be offered firstly to the national citizens, 
secondly to the citizens o f other G CC states, thirdly to non-Gulf 
Arabs and only then to other foreigners. That approach was in line 
with the overall Arab position on the issue. In 1968, the Arab Labor 
Organization called all the Arab states to give priority to Arab workers; 
in 1975 a similar resolution was adopted by the Arab League. The 
Strategy for Joint Arab Economic Action of the 1980s stated that 
“Arab manpower must be resorted to increasingly reduce dependence 
on foreign labor.” In 1984, the Arab Declaration of Principles on
-  194 -
Arab vs. Asian migrant workers in the GCC countries
the Movement of Manpower stressed once more the need to give 
preference to Arab nationals before the nationals of third countries.
In 1980, the UAE formally introduced a policy that Arabs should 
constitute at least 30 percent of the foreign workforce, and signed 
agreements with Tunisia, Morocco, and the Sudan to recruit more 
Arab workers (Al-Alkim, 1989, pp. 30-32). Similarly, in 1974, Qatar 
signed an agreement with Egypt to receive 9,000 workers annually 
from that country, and in 1982 with Tunisia providing for the 
recruitment of Tunisian military personnel and technicians for the 
Qatari army as well as blue-collar workers (Winckler, 2000, p. 27).
Despite all these declarations and agreements, the pro-Arab 
labor policies were never really implemented. Nader Fergany wrote 
that “attempts to organize the pan-Arab labor market have fizzled 
out into ineffective declarations of intent that have been impeded 
in reality by perceived narrow national interests, particularly of 
countries o f employment, acting the mind set of buyers in a buyers- 
market.” Moreover, “labor movement in the Arab region has been 
captive to the ups and downs of Arab politics, sometimes with 
devastating consequences to the welfare o f embroiled migrants” 
(Fergany, 2001, p. 12).
It is only recently that the G C C  authorities have begun to admit 
publicly the negative consequences o f this situation. During the 
October 2004 meeting of the G C C  labor ministers, Majeed Al- 
Alawi, the Bahraini Minister o f Labor and Social Affairs warned 
that “non-Arab foreign workers constitute a strategic threat to the 
regions future” (http://www.middle-east-online.com, 12 October, 
2004). Similarly, during another ministerial meeting of that kind 
in November 2005 Abdul Rahman Al Attiya, the G C C  Secretary- 
General, warned about the possible consequences of the situation. 
“The G CC countries need to look at the massive presence of 
expatriates basically as a national security issue, and not merely as 
an economic matter... International accords are pressing for the
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settlement o f expatriates and imposing giving them salaries equal 
to nationals and greater rights in the areas of education and health.” 
At the same time James Zogby, the president o f the Arab American 
Institute stated that the guest workers were a “time bomb waiting to 
explode and unleash riots like those that [recently] rocked France” 
{G ulf News, 24 November, 2005).
The regional politics occasionally also influences the situation 
on the labor market to a considerable extent. In particular, some 
significant changes in the composition of the foreign workforce 
occurred as a result of the events of the second Gulf War. Both the 
Iraqis and those whose governments were supportive of Iraq (including 
Palestinians, Jordanians, Yemenis, and Sudanese) were distrusted and 
forced to leave the GCC states during and in the aftermath of the 
crisis. Altogether, over 1.5 million people were expelled: up to one 
million Yemenis were expelled from Saudi Arabia along with 200,000 
Jordanians and 150,000 Palestinians -  mainly from Kuwait and 
Saudi Arabia. Several hundred thousand foreign workers (including
158,000 Egyptians) left Kuwait voluntarily or were evacuated by their 
governments (Shaban et al., 2002, p. 41). In addition, many Asian 
workers were evacuated from Kuwait by their governments, but most 
o f them were able to return to the country after the crisis.
Many Arabs who left the G C C  states during the Gulf war and 
in its aftermath did not return following the conflict. The resultant 
vacuum in the labor market, despite the G C C  governments’ 
intentions, was not filled by the nationals. The free market dynamics 
led Asians in particular to take the vacant jobs, enlarging their share 
in the workforce again.
The workforce has witnessed further change in the 1990s, 
partly because of the end of the Cold War and the processes of 
globalization. The job-seekers from China and from the newly 
independent states o f the former Soviet Union began to arrive in 
the Gulf looking for employment opportunities. Cheap to employ
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and often quite well educated, these migrants created an additional 
competition in the labor market.
The policy of nationalization of the workforce combined 
with political preferences has also had an impact on the foreign 
workforce. For example, in mid-1990s when trying to reduce the 
expatriate labor in order to find more jobs for young unemployed 
Saudis, Saudi Arabia reduced the number of work permits issued 
to Egyptians. As a result, their number decreased from 900,000 in 
1995 to 670,000 two years later.
Following all these developments, the percentage of the 
expatriate population represented by Arabs in the G C C  countries 
continued to decrease further in the following years: by early 2000s, 
they accounted only for 32 percent (see Table 2). In Saudi Arabia, 
the percentage of Arabs went down from 91 percent in 1975 to 
33 percent by 2004. In Kuwait, the decline was from 80 percent 
in 1975 to 30 percent in 2003. In other countries, where the 
proportion of non-native Arabs in the population was traditionally 
lower, their share nevertheless declined even further, to as little as
6 percent in Oman and 13—15 in Bahrain and the UAE (all these 
numbers are estimates only, as the precise data are not available).
Altogether, among the 12.5 million foreigners who lived in the 
GCC countries in 2004, there were about 3.2 million non-Gulf 
Arabs, half the number of Asians, who were represented by 3.3 
million Indians, 1.7 million Pakistanis, about 0.7 million of people 
from Bangladesh, the Philippines, and Sri Lanka each (Table 3). 
Thus, the percentage of Asians in the foreign populations varies 
from almost 70 percent in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to over 90 
percent in Oman.
The exact size of foreign communities in the G C C  states is, 
however, difficult to establish, as authorities usually do not reveal 
any information about them, thinking probably that it is better not 
to make foreign communities aware of their actual size.
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Table 2. Arab share in foreign populations, 1975-2002/4* 
(estimates, in percentages)
1975 1985 1996 2002/4
Bahrain 22 15 12 15
Kuwait 80 69 33** 30**
Oman 16 16 11 6
Qatar 33 33 21 19
Saudi
Arabia 91 79 30 33
UAE 26 19 10 13
G C C 72 56 31 32
Source: The ratios for 1975 and 1985 -  Birks (1988), Birks et al. (1988) 
and Winckler (2000); for Kuwait in 1996 from the Public Authority for 
Civil Information; for Oman in 1996 from the Ministry o f Planning, 
Statistical Yearbook 1996  (Muscat); the ratios for the other countries in 
1996 and in 2002/4 are the author’s estimates based on various sources. 
See also: the G C C  Demographic Report (1998). *  data for the years 2002, 
2003 or 2004; * *  — including the bidun (Kapiszewski, 2005).
The non-Gulf Arab community has mainly been composed 
of Egyptians (almost 1.5 million), Yemenis (0.9 million) and 
Palestinians/Jordanians (0.5 million) (Egyptian Central Agency for 
Public Mobilisation and Statistics, 2004; Ambrosetti and Tattolo,
2004). There are also over 300,000 Sudanese living in the GCC 
states nowadays.
There are numerous reports that give much larger numbers 
for particular Asian communities, especially in Saudi Arabia. 
Many claim that currently the Kingdom hosts over one million 
Bangladeshis, about 900,000 Sudanese, a similar number of 
Filipinos, 850,00 of Sri Lankans and over 500,000 Indonesians.6 If
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such numbers are correct, it means that the number of foreigners 
in Saudi Arabia is much higher than officially reported in the last 
census results (that this can be true, see Note to Table 1). In turn, 
some sources speak of only 40,000 Sri Lankans in Kuwait and just
100.000 Indonesians in Saudi Arabia.7
Table 3. Major expatriate communities in the G C C  countries 














Indians 120 320 330 100 1,300 1,200
Pakistanis 50 100 70 100 900 450
Egyptians 30 260 30 35 900 140
Yemenis 800 60
Bangladeshis 170 110 400 100
Filipinos 25 70 50 500 120
Sudanese 250 30
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The consequences of large Asian and non-Gulf 
Arab populations in the GCC states
The employment of foreign workers is both profitable and costly for 
the receiving countries. The benefits of importing foreign labor are 
fairly clear: foreigners provide a basic workforce as well as specialists 
to compensate for the limited number of nationals with required 
skills and attitudes, stimulate the domestic consumption of goods 
supplied by local merchants, and boost local property markets. The 
costs, although much more difficult to estimate, consist o f salaries, 
and the increased spending required to expand the educational and 
health services, housing, and roads, communications and other 
elements o f infrastructure in order to accommodate the needs of 
the newcomers. Moreover, the foreign labor force is a substantial 
drain of the G C C  states’ hard currency earnings, with remittances to 
migrants’ home countries amounting to $27 billion each year; $16 
billion coming from the migrant workers in Saudi Arabia alone (Al- 
Bassam, 2004). These remittances constitute a large portion of the 
G C C  countries’ GDP; for example, in Saudi Arabia in 2001 they 
amounted to about 10 percent of the total GDP of the Kingdom 
(.Al-Madinah, 16 July, 2002). Nevertheless, • the relative costs and 
benefits o f hosting foreign labor have more or less balanced each 
other out in economic terms. It has been shown that the percentage 
of the GDP that foreign labor generates is roughly equal to what 
the state has to spend on them.8
On the other hand, foreigners benefit from their employment in 
the G C C  countries. They are usually able to find better-paid jobs than 
they would have at home, enjoy a high standard of living, and often 
have a chance for a quick career advancement. In particular, they are 
able to save large sums of money and send or take them home, often 
significantly stimulating the economy in their home countries.9 
The presence of a large number of expatriates constitutes, however,
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a major threat to the stability o f the G C C  countries; it endangers 
the culture, influences the structure of society and, furthermore, 
has an impact on the foreign policy. During the G CC summit in 
Manama in December 2004, the Bahraini King submitted a report 
on the danger posed by foreign labor to the social and cultural life 
as well as the economy of the G C C  states. Majeed ibn Muhsen Al- 
Alawi, his Minister of Labor and Social Affairs, said in an interview 
that “we should save future generations from having their culture 
lost” and that although “we are not against the foreign labor” at the 
same time “we do not want these workers to become citizens in the 
region.” The submitted proposal was aimed at limiting the period a 
foreigner can work in a Gulf state to six years.10 The summit left it 
to further discussions which has continued ever since.
Expatriates have often been perceived by the nationals as disloyal 
to their hosts, and even as potentially dangerous political agents 
who spread hostile ideas or work as a “fifth column” for the benefit 
of foreign powers (Whitley, 1993, p. 30). Abdul-Reda Assiri has 
commented that “certain elements of the expatriate labor force could 
potentially be quasi militant,” function as “intelligence instruments, 
to instigate disputes and sabotage,” or serve as tools “for political 
pressure, and monetary and economic extortion” (Assiri, 1996, p. 19; 
ElRayyes, 1988, p. 86; Khalifa, 1979, p. 113; Fergany, 1984, p. 160). 
In 2005 the G CC Secretary General clearly stated that “expat 
workers are ‘security issue’” {G ulf News, 24 November, 2005). Thus, 
quite often, the security situation has an impact on the labor market. 
For example, in August 2005, the Kuwaiti Ministry o f Interior 
banned workers from Iraq, Iran and Syria from entering Kuwait 
due to the “security reservations” {Arab Times, 29 August, 2005). It 
also became compulsory for persons of certain nationalities to get a 
security approval before applying for residency in the country.
In the GCC states, as elsewhere, migration can be an important 
foreign policy issue, and migrants can influence both their host
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and sending countries’ policies. According to Hassan Hamdan al- 
Alkim, “the roles played by the expatriates ... in the G CC states 
are o f great importance in political articulation on foreign policy­
making” (Al-Alkim, 1994, p. 29; Davisha, 1970, p. 60). Although 
in the monarchies o f the Gulf members of expatriate communities 
do not usually have any formal rights in the political process, they 
can influence their host countries’ foreign policy via the local 
media. Expatriates also exert influence through the informal access 
to top-ranking nationals, which some of them enjoy, and through 
the expatriates’ involvement in the overall functioning of the state. 
According to al-Alkim, “the expatriate community, though without 
citizenship (...) exerts more real political influence than most local 
citizens, and in many ways is considered to be crucial to the relatively 
smooth functioning of the political process” (Al-Alkim, 1994, p. 
49). In a similar way, expatriates can often influence their home 
countries’ foreign policy towards the G CC (Crystal, 1997, p. 208).
The presence of large groups o f expatriates sometimes causes 
problems between their home and host countries. For example, 
in 1996, the Qatari government accused Egypt of its involvement 
in the attempted coup, and expelled ca. 700 Egyptian workers, 
particularly those employed in the Ministry of the Interior. Several 
hundred Egyptian workers were also fired by the Qatari authorities 
in 1997 and 1998, basically due to the tensions between the 
countries resulting from Cairo’s criticism of Doha’s developing 
relations with Israel. In turn, in December 1999, around 3,000 
Yemeni workers were deported from Saudi Arabia, apparently 
due to renewed tensions between the countries related to the 
border issues. In October 1999, a mass riot involving hundreds of 
Egyptian and Kuwaiti workers took place in Kuwait. One hundred 
and twenty people were wounded in the event, and 16 Egyptian 
workers were arrested and accused of arson, damage to private 
property, participation in an illegal gathering and resisting arrest in
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the riots. At the root of the incident were the inadequate working 
and living conditions of Egyptian workers, most o f whom were 
employed illegally and as such were not protected by either Kuwaiti 
or Egyptian authorities (Kapiszewski, 2004, p. 128). In 2005, the 
low-paid Asian workers also staged protests, some of them violent, 
in Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar for not receiving salaries on time. In 
March 2006, hundreds of mostly south Asian constructing workers 
stopped work and went on a rampage in Dubai, UAE, to protest 
their harsh working conditions, low or delayed pay, and the general 
lack of rights.
Such incidents demonstrate the tense relations which have 
developed between the nationals and the expatriates in some cases. 
Foreigners, non-Gulf Arabs in particular, have often suspected the 
nationals of desiring to exploit them on unfair economic terms 
and have feared the possible consequences o f a total dependence 
on their sponsors, given the lack of laws that could protect them 
adequately. They have felt the nationals have often acted out of 
prejudice and discriminated against them both in the labor market 
and* in their attempts to establish business enterprises or purchase 
real estate (Alessa, 1981, pp. 44-50). Non-Gulf Arabs have also been 
frustrated that the nationals’ attitudes towards them were not more 
positive than toward non-Arab or non-Muslim expatriates. They 
“naturally expect to be better treated and somehow more naturally 
welcomed in the Gulf than [let us say] Indians or Koreans,” and 
when their expectations are not met, they sometimes “repeat tales of 
‘arrogance,’ ‘greed,’ ‘exploitation,’ and ‘discrimination’ encountered 
in the Gulf” (Salame, 1988, p. 242). Such claims are often justified. 
According to James Zogby, “workers are trapped in horrible 
conditions, denied justice and their basic humanity” {G ulf News, 
24 November, 2005). Even Sheikh Sabah al-Ahmed, the Kuwaiti 
foreign minister, said once that foreign workers were often treated 
by unscrupulous contractors as “slaves” {IPS, Cairo, 5 December,
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1999). O f course, the non-Gulf Arabs’ perception of the treatment 
they receive in the G C C  countries depends, as is the case with all 
the expatriates, on their personal experiences (failures or successes), 
as well as their expectations and motivations before immigration.
Non-Arab laborers, Asian women especially, have also often 
complained about their treatment in the Gulf.
The sexual harassment o f Filipino housemaids by local employers, 
especially in Saudi Arabia, has become a serious matter in the recent 
years (Gamburd, 2005). Among other things, it has resulted in a ban 
on the under 21 years o f age female migration. Also in Indonesia 
the maltreatment of women in the G C C  states has been widely 
reported; it has been viewed as a national “embarrassment”, and led 
to calls to the government to stop sending housemaids altogether 
(Silvey, 2004, p. 258).
When several Nepalese contract workers were murdered in 
mid-2004 by their hostage-takers in wartime Iraq, anger over this 
situation spilled into the streets of Kathmandu, where the incident 
was indexed as an act o f Arab aggression against guest workers in 
the Gulf, and the Nepal offices of the Qatar Airways were torched 
(Chaudoir, 2005). Earlier, in 2001, the female labour migration 
was banned by the Kathmandu government.
There are also other social and cultural implications of presence 
of a large number of foreigners in the GCC states. The negative 
influence of expatriates on the national cultures, identities and values 
as well as social structures remains a big concern for the nationals 
(Kapiszewski, 2001, pp. 157-168). In particular, authorities are 
worried about the influence of Asian nannies or expatriate teachers, 
who form the majority of school staff, on local children; their 
concern is raising the children without a proper attention being 
given to Islamic and Arabic values. They are also unhappy at the 
growing influence of the foreign media and a large number of foreign 
women married to the nationals . Strangely enough, the authorities
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seem to be less worried about the overwhelming presence of the 
Western material civilization and Western consumption patterns in 
the G C C  states, probably the most threatening factors for the local 
culture and identity of the nationals.
The future of the GCC foreign labor market
The demand for foreign workers in the G CC countries in the years to 
come will depend on several factors: the number of young nationals 
entering the labor market, the effect of the nationalization of labor 
markets (mainly due to government regulations), the capacity of 
the economy to generate new jobs, the employment qualifications 
of the national labor in relation to the requirements o f the job 
market, the willingness of the nationals to take low-prestige jobs, 
as well as political and security considerations (Fasano and Goyal, 
2004; Girgis, 2002). Probably the most important factor will be 
the overall state of economy; the high oil prices at the beginning 
of the 2000s allowed for a further rapid development o f several 
G CC states and in consequence a large growth in population, the 
foreign one in particular. The reality has greatly exceeded the earlier 
predictions."
In terms of the numbers, were the trend of the last decade to 
continue, the number of the expatriates would grow in the next
10 years by another 10 million or so (between 1995 and 2004 the 
number of the expatriates went up from 7 million to 12.5 million, 
that is by 80 percent). There are also indications that the percentage 
of foreigners in the population may grow as well, at least in some 
countries.12 Most of the newcomers will be Asians, as employers 
in the GCC states will probably continue to prefer them to Arab 
workers.13 It is unlikely that in the near future the wage rate in such 
Arab countries as Egypt or Jordan will fall low enough to make 
the non-Gulf Arab labor wage-competitive with the Asian labor.
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Moreover, the Arab labor will remain less attractive for foreign 
employers due to the non-Gulf Arabs’ inferior level of education 
and technical training as compared to that of many Asians.14
What may, to some extent, slow down the growth of the foreign 
labor? This may occur because o f the following reasons:
-  There will be a growing number of nationals looking for jobs 
each year due to the demographic factors: the birth rate of nationals 
in the G C C  states is very high (3.5 on average), and almost half of 
the local population is under 15 years o f age.
— The nationals will become better educated, which will allow 
them to compete more effectively against the foreign labor in the 
private sector. Moreover, when facing the growing unemployment 
(especially high in Saudi Arabia15), the nationals will gradually 
change their work ethic and grow more willing to accept the low- 
prestige jobs currently held by foreigners (Kapiszewski, 2001, pp. 
210- 211 ).
-  National women will increase their presence in the workforce, 
in terms of the numbers especially in Saudi Arabia.
— The nationalization policies will create more jobs for nationals 
each year.16
Moreover, the decisive actions can be expected from some G CC 
governments in that matter. Saudi Arabia seems to be adopting 
most radical measures here. According to the 2002 guidelines of 
the Shura Council, by 2007, 70 percent of the workforce will have 
to be Saudi.
On February 2, 2003 Prince Naif bin Abdulaziz, Saudi Arabia’s 
Minister o f Internal Affairs and the Chairman of the Manpower 
Council, announced that the Saudi government had decided to 
lower the number of foreigners in the Kingdom to a maximum of 20 
percent of its indigenous population within the next 10 years, and 
to establish a quota system for foreigners in which no nationality 
may exceed 10 percent o f the total population (Riyadh Daily, 3
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February, 2003). This decision, if implemented fully, will have 
a dramatic effect on the foreign population in the Kingdom, and on 
the Arab immigrants in particular. In terms of the 2004 situation 
(16.5 million nationals , 6.1 million foreigners), the execution 
of the new policies would imply the expulsion of over half of the 
foreign workers currently residing in the Kingdom, a decrease in the 
size o f the Indian population from 1.3 million to around 300,000, 
and a reduction of the number of Egyptian, Yemeni, and Pakistani 
populations from almost a million (each) to a similar number.
In October 2004 Ghazi al-Ghosaibi, the Labor Minister, 
announced that the government plans to cut the number of foreign 
workers by no less than 100,000 every year, and in March 2005 he 
declared that the number of job visas was reduced from 832,244 to 
684,201 during one year (Ghafour, 2005).
Naturally, only time will show whether the Saudi authorities 
will be able to realize these ambitious plans. In the Five-Year Plan 
adopted in 1985, a 22.6 percent reduction in the foreign labor 
was planned by the year 1990 (that is, by some 600,000 people). 
In reality, the foreign workforce increased during that period by 
200,000.
The Kuwaiti government was similarly unsuccessful in trying 
to implement such policies. In 1997, a decision was issued that 
ministries must replace 10 percent of their expatriate staff every 
year with young Kuwaitis. The decision was implemented for two 
years only as ministries could not find enough qualified Kuwaitis to 
substitute them (Taqi, 2005).
The most recent proposal is to limit the expatriate stay, at least of 
the unskilled labour, to six years only. Labour ministers submitted 
such a recommendation to the G CC leaders in December 2005 but 
it evokes various reactions (Arab Times, 14 December, 2005).
To sum up, in the years to come, in all the G C C  states 
the employment o f the nationals and the labor migration will
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remain politically a very sensitive issue as it will cause further 
tensions between the profit-driven concerns o f the private sector, 
the indigenization efforts o f the states and the national security 
considerations. Moreover, a large number of foreigners residing 
in these countries will bring new social and cultural challenges of 
consequences difficult to estimate, especially as the naturalization 
o f many foreigners will take place. Asians will continue to 
dominate the foreign workforce at the expense of the non-Gulf 
Arab labor.
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Notes
1 There is a general lack of reliable population data for the GCC states. 
Author’s comments on that written in 2000 are still valid (Kapiszewski, 
2001, pp. 26, 27, 45, 46). Therefore, numbers presented in this paper 
should be treated as estimates only, especially ones for Saudi Arabia and 
Qatar.
2 For example, in Saudi Arabia, between 1990 and 2000, the GDP 
grew in average 1.6 percent annually but the country’s population grew 
at an annual rate of 2.7 percent, thus producing a declining trend in 
per capita income (Looney, 2004). In turn, over the 1997-2004 period, 
average nominal salary for Saudi nationals declined by 12 percent, as 
compared to 17 percent fall for foreigners (Fasano and Goyal, 2004).
3 Nationals prefer to work in the public sector because of usually high 
wages, job security, generous social allowances and retirement benefits, 
short working hours (allowing to be involved in additional private business 
on the side), lack of work discipline, etc.
4 See: Obstacles before Saudi women’s employment discussed, Arab 
News (6 February, 2006).
5 Nevertheless, many Gulf Arabs have perceived non-Arab Muslims as 
potential trouble-makers, often trying to use their shared Muslim identity 
to buttress their claims to resources and economic wealth, which the 
GCC nationals believe are necessarily and naturally only theirs (Ahmad,
2005).
6 For example, according to the spokesman for the Philippine Embassy 
in Riyadh in 2005 there were between 850,000 and 900,000 Filipinos in 
the Kingdom (Saudi Gazette, 17 December, 2005).
7 According to the official Indonesian government data for 2003 there 
were 104.698 Indonesians workers in Saudi Arabia.
http://www.nekatrans.go.id/statistik_naker/pptkln.php
8 Abdul Rasool Al-Moosa and Keith McLachlan (1985, p. 85) 
calculated that foreign workers in Kuwait generate 26 percent of the GDP 
while the state spends 30 percent of GDP to sustain this workforce.
9 Workers remittances constitute a large share of home countries’ 
GDP: in the 1990’s there were 12.4 percent in Egypt, 15.7 percent in
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Jordan and 22.4 percent in Yemen. Apparently each dollar o f remittance 
increased Egypt’s GN P by 2.2 dollars (Shaban and others, 2002, p. 27; 
Kandil and Metwally, 1990, pp. 159—180; Abella, 1992, p. 157).
10 One o f the reason for such a proposal was problem caused by 
international regulations imposing naturalization o f foreign workers who 
had lived in the country for more than five years.
11 For example, Girgis (2002), widely quoted in the literature on the 
subject, predicted in the year 2000 that by the year 2010 the demand for 
expatriates in the G C C  states will increase to 10,799,000. That number 
was achieved already in 2002.
12 In Kuwait in 2004 the foreign labour grew by 12 percent while 
national by only 6.6 percent (Jassen, 2005).
13 Girgis (2002, pp. 39—40) estimated that in the years 2003-2007,
485,000 non-Gulf Arabs will lose their jobs in the G C C states. The lost 
income that will result from the consequent out-migration will reach 
$3.6 billion from Arab workers. While the calculations leading to these 
precise numbers are debatable, one should agree with Girgis that in the 
years to come “ [non-Gulf] Arab countries are well advised to anticipate 
less remittance, more workers returning home and perhaps high 
unemployment rates at home.”
14 Nader Fergany (Al-Ahram Weekly, 23-29 December, 1999) stressed 
this problem in relation to Egypt: “We have a problem of human 
resource quality. This is a part o f our problem with the Gulf. Today, to 
be competitive in the global market you have to have efficient, cheap 
and highly trained labour. In this new era o f rapidly and continuously 
changing knowledge and high rates o f obsolescence, workers require 
access to on-going education programs. [But] our education, training and 
re-training systems are very weak.”
15 There are various estimates o f the level o f unemployment in Saudi 
Arabia. In January, 2005, Saudi Labour Minister Ghazi al-Ghosaibi said 
that there were 180,443 unemployed nationals. The Minister also said 
that there are numerous unofficial estimates that are greatly exaggerated 
and that the only figures which should be accepted are those from the 
General Statistics Authority. The problem is, however, that according to
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the Authority, the unemployment figure was twice as high as mentioned 
by the Minister, namely around 300,000 or 9.6 percent (Arab News,
13 January, 2005). Undersecretary for Planning and Development for 
the Ministry of Labour, Abdul Wahid Al-Humayid, revealed on January 
4, 2006, that there were only 155,000 Saudi male job seekers, that 
is five percent. The unemployment of women was unknown. Other 
sources quoted from 14 to 20 percent, with 32 percent among young 
workers (United Nations, 2001, p. 44), see also Saudi Monetary Agency 
statistics (Arab News, 5 March, 2003). In Bahrain, in 2004, there were 
16,000-20,000 unemployed, that is 13-17 percent of the national 
workforce (Almazel, 2005). In the UAE the number was put at 32,000 
(Karimkhany, 2005).
16 Nationalization policies did not bring much change in the com­
position of the workforce so far, but eventually they will (Kapiszewski, 
2001, pp. 212-243). Failures of the nationalization policies can be easily 
observed, for example, in Saudi Arabia. The Saudi Manpower Council 
mandated five percent of Saudization annually, while in reality that 
number was achieved only between 1998-2003 (Pakkiasamy, 2004).
Population and workforce in Oman
Population statistics
In the latter half o f the 20th century, largely thanks to the discovery 
of oil in the region, all political entities o f the Gulf transformed 
themselves from desert sheikhdoms into modern states. This process 
was accompanied by the rapid population growth1. The Sultanate 
of Oman has followed the suit. The population of the country grew 
from around 400 thousand in 1950 to 3 million in 2004: more 
than sevenfold (Table l ) 2.
Table 1. Oman. Population growth, 1950—2004 (in thousands)
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2003 2004
413' 505“ 654“ l,060b l,625b 2,402b 2,34lc 2,903d
Source: “ Gulf Statistical Profile, Table 5.2, p. 2 0 1 ;b Oman Statistical Yearbook
2004, www.moneoman.gov.om;c 2003 Population Census, Oman Statistical 
Yearbook 2004-,d CIA World Factbook 2004, www.cia.gov.
1 For the population data see A. Kapiszewski, National and Expatriates. Population 
and Labor Dilemmas of the GCC States (Reading, Ithaca Press, 2001), pp. 33—47.
2 There is a considerable discrepancy between the 2003 Population Census 
data and other, including official Omani information concerning the population 
of the country. The official Omani statistical data provided in successive Statistical 
Yearbooks showed the Omani population in 2000 -  2,402,000; 2001 -  2,478,000; 
2002 -  2,538,000 only to go down by 2003 Census data. According to various 
sources, the 2003 Census population numbers are underestimated.
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The average annual population growth rate maintained a steady 
increase from about 2.0 percent in 1950s to 5.5 percent in 1985, 
when it begun to decrease to about 3.0 percent in the 2000s3. But 
even such growth placed Oman in the years 2000-2005 among 
the world top ten countries in terms of population growth rates. 
According to the UN Population Division this trend will continue 
and the Omani population will triple in the next 50 years, reaching
9 million in the year 20504.
This increase of the Omani population has not been caused by 
the indigenous population alone but by the influx of foreign workers 
as well. The employment of foreigners was a structural imperative for 
growth in Oman, as development depended upon the importation 
of foreign technologies and required knowledge and skills alien to the 
local Arab population. In consequence, foreign workers have become 
an important part of the labour force in most sectors of economy and 
the government bureaucracy.
Table 2. Oman. Populations of nationals and expatriates, 1975-2004 
(in thousands)
Nationals Expatriates Total
19751 650 132 782
1985b 1,102 314 1,416
1995b 1,557 574 2,131
2003c 1,782 559 2,341
2004d 2,326 577 2,903
Source-. ‘ Birks: ‘The demographic challenge’, Table 7.7, p. 147; b Oman 
Statistical Yearbook 2004, www.moneoman.gov.om; c 2003 Population Census, 
Oman Statistical Yearbook 2004;d CIA World Factbook 2004, www.cia.gov.
3 www.econstats.com.
4 To be exact, the United Nations Population Division projected the Omani 
population to reach 8,751,000.
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The percentage of expatriates in the total population grew from 
approximately 17 per cent in 1975 to 27 per cent in 1995 (Table 
2 and 4). The situation began to change, however, at the turn of 
the century. Omanization policies (see below) finally reverse this 
process and in 2004 the population of Omani nationals went up to 
80 per cent, reaching its level from 1970s (Table 3).
Table 3. Oman. Percentage of nationals in population, 1975—2004
1975 1985 1995 2004
83.1 77.8 73.1 80.1
Source: Table 2.
Table 4. Oman. Percentage of expatriates in population, 1975-2004
1975 1985 1995 2004
16.9 22.2 26.9 19.9
Source: Table 2.
The Omani government have tried to change this proportion 
by adopting pronatalist policies that enlarge the size of national 
population. First of all, the authorities have devoted substantial funds 
to improving healthcare services and promoting hygiene, proper 
nutrition and healthy living as a way to increase the number of 
nationals. Due to these efforts, infant and maternal mortality rates have 
fallen sharply, being about four times lower than the world’s average 
at the turn of the century (Table 5). Meanwhile, life expectancy at 
birth has gone up considerably, rising by approx. 25 years in the last 
few decades and being almost ten years above the world’s average.
In order to encourage national couples to have more children, 
a number of incentives were introduced, including special housing
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loans or even free government housing for some low-income 
nationals, allowances for families according to the number of 
children or fully paid maternity holidays.















5.0 87 10 76.3 71.0
Source-. The World Health Report 2004, Annex, Tables 1 and 7, pp. 116 and 152 
and Ministry of Health information.
Notes: (1) — 2002, children born/women; (2) -  2000, per 100,000 live births; 
(3) — 2000, per 1,000 live births; (4) and (5) -  2002, in years at birth.
Effects of pronatalist policies are, however, difficult to evaluate 
fully, as statistics of fertility rates published rarely separate data for 
nationals and expatriates. In general, the fertility rate in Oman has 
been very high, much higher than the world’s average. Nevertheless, 
in the last decades it has been decreasing.
While in relative terms, the pronatalist policies have brought 
some positive results, their overall effects on population structure 
have been negligible. The ratio o f nationals to expatriates, has not 
been much influenced by these policies. Moreover, as expatriate 
labour often provides for consumption needs, the need for foreign 
workers can increase with population growth of the local population5. 
The pronatalist policies have also caused some problems for the 
authorities. The enlarged young section of the population becomes 
a socio-economic, if not political, burden and a potential factor
5 A. Hossein, V. Nowshirvani and M. Jaber, Economic Development in the 
GCC. The Blessing and the Course of Oil (Greenwich, Connecticut, JAI Press, 
1997), p. 73.
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of instability, especially as unemployment grows. Therefore, the 
government have tried to limit the overall number of expatriates 
by administrative means and to replace them by nationals at work 
(see below).
Heterogeneity of the population
The Omani population has not only been divided between citizens and 
temporary foreign workers. Even the nationals constitute a diversified 
group of people. Among them there are still highly distinguishable 
members of various tribes, ethnic or religious minority groups. Their 
group identification and perception by others have been related to 
the not-so-distant history of the country, when the interior, Muscat 
and Dhofar regions, as well as African territories were separate 
administrative entities, in case of the interior and Muscat additionally 
divided by the religious differences. Thus, in modern Oman there 
are still “Ibadis” (about 75 percent of the total population), coastal 
“Shiites”, “Dhofaris”, “Zanzibaris” (or more general “Swahilis” as they 
originated not only from the island, but also from Tanganyika and 
Central Africa). The Muscat-Matrah urban area has long been home 
to remarkable numbers of Persians (Iranians) and of merchants of 
Indian ancestry, some of whom also live along the al-Batina. Famous 
among the latter are the Liwatiyah, who originally came from Sindh 
(now in Pakistan) but have lived in Oman for centuries. The Omani 
Indian communities are mainly Shi’ites with a few Hindus. Besides 
majority Arabs, there is a large separate group of Baluchis. Finally, 
deep divisions exist between certain tribes (for example Al Bu Said, 
Al Hindi, Al Gafri). Nevertheless, most of the local passport holders 
are quite well integrated in the community which began to posses 
the attributes of the modern nation-state. This has happened thanks 
to the work of Sultan Qaboos who, after becoming the ruler of the 
country in 1970 and successfully handling problems caused by the
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Dhofar uprising, made national integration one of the major issues 
o f his policies. Only occasionally, in the social context, members of 
certain local groups, as well as naturalised foreigners are considered 
‘not real Omani’ by other nationals.
In turn, the expatriate population is also highly diversified. Major 
expatriate groups in Oman consist of Indians (approx. 330,000), 
Bangladeshis (approx. 110,000), Pakistanis (approx. 70,000), Sri 
Lankans (approx. 30,000) and Egyptians (approx. 30,000)6.
Nationals and expatriates in the workforce
Although the number of Omanis in the total population greatly 
exceeds the number of expatriates almost at the rate of three to one, 
the latter dominate the labour market. In 2003, there were 58 per 
cent expatriates in the Omani workforce (Table 6).
Table 6. Nationals and expatriates in the Omani workforce, 1995, 
2003
Nationals Expatriates Total
1995 270,000 496,200 766,200
2003 312,446 424,178 736,64
Source: 1995 -  Ministry of Development estimates, Five-Year Development 
Plan 1996—2000 (Muscat, 1996), p. 114; 2003 -  Population Census, Oman 
Statistical Yearbook 2004.
For several decades, the number of foreign workers has grown 
steadily along with the economic development of Oman. Growing 
at the same time was the expatriate share in the total workforce; 
it went up from about 35 per cent in 1975 to about 65 per cent
6 Data from the appropriate government departments as reported in Human 
Rights Watch reports for 2004.
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in 1995. Only more recently, after 1995, did the overall situation 
begin to change, and a development that has resulted in the decrease 
of average representation of expatriates in the overall workforce is 
visible.
On the contrary, the percentage of nationals in the workforce 
has decreased from 65 per cent in 1975 to about 35 per cent in 
1995, only to shift to approximately 42 per cent by 2003. Oman, 
along with Bahrain, has the highest percentage of working nationals 
among the G CC (Gulf Cooperation Council) states.
A large expatriate presence in the Omani workforce is expected 
to continue in the years to come. The popular conviction that 
demand for foreign labour is only transient, as “in essence it is a 
demand for foreign skills that G CC nationals are in the process 
of developing”, is not necessarily true7. The overall educational 
gap between nationals and foreign workers is not particularly large 
and the number of unskilled, illiterate foreign workers, who have 
little to offer nationals in terms of “know-how” transfer, is very 
high, ranging from 30 to 50 per cent8. Contrary to the long-term 
interests of nationals, the attention paid to the low wages o f such 
workers is often greater than the understanding of negative effects, 
of their large presence.
It also has to be remembered that the expatriate inflow is a self­
feeding process. The employment of foreign workers increases the 
demand for housing, services, consumer and other goods, creating 
an additional demand for manpower that can be met only by greater 
immigration.
The ratio o f the workforce to the total population is high, mainly 
because of the size of the expatriate workforce. The Economic Activity
7 S. Al-Qudsi, Labour Markets and Policy in the GCC: Micro Diagnostics and 
Macro Profiles (Emirates Lecture Series, Abu Dhabi, The Emirates Center for 
Strategic Studies and Research, 1998), p. 24.
8 Ibidem, pp. 29-31 and 46.
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Rate is Oman in 2003 was 31 per cent, that is comparable to rates 
in other countries at a similar level of economic development and 
with comparable per capita income, but much lower than in highly 
developed countries (for example, in the US, the rate was 51 per 
cent in 2000)9. Economic Activity Rates, naturally, differ a greatly 
between nationals and expatriates. The national workforce in Oman 
is small, lower than is to be expected from the size of the national 
population. Only 17.5 per cent of Omanis work, as compared to 
76 per cent o f expatriates. Thus, each employed national has, on 
average, five dependants. In sharp contrast, each expatriate worker 
has on average only 0.3 accompanying family members.
There are several reasons for the low Economic Activity Rate 
of Omanis. First o f all, the national population is very young, 
with large proportion of people aged below 15. Therefore, only a 
relatively small proportion falls within the economically active age 
group. Second, there is still only limited employment o f women 
(see below). Finally, many working-age men of Omani nationality 
do not actually participate in the labour market because o f the 
reduced economic necessity to do so: a circumstance that is 
exacerbated by a low retirement age. In contrast, the foreign 
labour force has a high Economic Activity Rate as a result o f the 
dominance of single male workers and a lack of non-working 
expatriates, young and old.
The Economic Activity Rates for Omani nationals remained 
basically the same in the last decade. This shows that various attempts 
by the government to increase the number of working nationals have 
not been as successful as they could (in particular, the participation 
of women in the workforce did not increase much). At the same 
time, the Economic Activity Rate for expatriates decreased slightly, 
showing that their overall status in the society increased (they have 
been able to have more dependants).
9 The Economic Activity Rate.
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Alongside the state policies o f providing jobs to all nationals is 
the fact that the majority of them have been employed in the public 
sector. This is a paradox in countries with very liberal economic 
policies and free markets, but it is largely caused by the fact that 
salaries and other benefits in the public sector are quite attractive for 
nationals as compared to the demand for labour in the competitive, 
profit-oriented private sector. In Oman, 62.6 per cent o f nationals 
were employed in the public sector in 2003, while 27.4 per cent 
were employed in the private sector10.
Women in the population and in the workforce
Women constitute a minority of the population of Oman due to the 
large number of single male expatriates as well as restrictions placed 
on the residence of expatriate women. Only certain categories 
of foreigners are allowed to bring their families with them, one 
criterion being the minimum required salary. In 2003, there were 
1,027,576 women in the total population, that is 43.9 per cent. 
That proportion slightly increased in the last decade; for example, 
there was 41.4 per cent women the total population in 1997, 
showing more liberal attitude to bringing in foreign female workers 
and possibility to increase a number of female dependants.
While Omani women have constituted about 50 per cent of the 
national population (49.5 per cent in 2003), the expatriate women 
were at that time responsible only for 26.2 per cent o f the foreign 
population. Therefore, the ratio o f expatriate men to women was 
almost 3:1.
The female workforce in Oman continues to be small, at 15 per 
cent o f the total; in 2003, there were 113,632 women in the total 
workforce of 736,62411.
10 Population Census 2003, Oman Statistical Yearbook 2004 (Muscat, Ministry 
of Development), Table 23-2.
11 Ibidem, Table 16-2.
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The Omani female workforce is over 17 per cent of the total 
Omani workforce; in 2003 there were 53,791 Omani women in 
the total Omani workforce o f 312,44612. That percentage has been 
steadily going up in recent years; for example a decade earlier, in 
1993, there were fewer than 10 per cent o f Omani women in the 
total Omani workforce13.
The expatriate female workforce accounts for 14 per cent o f the 
total expatriate workforce; in 2003 there were 59,841 expatriate 
women in the total expatriate workforce o f4 14,17814. That percentage 
was much less than a decade earlier (19 per cent), probably because 
o f the growing number of Omani women going to work.
As a small percentage of national women work, their Economic 
Activity Rate is low -6 .1 , much lower, as might be expected, than in 
the case o f men (28.7), but in the upward trend; in 1993 the Economic 
Activity Rate for Omani women was 3.5. In contrast, the Economic 
Activity Rate of expatriate women is quite high, over 40 per cent.
The majority of national women work in the public sector which 
provides higher salaries and accommodates better their needs for 
flexible working hours. Moreover, the public sector provides them 
with protection, shielding them from the necessity o f dealing with 
a large number of persons, usually foreign men, as is the case in the 
private sector. In 2003, 63.3 per cent o f female Omani workforce 
was employed in the public sector, as compared to 26.6 in the 
private one, interestingly enough in both cases almost the same 
percentage as for Omani men15. Thirty-nine per cent of Omani 
women worked in education, 15 per cent in public administration, 
and 14 per cent in health and social work16.
12 Ibidem, Table 17-2.
13 A. Kapiszewski, Nationals and Expatriates, p. 108.
14 Population Census 2003, Table 18-2.
15 Ibidem, Table 23-2.
16 Ibidem, Table 20-2.
- 226 -
Population and workforce in Oman
The increase in the employment of national women is expected 
to continue in the near future, because o f the economic necessities, 
more liberal attitudes towards the employment o f women in 
society at large, the strong interest among many national women in 
working, the improvement o f educational facilities for women and 
the shortage of national men to fulfil the needs o f the market.
Although a part o f national public opinion might still be against 
the idea o f working women, the authorities have become strong 
supporters o f enhancing their public role and their employment. 
In 1994, Sultan Qaboos nominated the first two women to the 
State Consultative Council (Majlis al-Shura). Opening the Council 
session, he called on Omani women “to roll up their sleeves and 
contribute to the process of economic and social development [...]. 
The country needs every pair o f hands”17. On another occasion 
he said, that “if the energy, capability and enthusiasm o f women 
were excluded from a country’s public life, that country would 
deprive itself o f 50 per cent o f its genius”18. Further promoting 
the role o f women in public affairs, in 1997, he allowed national 
women to participate in the elections (the first such case in the 
G CC countries) and later nominated four o f them to the newly 
established Council of Oman. In 1998-1999, the Sultan appointed 
the first woman ambassador, named three women under-secretaries 
in the Omani government and one a member of the board of the 
chamber of commerce and industry. In 2003, he appointed a 
woman to become President o f the Public Authority for the Craft 
Industries at the rank of a minister. Finally, in 2004 the Sultan 
appointed three other women to the cabinet, to manage the 
Higher Education, Tourism and Social Development Ministries. 
Moreover, five female lawyers were appointed as attorney generals, 
the only such case in the G C C  states. In turn, among the religious
17 Khaleej Times, 4 September 1994.
18 K. Thomas, A velvet revolution’, Arabics Trends (April) 1999, p. 34.
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leaders o f the G C C  countries, the Mufti o f Muscat stands apart as 
being the only one to give his blessings to the inclusion of women 
in the political process19.
Policies towards foreign labour
Policies towards foreign labour have been designed to secure the 
preservation of the existing regime and the dominant position of 
the national population. They are based on the following principles: 
rigorous laws regulating the entry, residence and employment of 
foreigners; rotation of the migrant workforce; preference for labour 
from certain regions; and last but not least, rigid restrictions on 
naturalisation.
Laws regulating the entry and employment o f foreigners have 
generally been restrictive. Except for the citizens of the GCC 
countries and a few other exceptions nobody can enter a country 
without a proper visa, which in most cases requires a local sponsor. 
When the purpose of entry is employment, the application has to 
be made by the future employer, in which case residency and work 
permits issued by the Ministries of the Interior and Social Affairs, 
Labour and Vocational Training, are also necessary. Work permits 
and entry visas are issued only when taking into consideration age, 
health, competence and qualifications for the job in question, and 
sometimes also ‘good reputation and behaviour’. Residency visas are 
granted for a limited period of time, not exceeding five years. Work 
permits have to be renewed regularly, often annually, and when 
cancelled the residency permits become invalid. Changing the type 
of visa (for example from tourist to residency) is restricted, as is the 
possibility o f changing employer (which usually requires the prior 
consent o f the first sponsor and the authorities). In such situations
19 C. J. Riphenburg, Oman: Political Development in a Changing World 
(Westport, Connecticut, Praeger, 1998), p. 152.
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the person is often required to leave the country for a certain period 
of time before being granted a new contract and work permit, lire 
local sponsor is responsible, at least on paper, for the conduct of 
the employee and is obliged to ensure that he or she is employed in 
accordance with legislation. In reality, the foreign workers can be 
hired and fired at the will of their employers. Moreover, authorities 
can terminate residency and working permits at any time. To secure 
even better control of foreign labour, employees are generally 
required to cede their passports to the employer for the duration of 
their stay in the country.
Despite the existence of all these restrictive regulations, the 
rotation of the workforce has proved impossible to achieve as 
planned. The free market economy has been more powerful than 
the policies the authorities would like to implement. The majority 
of expatriates have stayed beyond the term of the original contract, 
as employers usually prefer to hire workers with local experience 
rather than bring in new ones. Moreover, bringing in a new worker 
involves additional costs to the company. As a result, the average 
period of time that foreign workers have spent in Oman has been 
growing and the number of practically, though not formally, 
permanent workers has increased.
In turn, the policies regarding preferences for labour from certain 
countries have essentially accomplished their goals. In particular, 
the number of non-Gulf Arab workers, Palestinians in particular, 
was kept low while the number of Asians was high.
Finally, policies regulating naturalisation and citizenship have 
been most strictly enforced, successfully limiting the possible 
enlargement o f privileged local populations by foreign elements. 
One has to be resident for 20 years to have the right to apply for the 
citizenship; this requirement is reduced to 10 years if the applicant 
has been married to an Omani. Because o f such restrictions, very 
few people have been naturalized; for example between 1986 to
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1996 only 1,861 foreigners were able to obtain such status20. Most 
o f them were Arab women married to nationals21.
In due course, however, the authorities realised that the size of the 
foreign workforce grew much beyond the government s expectations 
and full control over it became increasingly difficult. Therefore, they 
began to introduce different measures to deal with the problem.
To discourage foreigners even from considering the option of 
settling down, they have been forbidden, with a few exceptions, 
from owning land, buildings and any other immovable property, 
and barred from entering into a commercial venture without 
a national partner (foreign participation in a business must not be 
a majority share).
To limit the number of non-productive foreigners residing in the 
country, expatriate workers are prohibited from bringing in their family 
members unless they earn above a certain limit. Male children above 
the age of 18 are not allowed to stay with their parents unless they 
work or study in the country under different sponsorship. To limit the 
number of foreigners further, employment contracts are generally not 
renewed for expatriates reaching the retirement age of 60.
Then, the government have made employment of foreigners 
more expensive. For that reason the costs of labour cards, work 
and resident permits, entry and exit visas and health cards as well 
as the costs of subsidised services for expatriates have continually 
increased. In 1994, the government introduced a tax for hiring 
foreign workers. The tax ranges from 60 rials ($157) annually for 
each expatriate employee in the private sector to 70 rials ($184) for 
each domestic helper. Secondly, to reduce the number of foreigners 
further, amnesties have been regularly granted to non legally
20 As calculated by the number of passports issued by the Naturalization 
Department, Statistical Yearbook 1996 (Muscat, Ministry of Development).
21 J. al-Jasser, “Naturalization in the Gulf: Ladies come out on top”, Mideast 
Mirror, 2nd June 1999.
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residing foreigners (that is, without a proper visa), allowing them 
to leave the country voluntarily without punishment. At the same 
time, tough penalties were introduced for illegal employment, with 
sentences to be served in prisons and substantial fines for both the 
illegal labourers and the nationals employing or sheltering them. 
The administrative deportations of non-legalized residents have 
been also practised.
Finally, to limit further the increase in the number of foreign 
workers, especially unskilled, the authorities have been trying to 
develop high-tech manufacturing and services which are not labour- 
intensive and do not need large on-site field personnel.
All the policies aimed to limit the numbers o f the foreign 
labourers have neither been strict enough, nor fully implemented 
. In reality, they have often been losing the battle with the forces 
of the free market. A laissez-faire approach to the import of foreign 
labour continues to enjoy a strong support from the politically 
powerful lobbies of trading and merchant families whose fortunes 
have to a large extent been built thanks to expatriate workers.
Localisation of the labour market
Omanisation (often also called localisation, nationalisation or 
indigenisation) are terms used to describe policies leading to 
the replacement of expatriate labour by nationals. The Omani 
authorities try to implement such policies to provide jobs for all 
citizens, and also because they understand well the security-related, 
economic, social and cultural risks coming from the existence of 
large communities o f foreigners on their territory.
The localisation of jobs in Oman went on the government’s 
agenda very early. The Education and Training Council chaired by 
the Sultan was already established in 1977. The Third Five-Year 
Development Plan (1980-1985) paid much attention to this issue.
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The Ministry o f Social Affairs and Labour through its Directorate 
General o f Vocational Training established several Vocational 
Training Institutes in different regions of the Sultanate in the mid- 
1980s. In hardly any time at all, they began to offer numerous 
commercial and technical courses for nationals. Oman Technical 
and Industrial College, the Institute o f Health Services, the Institute 
o f Public Administration and the Institute for Bankers were set up 
as well22. State-owned oil companies, such as Oman Petroleum 
Development and Oman Refinery Company established in-service 
training and educational programs for their Omani employees. At 
the same time, the authorities began to involve the private sector 
in such programs. In the early 1980s, the Training-Levy Rebate 
Scheme was introduced to reimburse the costs of training courses 
for Omani nationals to private employers.
The first sector the government decided to nationalise was the 
banking sector, attractive for nationals thanks to high salaries and 
the prestige associated with the job. Omanis quickly dominated this 
sector and in the 1990s already constituted 85 per cent of all bank 
employees. Programs to Omanise fully some other sectors, nursing 
for example, were established as well. At the primary school level, 95 
per cent o f teachers are Omanis already; in the whole public school 
system 57 per cent o f teachers were nationals in 199923. Altogether, 
81.8 per cent o f all government employees (excluding military) were 
Omanis by 2005, with several government departments becoming 
almost 100 per cent localised24.
22 J. S. Birks and C. A. Sinclair, ‘Successful education and human resource 
development — the key to sustained economic growth’, in B. R. Pridham (ed.), 
Oman: Economic, Social and Strategic Developments (London, Croom Helm, 
1987), pp. 145-65.
23 The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, (March) 1999, p. 74.
14 Interview with Ahmed bin Abdulnabi Macki, Minister of Economy, Khaleej 
Times, 4th January 2006.
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In 1994, Oman became the first country in the G C C  to 
introduce legal requirements for the localisation of the private 
sector. The Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour imposed an 
Omanisation percentage according to a sectored quota system: 
banking -  90 per cent; transport, storage and communication -  60 
per cent; finance, insurance and real estate -  45 per cent; hotels and 
restaurants -  30 per cent; wholesale and retail -  20 per cent; and 
contracting -  15 per cent. Several categories o f jobs, such as fishing, 
animal husbandry, driving light vehicles or practising traditional 
handicrafts, were reserved for nationals only. The plan aimed to 
increase the percentage of Omanis in the private sector to 27 per 
cent by the year 2000 (from 17 per cent in 1995), which would 
bring the overall localisation of the workforce to 40 per cent.
Companies were asked to reach the targeted percentages on time 
or face heavy fines, the denial o f visas for importing labour and 
the loss o f public contracts for failing to comply. Nevertheless, the 
implementation of this ambitious program had to be postponed. 
Most o f the private companies were not ready to fulfil the legal 
obligations, claiming lack of sufficient numbers of properly skilled 
Omanis to take jobs over from expatriates. The truth, however, was 
that all too often, private companies did not take the issue seriously 
and did very little or nothing about it. The attitude of the private 
sector was, and still is, somewhat opportunistic and there has 
been evidence of “crash management hire-an-Omani-somehow” 
techniques to win favour with the government25. Another major 
problem has been the different salary expectations between expatriate 
and local labour. Many expatriates from Asia are ready to work for
60 rials ($160) a month while the minimum wage required for 
an Omani secondary school graduate is 200 rials ($550). Private
25 F. Al-Farsi, ‘Omanisation and faculty development in Sultan Qaboos 
University’, in K. E. Shaw (ed.), Higher Educationin the Gulf: Problems and 
Prospects (Exeter, Exeter University Press, 1997), p. 183.
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companies prefer, o f course, to employ the former. Nevertheless, 
thanks to the government involvement, the rate of localisation in 
the private sector reached 25 percent in 2005 (increasing from 16.4 
in 2000)26.
In the mean time, the Omanisation policy and the quota system 
in particular were outlined in the Fifth Five-Year Development Plan 
(1996—2000) as well as in the Sixth (2001—2005). It was stated 
there that, along with Sultan Qaboos’ vision for Oman’s economy, 
there was a need to attach a greater importance to human resource 
development. This means “upgrading and developing ... basic 
education to the level o f distinguished international standards”, 
and “expanding the area o f technical education and vocational 
training, and directing most o f the basic education graduates 
towards these areas”27. At the same time, it was also expected that the 
unemployment should substantially go down and the Omanisation 
of the labour force should increase.
To fulfil these goals, to oversee all issues related to vocational 
education and in particular to ensure that vocational training meets 
the needs o f the private sector employers, the Supreme Committee 
for Vocational Training and Labour was established (replacing 
former bodies o f this kind). Ministers of national economy, 
commerce, industry and development became it members. The 
Committees executive arm, the Vocational Training Authority, 
has been entrusted with the task of initiating programs to increase 
the number of trained professionals and technicians. Thanks to 
the Authority’s initiatives, several technical colleges and vocational 
training centres have been established. Many private institutes 
offering training in business, computer skills and accounting have 
opened as well. Moreover, significant budget allocations have been
16 Interview with Ahmed bin Abdulnabi Macki, Minister of Economy, Khaleej 
Times, 4th January 2006 .
27 Royal Decree No. 1/96, Official Gazette, January 1996 .
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made for training schemes for nationals, including ones for women. 
The government has also decided to use for that purpose funds 
generated from the tax imposed on companies for hiring expatriate 
workers. The authorities have also expanded earlier schemes and 
have begun to reimburse private companies for employing Omanis, 
covering the entire cost of their in-job training and 50—80 per cent 
o f their salaries for the first few months.
The Vocational Training Authority has adopted the British 
National Vocational Qualification System to help boost human 
resource development. It puts equal emphasis on real-life experience 
and classroom theory, and — to a large extent — satisfactorily tackles 
the problem of secondary school leavers. Only those educational 
institutions which satisfy the system’s requirements are entitled to 
apply for government subsidies. To expand educational possibilities 
further, as Sultan Qaboos University and a few other existing public 
colleges can enrol only about 15 per cent o f high school graduates, 
the establishment o f private colleges has been allowed. The 
government believes that with all these measures adopted, it will 
be possible to increase the enrolment of nationals in technical and 
vocational education significantly. At the same time, the Chairman 
o f the State Council, Sheikh Hamud al-Harifhi, warned men in 
Oman “against the consequences o f their laziness, because women 
are taking their due role in all ministries, establishments and areas 
o f production and are scoring superior positions”28. As national 
women won the majority of university seats, the state intervened 
and had the enrolment percentage equalled between males and 
females.
Other actions have been initiated as well. First o f all, the Omani 
government decided, in 1997, to require the early retirement o f more 
than a fourth of its civil service, to secure in such a way a number of 
jobs for young nationals. Secondly, 1998 (and later, 1999 as well)
28 Reuters, 25 June, 1999.
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were proclaimed the Year o f the Private Sector, with the aim of 
promoting further development o f this sector and the localisation 
of private establishments. In particular, companies employing 
a large number of Omanis and organising training programs for 
them became eligible for special “green cards” from the (renamed) 
Ministry o f Social Affairs, Labour and Vocational Training, giving 
them priority in expediting their labour-related transactions at the 
Ministry. To help to eradicate unemployment among graduates, the 
Fund for the Development o f Youth Projects was launched in 1998, 
the first o f its kind in the Gulf. Sultan Qaboos and other members 
o f the royal family were the first donors to the fund. Finally, a 
decision was reached to begin implementing strictly the 1994 law 
and fine establishments that do not meet the quota requirements. 
Petrol stations were the first companies where this measure was 
adopted. The authorities suspended labour cards of expatriate 
employees in gas stations which are not 50 per cent Omanised. 
In the next step, all school bus and tractor driver positions were 
set aside for nationals29. Hairdressers, tailors and gas distributors 
were added to the list of occupations reserved for Omanis only. 
Moreover, the government asked all private companies employing 
50 or more local workers to have an Omani director of personnel 
by the end of 1999 and announced that it would no longer grant 
expansion loans to companies that had not reach Omanisation 
targets. The authorities stress that they do not intend to Omanise 
positions if there were a negative repercussion on productivity or the 
quality o f services provided. Nevertheless, the restrictions result in a 
certain amount o f complaints both from nationals and expatriates.
29 This decision has not been easy to implement. For example, as Oman 
Observer noted, many Omanis “are not able to operate the sophisticated mowers, 
bailers, rakers, etc.”. Moreover, small farmers have financial worries related to the 
ban. Omani tractor drivers charge 120 rials ($307) a month compared to 70 rials 
($180) for Asian workers.
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As the Economist Intelligence Unit experts remarked: “the forced 
complete Omanisation of basic services as such as the supply of 
cooking gas cylinders, on which a substantial portion o f the country 
depends, will leave the government open to particular criticism if 
Omanis who take these jobs are not responsive to after-hours or 
weekend calls. There will no doubt be some early difficulties, but 
the government is unlikely to rescind the order as it comes under 
increasing pressure from unemployment” 30.
Localisation has become easier to achieve as the attitude of 
young Omanis towards jobs has changed. Young people used to 
want to work in the ministries or to begin their careers in high 
managerial posts: now they realise that this is often not possible 
and faced with the threat of unemployment, they go to technical 
or clerical jobs outside the public sector as well. The Minister for 
Social Affairs, Labour and Vocational Training, Amur bin Shuwain 
al-Husni, stressed the importance of this approach and said that 
Omanis should seize the jobs available rather than wait for the 
choicest ones. “We cannot wait for foreigners to cook for us, drive 
our cars and tailor our clothes ... no work is inferior”31. Sultan 
Qaboos went even further and denounced what he called ‘the 
laziness’ of the present generation who are no longer willing to 
perform manual labour32.
Despite all these efforts, Omanisation continues to face serious 
problems. In the study by Asya Mohamed Suleiman Al-Lamky, 
65 per cent o f Omani graduates indicated that they were not able 
to replace expatriates at work33. According to Fawzia Al-Farsi, the
30 EIU, Oman. Country Report (2nd quarter 1999), p. 15.
31 Gulf News, 5 May 1998.
32 EIU, Oman. Country Report (4th quarter 1998), p. 13.
33 A. M. S. Al-Lamky, Higher Education in Oman: Perceptions of University 
Graduates in the Context of Dependent Development, 1970-1990 (Ph.D. thesis, 
The George Washington University, 1992), p. 216.
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major obstacles to Omanisation are: lack of awareness amongst 
expatriates o f their responsibility to train nationals and inadequate 
cooperation from expatriates in this respect as a result o f their 
fear o f losing employment, lack of clear policy and Omanisation 
targets; continued preferential treatment o f expatriates over Omani 
nationals in the private sector; insufficient opportunities for Omanis 
to be given responsibility at work, inappropriate Omani work 
attitudes and limited commitment34. Moreover, the localisation of 
the workforce in Oman, as in other G CC countries, has not been 
welcomed by everybody. Some businessmen have expressed their 
criticism of enforced localisation. They believe that “Omanisation 
cannot be based on converting the private sector into charitable 
institutions, forcing it to absorb nationals”35. Others point out that 
localisation should not be speeded up as otherwise serious problems 
will likely to occur, as for example was the case when expatriate 
water-tanker drivers were replaced by nationals, resulting in a poor 
supply of water36. On the other hand, there has also been criticism 
that localisation policies have not been enforced firmly enough. 
The President o f the Shura Council, ‘Abdullah bin Ali al-Qatabi, 
has called in 1998 for the review of the Omanisation policies 
since an increasing number of expatriates continue to arrive in the 
Sultanate to take up employment37. Moreover, the unemployment 
o f nationals stays high: according to official estimations in 2003, 
more than 60,000 Omanis under the age o f 24 were without jobs38. 
Nevertheless, in comparison with other G CC states, the localisation 
of the Omani workforce has been quite successful so far.
34 Al-Farsi, ‘Omanisation’, p. 190.
35 Emirates News, 10 October 1997.
36 EIU Oman. Country Report (1st quarter 1998).
37 Khaleej Times, 23 March 1998.
38 Middle East Economic Digest, 2 May 2003.
Non-indigenous citizens and 
"stateless" residents in the Gulf 
monarchies. The Kuwaiti bidun
Since the discovery of oil, the political entities of the Persian Gulf 
have transformed themselves from desert sheikhdoms into modern 
states. The process was accompanied by rapid population growth. 
During the last 50 years, the population of the current Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) states: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, 
Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Oman1, grew from 4 million 
in 1950 to 33.4 million in 2004, thus recording one of the highest 
rates of population growth in the world2. The primary cause o f this 
increase has not been the growth of the indigenous population, 
large in itself, but the influx of foreign workers. The employment of 
large numbers o f foreigners was a structural imperative for growth 
in the G CC countries, as oil-related development depended upon 
the importation of foreign technologies, and required knowledge 
and skills unfamiliar to the local Arab population. Towards the end 
of 2004, there were 12.5 million foreigners, 37 percent o f the total
1 The GCC is a regional organization of these states established in 1981.
2 For the population data see Andrzej Kapiszewski, Nationab and 
Expatriates. Population and Labor Dilemmas of the GCC States (Reading, Ithaca 
Press, 2001), pp. 33-47.
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population, in the G C C  states. In Qatar, the UAE, and Kuwait, 
foreigners constituted a majority. In the United Arab Emirates 
foreigners accounted for over 80 percent of population. Only Oman 
and Saudi Arabia managed to maintain a relatively low proportion 
of foreign population: about 20 and 27 percent, respectively.
This development has created security, economic, social and 
cultural threats to the local population. Therefore, to maintain the 
highly privileged position of the indigenous population and make 
integration of foreigners with local communities difficult, numerous 
restrictions were imposed: the sponsorship system, limits on the 
duration of every foreigner’s stay, curbs on naturalization and on 
the citizenship rights of those who are naturalized, etc. However, 
these measures did not bring the expected results. Rotation of the 
workforce has failed to meet expectations. The free market economy 
has been more powerful than the policies the authorities tried to 
implement. The majority o f foreign workers have stayed beyond 
the term of their original contracts because employers usually 
prefer to keep workers with local experience rather than bring in 
new ones. As a result, the average stay of foreign workers in the 
G C C  countries has continued to grow, and the number of almost 
permanent foreign workers has increased, albeit not formally.
The domination of foreign labour over the indigenous one has not 
been the only peculiarity of the G CC states population structure The 
populations in these countries have been divided into citizens and 
temporary foreign workers and there have also been deep divisions 
within the citizens’ groups themselves. Among the local passport 
holders, there have been naturalised foreigners and other “non- 
indigenous” citizens, including members o f certain tribes, or certain 
ethnic or religious minority groups considered “impure” nationals 
by “real” nationals. In some countries the authorities established 
different degrees o f citizenship resulting in not all citizens being 
equal.
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The question of citizenship arose at the beginning of the oil 
era and acquired greater significance when the sheikhdoms of the 
Gulf obtained their independence. Citizenship was introduced as 
a concept that the local Arabs found a novelty, largely o f Western 
origin and connected with the idea of the nation-state. It was 
“a blanket designation that overlooked tribal and geographic origins 
[...] a classificatory principle alien to their way of conceptualising 
social relations”3. Traditionally, the primary affiliation for most of 
the indigenous population was o f a tribal nature. An “alien” was, 
by definition, anyone who did not belong to the tribe4. Thus, the 
core of the new nations in the Gulf consisted of tribes connected 
with the ruling families, as well as some powerful local merchant 
families. As loyalty to blood was considered far more important 
than residence in the particular territory and as the final word 
on citizenship remained in the hands of the ruler, inhabitants of 
a country could easily obtain the citizenship of another country, if 
they were linked to the proper tribe residing across the border. This 
eventually led to their possession of dual citizenship. Nevertheless, 
the later established laws formally regulating the issue usually 
incorporated both blood and territory in the definition of nationality 
and hence in the requirements to be satisfied for citizenship5. This
3 A. N ga Lo n gva, Walls Built on Sand. Migration, Exclusion, and Society in 
Kuwait (Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 1997), p. 46.
4 The “alien” classification is often visible in names assigned by the natives to 
non-local residents. Al Yamani, Al Najdi, Al Hijazi or Al Hasawi are examples of 
well known Gulf families which originated in particular regions of the peninsula. 
See Lon gva, Walls Built on Sand, p. 46.
5 The first nationality law in this part of the world was established during 
the Ottoman period. In 1869, the Sultan separated the notions of religion and 
nationality and instead adopted the concept that the citizenship of the individual 
was determined by the citizenship of his or her parents or by the place of birth. After 
the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923 established 
the citizenship of the people, who were earlier under the Ottomans’ jurisdiction,
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approach did not change much over the years, and citizenship and 
tribalism cohabit uneasily under a regime that has been described 
as the “simultaneity of the unsimultaneous”6. Until today, the issue 
of roots for many G C C  families is a sensitive one.
The question of citizenship was made more complicated by the 
context o f the dual nature of the Arab statehood identity. Many 
Arabs subscribe to the principle that they constitute a single people, 
a single Arab nation (ummah arabiyyah), united by a common 
language and religion. This concept has even found expression 
in the constitutions o f Kuwait and the UAE. At the same time,
based on the territorial principle. Despite the provisions of this treaty, many Arab 
states, Kuwait and the UAE in particular, decided to use both the principles -  
loyalty to blood and loyalty to the land -  as a basis for citizenship. Bahrain was the 
only Gulf country where the place of birth was supposed to decide about the right 
to citizenship. Already in the 1930s, when the country was still very much under 
British influence, people born in Bahrain who wanted the country’s citizenship 
had to register within a year of their 18th birthday with the authorities. P. Dresch, 
Debates on marriage and nationality in the United Arab Emirates, in: P. Dresch 
and J. P iscatori (eds), Monarchies and nations. Globalisation and Identity in the 
Arab States of the Gulf (London, I.B. Tauris, 2005), p. 141. For discussion on 
the issue of citizenship in the Arab world see: S. Stanton Russell, Migration 
and political integration in the Arab world, in: G. Luciani (ed.), The Arab State, 
(Berkeley, University of California Press, 1990), pp. 377—8; G. Dib, Migration 
and naturalisation laws in Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Kuwait and the United 
Arab Emirates, ESCWA, Population Bulletin, Part I (15) 1978, pp. 33-62, Part
II (16) 1979, pp. 3-18; N. A. Butenschon, U. Davis, M. H assassia (eds.), 
Citizenship and the State in the Middle East (New York, Syracuse University Press, 
2000). The Saudi Nationality Law of 1926, recognized as Saudi citizens “original” 
residents of the Kingdom holding Ottoman nationality in 1914, Ottoman 
nationals or non-Ottoman nationals domiciled in the Kingdom in 1914 and 
continued to do so until 1926 without obtaining a foreign nationality; www. 
uscis.gov.
6 B. Tibi, The simultaneity of the unsimultaneous: old tribes and nation-states 
in the modern Middle East, in: P. S. Khoury, J. Kosiner (eds), Tribes and State 
Formation in the Middle East (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1990), pp. 
127-152.
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Arabs identify themselves with particular sovereign states, a fact 
acknowledged in turn by the Arab League. Thus, in the Gulf a 
basic principle o f a single Arab nation conflicted with the unequal 
treatment of the large migrant non-Gulf Arab workforce. Labour 
migration within the Arab world did not help to make the region a 
single territory without boundaries -  the concept often proclaimed 
by pan-Arabists. On the contrary, and especially in the case o f the 
GCC countries, labour migration has induced states to develop 
policies to control their borders. This approach has been clearly 
articulated in the Kuwaiti law which underlines that: “The most 
prominent aspect of the State’s sovereignty over its lands is the 
protection of its territories from any offender who daringly violates 
the said sovereignty by infiltration and residing in it without having 
secured a proper residence permit”7.
Despite sharing a negative attitude towards the integration of 
foreigners, several G C C  states naturalised many foreigners, mostly 
Arabs, in the first years of their independence. They did so to 
enlarge the size of the country’s legal body of citizens or for political 
reasons. Moreover, some badu (bedouins) and foreign Muslims (of 
Arab, Persian or African origin; the last including former slaves), 
long-time residents o f these countries, were also initially granted 
citizenship.
For example, the UAE gave citizenship to several thousand 
members of certain non-local tribes as well as to some foreign residents. 
Many Arabs of Omani, Bahraini and Qatari origin benefited from 
this opportunity, and so did some Arabs residing earlier in Iran and 
Baluchis from Pakistan. In particular, the Abu Dhabi emirate acted 
thus in order to enhance its political weight vis-a-vis the other emirates. 
It also granted citizenship to many Yemenis because of the special 
relationship between Sheikh Zayed, the President of the country,
7 Explanatory Memorandum accompanying Kuwait’s Law No. 55 of 1982; 
Russell, Migration, p. 384.
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and Yemen. Most of them were from the Hadhramaut region. Some 
were many well educated people from the Aden area driven out by 
the communist government8. In turn, Dubai, gave passports to some 
Iranians who had lived and traded there for generations (including 
the Bastakis).
In turn, Saudi Arabia in 1950s and 1960s, awarded citizenship 
to a number of Yemeni, Egyptian, and Palestinian workers as well 
as to dissident refugees from Egypt, Syria, Yemen, Lebanon, and 
Palestine. Oman in a similar way naturalized many Indian traders, 
Pakistanis who worked in the army, and Yemenis with family links to 
the province of Dhofar as well as people from their former territories 
in Zanzibar and East-Central Africa9. A large number of people were 
also naturalized in Kuwait (see below).
After consolidating their independence, the Gulf monarchies 
restricted the possibility o f obtaining citizenship. They declined 
to extend that right to a broader populace as it became a unique 
privilege, connected with social and material benefits10. Moreover,
s Like the bin Breks, who later became prominent “locals” in Dubai. See also: 
P. Dresch, Debates on marriage and nationality., p. 142.
9 In 1964 Omanis in Zanzibar were told to go home. Many returned and 
eventually received the country’s citizenship as of Omani ancestry. The ones 
with mixed Omani-African descent were naturalised. Since 1970s, the Omani 
nationality law considered children of Omani male nationals born abroad to be 
full Omani citizens. Nevertheless, Zanzibari returnees and their children have 
created a separate community, especially in Muscat; many of them speak Swahili 
rather than Arabic until now. For an excellent study of Zanzibari Omanis in 
Muscat see: M. Al-Rasheed, Transnational connections and national identity, in: 
P. Dresch andj. Piscatori, Monarchies and nations, pp. 96—113.
10 A. Nga Longva, Citizenship in the Gulf States: Conceptualization and 
Practice, paper presented at the Conference on Citizenship and the State in the 
Middle East, University of Oslo, November 1996; R. M aktabi, The politics 
of citizenship in Kuwait — membership and participation in a rentier state; paper 
presented at 13th Annual National Political Science Conference, Hurdalsjoen, 
Oslo, January 2005.
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rulers now worried that extending citizenship rights to foreigners 
could lead to domination of the naturalized population over the 
local one. Therefore, Kuwait decided that citizenship could be 
granted only to people who have resided in the country since 1920; 
Bahrain declared the year 1921 for that purpose, the UAE -  the 
year 1925 and Qatar -  the year 1930.
This policy did not change in the following years. The residency 
requirements stipulated by the respective laws have been very 
extensive (although shorter for certain Arab nationalities), and 
naturalised citizens have remained subject to some restrictions of 
their rights, especially of a political nature1'. In the UAE, according 
to first Nationality Law of 1972, Omani, Qataris, and Bahraini 
residents for three years were eligible for citizenship in one of the 
emirates making up the Federation. Other Arabs had to prove 
ten years’ residence, at least five of which had to fall after the date 
when the law was issued; other foreigners’ request for naturalization 
required continuous residence since 1940, or for 30 years out of 
which 20 had to fall after the law came into effect12. Later, some 
expatriate Arabs, who had worked for the UAE government for more 
than 20 years, were allowed to retire and stay in the country, although 
not all of them have formally been naturalised. Until recently, Omanis 
and Yemenis serving 15 years in the UAE military force could also 
apply for citizenship.
Kuwait and Qatar require that Arab applicants for citizenship 
should have been resident for 15 years at least; 20 for non-Arabs. 
Oman, on the other hand, does not distinguish between Arabs and
11 J. al-Jasser, Naturalization in the Gulf: Ladies come out on top, „Mideast 
Mirror”, June 2, 1999. The information in the following section are based on the 
Jassers article.
12 P. D resell, Debates on marriage and nationality, p. 141. The Federal law of 
1975 substituted reference to Omanis, Qataris and Bahrainis by more general: 
“members of the Arab tribes who migrated from countries neighbouring the 
State”, ibidem, p. 144.
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non-Arabs: all have to have been resident for 20 years, but this 
requirement is reduced to 10 years if the applicant has been married 
to an Omani since before 1986. Bahrain requires Arabs to be resident 
for 15 years, non-Arabs for 25, before granting its citizenship. Until 
recently, Saudi Arabia required a residency period of five years and 
proficiency in Arabic. Nevertheless, even fulfilling all the necessary 
requirements has not granted a foreigner an automatic right to 
citizenship. Interior ministries decide in such cases and often turn 
down applications without having to announce cause. On the other 
side, the G C C  rulers have the absolute authority to grant citizenship 
to anyone even if they do not meet the basic requirements. This 
prerogative is usually invoked when the persons concerned have 
done the country a great service, if their skills are greatly desired, 
or for any other reason that the ruler deems appropriate. In such a 
way, the UAE and Qatar accepted (and naturalised) a number of 
Iranians after the Iranian Revolution of 1979.
Naturalized citizens face varying restrictions: in Saudi Arabia, 
for example, they are excluded from the armed forces, the internal 
security forces, the diplomatic corps and other sensitive posts. In 
several Gulf countries they are not eligible to vote, run for parliament, 
or be appointed to a ministerial post before the passage of a certain 
period: 20 years in the case of Kuwait, and 10 in Qatar and Bahrain. 
In the UAE, naturalized citizens never obtain certain rights unless 
they were Omani, Qatari, and Bahraini natives; in that case they 
get them seven years after naturalization. Only Oman grants 
naturalized citizens all the rights o f native Omanis. Moreover, the 
“non-indigenous” passport holders, not only the naturalised ones 
but also members of certain groups are often not treated by “real” 
nationals as equal to them, which often leads to their discrimination 
in various fields. This, for example, has been the fate of many Badu 
in Kuwait, Shi’ites of Iranian background in several G CC countries, 
and Yemenis in the province of Asir in Saudi Arabia.
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All G CC countries formally require that people who would like 
to be naturalised renounce their previous citizenship. Conversely, 
G CC nationals —as well as their dependants if they do not specifically 
express their desire to retain the citizenship — usually lose their 
citizenship if they are granted the nationality o f another country. 
Such approach is caused by the conviction that “dual (or multiple) 
nationality is anathema to the idea of loyalty to the state, and can 
result in confusion regarding jurisdiction in cases o f disputes, as 
well as in matters relating to military service and employment in 
sensitive posts.”13 Nevertheless, as already mentioned, that rule 
sometimes does not apply to nationals within the G CC; there are 
members o f certain tribes whose historical territory lies across the 
modern state borders, who hold dual citizenship (see below).
In total, about 50,000 people were naturadised in the UAE (until 
1997), constituting about 8 per cent of the national population14. 
More recently, however, the practice has been severely curtailed and 
today it does not contribute significantly to the local population 
growth. In turn, Saudi Arabia naturalised between 1989 and 1992 
only 15,058 people15, and Oman, between 1986 to 1996 only 1,861 
people16. Most of them were Arab women married to nationals17. 
Also today, naturalisation in all G C C  countries is limited mainly to 
foreign spouses of national men18. But even this right carries with it 
several restrictions. Foreign wives of citizens can usually obtain local 
passports only after a probation period lasting several years and at 
times the right o f citizenship is extended only during the duration
13 Ibidem.
14 „Emirates News”, 13 Aug. 1997.
15 „Arab News”, January 3, 2004.
16 As calculated by the number of passports issued by the Naturalization 
Department, Statistical Yearbook 1996 (Muscat, Ministry of Development).
17 J. al-Jasser, Naturalization in the Gulf.
18 Occasionally, also certain well-educated and well-connected long-term 
Arab immigrants are discretely given citizenship.
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of a marriage (that is, women may have to return their passports if 
divorced)19. In Saudi Arabia the law forbids foreign women to get the 
Kingdom’s citizenship if they married certain government officials, 
members o f the Saudi armed and internal security forces or Saudis 
while studying abroad. Foreign women married to a Saudi national 
can apply for the citizenship only if marriage was sanctioned by 
the interior ministry20. The Qatari law of 1989 altogether banned 
certain categories o f state employees from marrying foreigners: 
ministers, members of the diplomatic service, officers of the armed 
forces, police and intelligence, and Qataris studying abroad. Others 
needed permission from the authorities. Male Qatari can request 
it if they have some “social reasons” for marriage, sufficient funds 
to support a family, not more than one wife already, and not more 
than one divorce history before. The wife cannot be younger from 
the man by more than 15 years. Female Qataris need permission to 
marry as well. All these measures apply only to non-GCC citizens; 
relatives, even without the Qatari citizenship, are also not to abide 
by this law21. Similar law exists in Oman since 1993 and is planned 
to be introduced in the UAE as well22.
Foreigners married to national women, if such a legal possibility 
exists at all, are normally not eligible for citizenship, and are required 
to have a job and a local sponsor to stay in the country. Children 
from such marriages are not automatically considered nationals 
since citizenship usually passes to offspring only from the paternal
15 For example, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Oman require that five years pass
between a persons naturalization and his wife’s being granted citizenship. The
UAE require that the spouse reside in a country for three years after her husband
is naturalized in order to be granted citizenship, while Qatar requires for that
purpose two years. al-Jasser, Naturalization in the Gulf.
20 Ibidem.
21 P. Dresch, Debates on marriage and nationality, p. 149.
22 Ibidem.
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side23. Therefore, very often wives and children of naturalised 
citizens remain naturalised citizens. In the UAE, paradoxically, the 
illegitimate child o f an Emirati womAn is better provided by the 
law — can have the country’s citizenship — while her legitimate child 
by a foreign husband will probably never get it2\  In the UAE, a 
national woman married to a foreigner may lose her citizenship25.
In Saudi Arabia, on May 23, 2005, the amendments to the 
Kingdom’s naturalisation law went into effect. These amendments 
allowed residents who had legally lived in the country for 10 years to 
apply for Saudi nationality under certain conditions; earlier, formally 
only five years of permanent residence was required but the authorities 
rarely put that clause into practice26. Moreover, the new law allows 
children of Saudi women married to foreigners to acquire citizenship 
when they reach 18 years of age. The non-Saudi husband of a Saudi 
woman may be granted citizenship once his children have obtained 
Saudi nationality. Despite provisions formally allowing the Kingdom’s
23 For example, in January 1998, the Cassation Court in Manama rejected the 
plea of three people applying for Bahraini citizenship, stating that the fact that 
they had Bahraini mothers did not qualify them for that right as their fathers were 
of Iranian origin. „Khaleej Times”, 10 January, 1998.
24 P. Dresch, Debates on marriage and. nationality, p. 157.
2=1 Ibidem, p. 151.
26 M. Al Hakeem, Saudi Arabia to approve new citizenship by-law soon, „Gulf 
News”, April 4, 2005. The 1974 citizenship law stated that individuals born in 
Saudi Arabia of foreign parents or of Saudi mother and a father of foreign or 
unknown nationality, and individuals born outside of Saudi Arabia of a Saudi 
mother and a father of foreign or unknown nationality can apply for a Saudi 
citizenship if they have permanent residence in Saudi Arabia at age of maturity, 
have no criminal convictions, are knowledge in the Arabic language, and submit 
within one year of maturity the application for naturalization. When an individual 
files a claim to Saudi citizenship, representatives of the Saudi government travel 
to the individual’s locality and take affidavits from community members who are 
familiar with the individual’s and/or the individual’s family’s or fathers origin; 
http://uscis.gov.
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Muslim expatriates to apply for Saudi citizenship, which many of 
them would be happy to obtain, it is unlikely that authorities will be 
willing to provide many non-Saudis with the country citizenship.
In most o f the G CC states, the law permits the state to revoke 
citizenship for political or criminal reasons. The UAE law declares 
that it may happen if a citizen “serves the interests of a hostile country, 
or voluntarily obtains the nationality of another country”. The first 
provision was applied on several occasions to those involved in anti­
government activities. Similarly, in 1994, Saudi Arabia, in probably 
the most famous case, revoked the citizenship of Osama bin Laden. 
In turn, since the early 1980s hundreds of Bahraini citizens, especially 
Shiites, have been forcibly exiled from Bahrain to Iran27. Similar 
incidents happened in 1995. Some Bahraini nationals were also 
denied the right o f return to the country, despite the fact, that under 
Bahrain’s Constitution “no citizen shall be deported from Bahrain, 
nor shall he be denied re-entry.”
In early 2005, the Qatari government revoked citizenship of 5,266 
people from Al-Ghafran branch of Al-Murrah tribe. The government 
justified the decision on the ground that this branch of the tribe was 
of Saudi Arabian origin, and its members held Saudi citizenship, what 
defied a ban on dual citizenship28.
However, some of those affected believed they were punished for 
their loyalty to the deposed emir, Khalifa bin Hamad Al-Thani, or 
that the action against them was a belated response to a failed coup 
attempt in 1996 to unseat Qatar’s current ruler, Sheikh Hamad Al- 
Thani29. The move was apparently aimed also at keeping a “proper” 
balance in Qatari society, especially in view of the upcoming first
27 “Fear, Flight and Forcible Exile. Refugees in the Middle East”, Amnesty 
International Country Report 1998, web.amnesty.org.
28 AFP, May 5, 2005.
29 „Arab News”, April 2, 2005.
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ever parliamentary elections in the country, as well as reflected 
strained relations between Qatar and Saudi Arabia.
Moreover, all the GCC states reserve themselves a right to withdraw 
citizenship of a naturalised person within five years of granting it if 
the individual concerned was proven to have committed a crime.
In general, with the exceptions presented above, fear of 
compromising economic privileges and of diluting the identity of the 
local population has led the G CC countries to reject the option of 
absorbing foreign labour, even of long-term residents, as citizens. The 
concern remains that naturalised foreigners cannot be fully trusted, 
especially in crisis situations when the loyalty to the country of origin 
could come into question, and they are equally suspected of having a 
negative social and cultural impact on the local populations .
Recently, there were a few exceptions to this rule. In Bahrain, a 
new citizenship law was introduced in July 2002 to allow individuals 
from Arab countries to obtain Bahraini citizenship. The government 
apparently decided to change the social structure of the country by 
granting citizenship rights to a large number of foreigners, mainly 
Sunni Arabs from around the region. Some suggest that as many as
50,000 to 60,000 people became “politically naturalised”30. The aim 
was probably to reduce the Shi’ite majority in the electorate as well 
as reduce the statistical dominance of the foreign workforce. The 
Bahrain Freedom Movement issued a declaration on the matter on 
September 3, 2002. It stated that the government was engaged in 
“relentless efforts in employing foreigners to create a workforce largely 
composed of non-Bahrainis to ensure total control o f markets”31. 
What especially angered the Shiite Bahrainis was the naturalisation 
of large number of Jordanian, Syrian, Egyptian and Pakistani
30 The International Crisis Group, The Middle East Report no. 40, “Bahrain’s 
Sectarian Challenge”, May 6, 2005.
31 „Voice of Bahrain”, September 2002. See also Marc Pellas, Far from 
democracy in the Gulf, ,,Le Monde Diplomatique”, March 25, 2005.
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military and police officers, judges and some other civil servants, 
called by them “mercenaries”. Apparently, some 8,000 Saudis were 
also awarded Bahraini citizenship in 2001-2002, without having to 
forego Saudi citizenship. There were people who claimed affiliation 
to the Dawasir tribe that was once in Bahrain but has long resided in 
eastern Saudi Arabia. The Bahraini Shiite opposition considered this 
move politically motivated, to allow Sunnis to vote in the October 
2002  parliamentary elections32.
Kuwaiti bidun
In Kuwait, the situation of “non-indigenous” permanent residents 
has been particularly complex.
Kuwait has created different categories of citizens, unequal in rights. 
In 1948, the first two decrees on the matter defined as “originally 
Kuwaiti” members o f the ruling family, those permanently residing 
in Kuwait since 1899, children of Kuwaiti men and children of 
Arab or Muslim fathers also born in Kuwait33. Naturalization was 
possible for people who had lived in Kuwait for at least 10 years, 
were employed, and spoke Arabic; it could also be granted to other 
people “by special order for valuable services.” On the other hand, 
citizenship could be revoked as a penalty for diverse crimes, among 
them “propagating anti-Islamic ideas” .
A decade later the citizenship law was introduced (the Kuwaiti 
Nationality Act of December 14, 1959). This law defined Kuwaiti 
nationals as those persons who were residing in Kuwait in 1920, and 
had maintained residence there until 1959 (“Everyone who came 
to Kuwait pre 1920 is a natural Kuwaiti”)34. Moreover, only those 
inhabiting the area before 1920 became Kuwaitis “by origin” (the
32 “Bahrain’s Sectarian Challenge”.
33 J. Crystal, Oil and Politics in the Gulf: Rulers and Merchants in Kuwait and 
Qatar (Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 1990).
34 A. N ga Longva, Walls Built on Sand, p. 47.
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so-called first class citizens), while those who arrived later became 
“naturalized” Kuwaitis (second-class citizens). Children of Kuwaiti 
fathers, born in Kuwait or outside its borders, became Kuwaitis as 
well; children of Kuwaiti mothers and non-Kuwaiti fathers were 
denied this right. Thus, the 1959 law widened the category of 
original Kuwaitis by establishing 1920 as the residency criterion, 
but at the same time narrowed the eligible population by excluding 
children of non-Kuwaiti men (i.e. children of “Arab and Muslim 
fathers born in Kuwait”). Th&jus soli principle was just replaced by 
one of jus sanguis nature. The date 1920 was chosen as it was the 
year of the battle of Jahra against the Ikhwan forces o f Ibn Saud, the 
event which saw, as it is often claimed, the birth of an explicit Kuwaiti 
national awareness35. Nevertheless, the law did not make clear what 
residing in Kuwait in 1920 means. At that time, Kuwait was already 
recognized as an independent country under a British protectorate, 
but the country’s borders were defined only later: in 1922 with Saudi 
Arabia, and in 1923 with Iraq. Moreover, the forces defending Jahra 
were composed not only of the long-settled inhabitants o f the town, 
but also of nomadic tribesmen. On that basis, members o f both 
groups were later granted Kuwaiti citizenship, establishing a pattern 
of offering this right not only to the permanent residents of certain 
locality but to migratory groups as well36.
The Nationality Law of 1959 was amended several times. In 
particular, the amendment of 1960 allowed the naturalization of
3' M. A.Tetreault, Stories and Democracy. Politics and Society in Contemporary 
Kuwait (New York, Columbia University Press, 2000, pp. 45—46).
36 Longva describes the different perception of citizenship by urban Kuwaitis 
vs. tribally oriented ones. While for the first, national identity is bound up with 
the connection between the citizen and the territorialized community (previously 
the town, today the nation-state), in the Bedouin tradition, with absence of 
attachment to a particular territory, peoples identity is connected with the 
ruler, whom they follow, and display allegiance and loyalty to. A. Nga Longva, 
Citizenship in the Gulf States.
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no more than 50 people a year: a restriction which seems to have 
been meant for non-Gulf cases only. Later, the amendment of 1966 
allowed Arabs who had resided in Kuwait since 1945 and non-Arabs 
who had resided there since 1930 to apply for Kuwaiti citizenship. 
That possibility was later expanded to Arabs who had lived in Kuwait 
for at least 10 years continuously and to non-Arabs who had lived for 
15 years. Finally, a 1981 amendment restricted the grant of Kuwaiti 
nationality only to Muslim applicants.
Using a clause permitting granting citizenship to everyone “who 
served the country and who deserves it”, in the 1960s and 1970s, the 
government gave citizenship to thousands of badu living in Kuwait 
but whose tribes originated outside the country. The government 
encouraged these people to work and settle in Kuwait, fearing that 
otherwise the large number of workers from other countries would 
dominate the labour market, badu were characterised as completely 
loyal to the monarchy and, therefore, did not appear to be as radical 
as the politically active Palestinian, Lebanese or Syrian immigrants. 
In addition, badu were needed to counterbalance a growing anti­
government opposition from the urban commercial establishment. 
As a consequence, by 1980 as many as 200,000 people had been 
naturalised in Kuwait. In the 1980s, this procedure continued, 
with 10,000 to 17,000 people naturalised each year37. In 1994, the 
parliament passed a law stating that every male born to a Kuwaiti 
father, including naturalized ones is Kuwaiti by origin38. Thus, tens of 
thousands o f second-class citizens, children of naturalized Kuwaitis
37 Ministry of Planning, Annual Statistical Abstracts. It is interesting to note 
that the law prohibits the naturalization of non-Muslims; however, citizens who 
were Christians before 1980 (and children born to families of such citizens since 
that date) were allowed to transmit their citizenship to their children.
38 The amendment to the citizenship law reads: “Offspring of a naturalized 
Kuwaiti are treated as first-class citizens if their father was a Kuwaiti at the time of 
their birth”, „Arab Times”, February 7, 1994.
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obtained citizenship. In effect, in the late 1990s, naturalized Kuwaitis 
constituted approximately a third of the national population.
Nevertheless, until mid-1990s, most of these people could not 
vote or run for public office; a naturalized person obtained voting 
rights 30 years after becoming a Kuwaiti citizen. The appointment of 
a naturalized citizen to a senior-level government position required 
special permission. Finally, the law of 1994 slightly changed the situation, 
reducing the period during which a naturalized person was denied the 
vote from 30 to 20 years. All these laws considerably expended the size 
of the electorate; the first was noticeable in the 1996 elections.
Until now, Kuwait has not resolved the problem of many “stateless” 
persons, the so-called bidun (not to be confused with badu)39, who 
may have lived in the country for several generations, but who 
have never obtained citizenship40. The true bidun are either former 
nomads who previously had no formal citizenship and whose tribes 
usually originated from the territories of Iraq (sometimes also from 
Saudi Arabia, Syria, Jordan, and Iran)41, or other undeclared former 
residents o f these states. Many such people came to Kuwait to join the 
newly created army as most Kuwaiti men did not wish to serve in the 
military42. The Ministry of Defense listed them as stateless to avoid
39 In Arabic bidun jinsiyya means “without nationality” or “without citizen­
ship”.
40 See, for example, The bidun of Kuwait: 'Citizens without Citizenship’ (New 
York, Human Rights Watch/Middle East, 1995).
41 Most bidun of his type came from the Shammar and Anayzah tribes.
42 For many badu, service in the police and the military was a natural extension 
of the traditional role many they had played earlier as personal guards to sheikhs. 
They were perceived as loyal to the Emir and potentially less dangerous for state 
stability as they were usually disinterested in the ideological concerns of the 
time, as e.g. Arab Nationalism. On the other hand, service in the security forces 
was often the best career choice for them as without citizenship they could not 
legally own business in Kuwait. Jill Crystal, “Public order and authority. Policing 
Kuwait”, in: P. Dresch and J. Piscatori, Monarchies and Nations, pp. 174—178.
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the embarrassment of having to admit to hiring foreign mercenaries, 
especially from the neighboring countries43. In the later years, many 
badu with unclear nationality status continued to arrive in Kuwait, 
either legally or illegally, often exploiting to their advantage a gap 
in the residence rules that excluded Bedouin tribal members from 
obtaining visas to enter Kuwait44. These people also joined the 
category of bidun. Later, the bidun group expanded further by the 
addition of those individuals who qualified for Kuwaiti citizenship 
in accordance with the requirements of the 1959 nationality law, but 
who failed to submit a request by the appointed deadline (1966). 
Their reasons were different: some perceived the nationality issue as 
unimportant at the time, others did not understand the legal aspect 
of citizenship, were too sick or too old to undertake necessary actions, 
had lost their parents prematurely, or refused to register believing that 
they qualified for first degree citizenship but that the government 
wanted to give them second category citizenship45. Finally, the 
group has been enlarged by children of all such people. In effect, 
the population of bidun continued to grow continuously, and in die 
1980s exceeded the 200,000 mark. Therefore, the bidun composed 
a large part of Kuwaiti population; according to the data available, 
in 1985 there were 207,310 bidun in the country, as compared to 
437,978 Kuwaiti citizens46.
For a long period, all these people, like the previously mentioned 
badu who later became naturalized, were allowed to work and
43 A. N ga Longva, Walls Built on Sand, p. 51.
44 A.-R. Assiri, The Government and Politics of Kuwait: Principles and Practices 
(Kuwait, 1996), p. 24; A. Nga Longva, Walls Built on Sand, p. 72, note 7.
45 When the citizenship law was issued in 1959, the special investigation 
committees were formed to decide about nationality and provided those considered 
Kuwaiti with nationality identification cards. Many residents of Kuwait clarified 
then their status and obtained citizenship. Some, however, for various reasons did 
not contact the committees and became bidun.
46 R. M aktabi, The politics of citizenship in Kuwait.
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reside in Kuwait, practically permanently, without, however, being 
formally granted the status of citizen and without clarifying their 
former nationality. Some have no home other than Kuwait and 
consider themselves genuine Kuwaitis but do not possess appropriate 
documents to prove their identity. Others have simply tried to use the 
existing opportunity to live in Kuwait, hoping that one day they will 
be able to obtain Kuwaiti citizenship.
For quite a time the bidun were widely accepted as part of Kuwaiti 
life. I heir men constituted a large proportion of the country’s 
military and police forces (in the 1980s up to 80 per cent47) and 
their status was close to that of the so-called ‘certified’ Kuwaitis. They 
received numerous privileges as nationals, except public housing 
and state-sponsored loans. Those employed in the military and other 
government jobs were often even granted Kuwaiti passports (although 
not the “normal” ones, but “special” temporary documents). Similar 
to the Kuwaitis in outlook, dialect and tradition, their different status 
was often known only to the authorities and sometimes not even to 
themselves (especially in the case of second or third generation of 
bidun)-, in official statistics they were counted alongside Kuwaitis. 
Nevertheless, the Kuwaiti authorities have always been convinced that 
many bidun simply hide their true nationality (and/or discarded their 
passports) in order to gain entitlement to superior Kuwaiti economic, 
social and political rights. In other words, that they are economic 
immigrants who would like to be considered as citizens. Moreover, 
bidun, as a category, has been often perceived by “true” Kuwaitis as 
second class-citizens and often described in derogatory terms48.
47 Apparently, the bidun formed 95 percent of Kuwait’s infantry before 1990— 
91 war; Middle East Report, September-October 1991. In 1995, only 25 per 
cent of the 20,000 soldiers were bidutv, The Bedoons of Kuivait: citizens without 
citizenship (New York, Human Rights Watch, 1995), p. 30.
48 Sami A. Aldeeb Abu-Sahlieh has pointed out that bidun were often referred 
to as people “of unknown identity”, “a term which means in fact ‘bastard’ [...]
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The legal situation of the bidun changed in 1985 when afraid of 
political movements growing in the country as well as of the lasting 
impact of Ayatollah Khomeini’s revolution and the Iraq-Iran war, the 
Kuwaiti government cancelled their former status, turning the bidun 
intoillegal residents. Kuwaitis became concerned that “their ambiguous 
status as an unacknowledged population provided a human pool 
into which Iraqi refugees, draft dodgers, and infiltrators as well as 
absconding workers and illegal aliens could easily blend after getting 
rid of their identity papers”49. As the authorities began to apply the 
1958 Residence Law strictly, most of the bidun, who thought they 
were qualified, applied for citizenship (over 62,000 not counting 
dependants). In most cases the citizenship was not granted, and the 
Minister of Interior Affairs told the National Assembly that he believed 
90 per cent of applicants to be lying about their past national status50.
In 1989 the Ministry of Planning corrected the population data, 
removing the bidun from the category of Kuwaitis. As a result, the 
percentage of “real” Kuwaitis — i.e. the ones enjoying the country’s 
citizenship -  fell from 40 to 28 per cent o f the population. As a 
consequence of this approach, the bidun lost many privileges enjoyed 
only by nationals and began to face difficulties in the labour market. 
Moreover, they were forced to apply for residency permits as any 
other foreigners.
The dilemma of how to treat them was aggravated by the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait. As the Iraqi authorities ordered all non-Kuwaiti 
citizens living in Kuwait to join the Iraqi forces under penalty of 
death, some bidun, voluntarily or not, found themselves on the enemy 
side51. Consequently, as the war ended, thousands of bidun were
as al-fugu, the mushroom (without roots) or with other insulting terms”; “The 
Islamic conception of migration. Past, present and future”, www.lpj.org.
'19A .N ga Longva, Walk Built on Sand, p. 51.
50 The Bedoons of Kuwait, p. 13.
51 Ibidem, p. 23.
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arrested in Kuwait on collaboration charges or denied re-admission to 
the country as government worried about their real allegiances (and 
was also determined to reduce the number of non-nationals in the 
country). Many bidun were also forced into exile (apparently, around
10,000 were deported). That was an experience that was especially 
tragic for those among the bidun who had supported the Iraqis and, 
considering themselves Kuwaiti patriots had joined the anti-Iraqi 
resistance movement. Those who remained in Kuwait, approximately 
170,000, (as compared to around 225,000 before the invasion)52 
became officially classified as “non-legal residents” (“citizens without 
citizenship”53), which severely restricted the possibility of their 
employment, receiving welfare benefits, educating their children in 
free public schools and so forth54. A majority of those working in the 
military or security services lost their jobs55.
Maintaining stateless status for the bidun contravenes international 
standards, which assert that citizenship is a basic human right. 
Therefore, the Kuwaiti authorities incur severe criticism from human 
rights organisations in the West, especially since, in 1975, the country 
had ratified the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness56.
52 This number was quoted by „A1 Watan”, 23 November 1997. Assiri noted 
that in mid-1994 there were 116,694 of them, i.e. 7.2 per cent of the total 
population, about 53.7 per cent of the pre-invasion figure, The Government and 
Politics of Kuwait, p. 25.
53 This category of people is sometimes referred to as “denizens”. “Denizen” 
denotes long-term residents who are neither citizens nor non-citizens. See T. 
Ham mar, Democracy and the Nation State: Aliens, Denizens and Citizens in a 
World of International Migration (London, Avebury, 1990).
54 For example, in mid-1990s about 10,000 of them were unemployed, 
and around 50,000 children of school age suffered from the inability to attend 
government schools. A.-R. Assiri, ibidem.
55 The number of bidun in the armed forces went down from 17,000 before 
the invasion to about 8,000 afterwards. A.-R. Assiri, ibidem.
56 In particular, The Amnesty International, in its yearly reports, regularly 
criticized the Kuwaiti government for the treatment of bidun.
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Probably because of that criticism, but also due to the lack of 
sufficient number of “first class” Kuwaitis willing to join military 
and police forces, in the following years, Kuwaiti authorities, granted 
citizenship or permanent residency status to a number of bidun, 
those recognized as having sufficient links to Kuwait. Debatable 
cases were referred to courts for final decisions. In September 1998, 
the Kuwaiti government went even further and decided that genetic 
tests would be applied to all stateless residents to prove their Kuwaiti 
linkage57. The spokesman for the government stated, that ‘adopting 
DNA testing is a nonnegotiable basis to assess the right of citizenship 
through a claim of kinship to a Kuwaiti mother, father, or other 
relative’58. Occasionally, the Emir on the occasion of the holy month 
of Ramadan granted citizenship to orphans whose fathers were bidun 
and whose mothers were Kuwaiti. At the same time, some bidun 
acquired passports from countries with which they did not have any 
affiliation or even purchased counterfeit documents. Such passports 
— even though Kuwaiti authorities might have been aware of their 
illegal procurement — allowed them also to obtain residency permits, 
to work or to marry, yet not to obtain visas to travel abroad on these 
documents59. Despite all these actions, thousands of bidun maintained 
the “non-legal” residents status.
In June 1999, just before parliamentary elections, the Kuwaiti 
government took another step to resolve the problem, deciding that 
the essential prerequisite to consider granting a bidun citizenship 
was for him to be registered in the 1965 census, the first census held
57 In July 1999, the Emir issued the decree regulating this matter.
58 „Khaleej Times”, September 7, 1998. According to the Minister of Health, 
following the government decision, some samples were sent for testing to London. 
„Gulf News”, September 21, 1998. Apparently, the project was shelved shortly 
after its inauguration.
59 The U.S. Department of State, “Country Report on Human Rights Practices 
for 2000 — Kuwait”; www.state.gov.
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in the country60. At the same time, the government gave the bidun 
time until June 27, 2000 to legalize their status or face legal action. 
The issue was present in the election campaign, with several deputies 
criticizing the government for not providing all bidun with identity 
cards to allow them to acquire driving licenses, permission to marry, 
legal employment, and entitlement to free education and medical 
treatment. These deputies claimed that in addition, the government 
should consider granting citizenship to the bidun, because doing so 
would reduce the number of foreigners in Kuwait.
The Kuwaiti parliament finally approved that proposal in June 2000 
(Law No. 22 for Progressive Naturalization of the Bidun). At the same 
time, the parliament allowed the government to grant citizenship to
2,000 adults and their families each year61. That number was lowered 
to 600 in 2002 only to go up to 5,500 again a year later.
In the meantime, around 102,000 bidun were officially registered 
with the government committee for illegal residents. Thirty-six 
thousand of those who registered during the 1965 population census 
became entitled to Kuwaiti citizenship62. Out of the remaining 66,000, 
twelve thousand were categorized as having foreign nationality or 
citizenship, others were considered stateless; both groups, however, 
faced deportations or other legal actions after the June 27, 2000 
deadline. After the deadline, the government began sending files 
of bidun to the public prosecutor to start deportation procedures, 
despite protests from members of the parliament. At the same time, 
hundreds of the exiled bidun launched a five-day-long sit-in protest at 
the Kuwaiti-Iraqi border, demanding return to Kuwait63. The Kuwaiti 
government accused Iraq of organising the protest ‘to whip up the 
crisis’ and asked the UN Security Council for assistance to avert ‘the
60 AFP, June 28, 1999.
61 AFP, May 15, 2000.
62 AFP, June 27, 2000.
63 AFP, October 7, 2000.
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grave danger’ that the situation posed. To calm down the situation, 
the Kuwaiti authorities agreed to grant citizenship to 1,000 stateless 
Arabs and their families64.
As the prospect of a conflict with Iraq drew closer, Kuwaiti mistrust 
toward the bidun continued to gain ever greater credence. Concerns 
over Kuwait’s internal security were heightened in December 2002, 
when Saddam Hussein delivered an unprecedented address to the 
Kuwaiti people. Pretending to be a public apology for the 1990 
invasion, Saddam’s statement was a thinly veiled call on Kuwaitis 
to rise up against the ruling family and American troops deployed 
in Kuwait. The address invoked the fear of domestic instability as 
a backlash to the US invasion of Iraq, and many Kuwaitis viewed 
the bidun as potential troublemakers. “They are all Iraqi fifth 
columnists,” said Abdullah Bishara, a former Kuwaiti ambassador 
to the United Nations65. Nevertheless, the Kuwaiti parliament, in 
January 2003, further eased restrictions on bidun applications for 
nationality. It also allowed bidun serving in the army and police 
the same entitlements as foreign workers. Moreover, citizenship was 
approved for 400 bidun who fought against Iraq during thel990 
invasion, which gave the families of the bidun killed in action some 
hope that they too might acquire Kuwaiti citizenship.
It is difficult to say what the removal of Saddam Hussein brought 
to the situation of the Kuwaiti bidun. Many of them hoped that it 
would lead to an improvement in their status. On the other hand, 
some Kuwaitis expected that with Saddam gone and Iraqi border 
opened, all the bidun would go back to their supposed former 
home66. This expectation, however, did not materialize. The bidun- 
related issues have remained present in the Kuwaiti politics. In
64 BBC, October 8, 2000.
65 N. Blanford, Stateless Kuwaitis struggle for acceptance amid deepening 
suspicion, „Daily Star”, January 27, 2003.
66 Ibidem.
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June 2004, some members o f parliament proposed granting bidun 
a number of basic rights, including free education and medical care 
(the government eventually did). In January 2005, some Kuwaiti 
parliamentarians accused the Minister o f Justice Ahmad Baquer, of 
refusing to attest marriage certificates o f bidun, thus violating their 
human rights67. The assembly also called on the government finally 
to address the status of the bidun, stressing that there were still 
between 70,000 and 110,000 bidun with unresolved legal standing 
in the country.
Abdul-Reda Assiri justified this approach in the following way: 
The majority of stateless persons who live in Kuwait and form a 
part of the social fabric and kinships have an organic relationship 
to the country. We have to benefit from this group before this 
section of the population disrupts social and political elements 
through widespread discontent. [Therefore, what should be done 
is to] grant naturalisation to relatives of Kuwaitis and offspring 
of Kuwaiti women married to stateless individuals, naturalise 
qualified experts, experts, especially technicians, physicians, and 
teachers born in Kuwait and still living in Kuwait, naturalise 
military and armed forces members and those who proved loyal 
and have served Kuwait68.
Despite such calls, it will probably take several more years finally 
to regulate the status of most o f the Kuwaiti bidun.
"Stateless" people in other GCC states
There are also some “stateless” people residing in other G CC 
states, although of a rather different background from the Kuwaiti 
bidun (and in fact often not even called bidun by the local 
populations).
67 „Gulf News”, January 12, 2005.
68 A.-R. Assiri, The Government and Politics of Kuwait, p. 27.
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Some bidun live in Bahrain; they are mainly Shi’ites of Iranian 
origin. A group of them were deprived Bahraini citizenship in 1939 
when Great Britain, which dominated the country at the time, 
promulgated the first law on citizenship. Others lost their citizenship 
when they did not present themselves to the authorities within a 
given time after the promulgation of the law of passports in 1963. 
Children of such people enlarged the bidun group, which by the 
end of the 1990s consisted of 9,000 -  15,000 people. The status 
of the Bahraini bidun was similar to that of the Kuwaiti. They did 
not have political rights and as such they could not, for example, 
participate in the 1973 elections or occupy public functions. Unlike 
Kuwaiti bidun, the bidun of Bahrain were barred from employment 
in the police and the military. According to the Citizenship Law 
of 1974 (and 1963 law as well), citizenship in Bahrain has been 
divided into different categories which are stated on the passport: by 
birth (bil tuilaadeh), indicating persons born to a Bahraini father; by 
naturalisation (bil tajjanus), whether born in or outside Bahrain; by 
ancestry (bilsilalah), i.e. those who can prove a Bahraini ancestry69. 
The last category is reserved for descendants of people who have 
migrated to Bahrain in the past, or once were expelled from Bahrain, 
and can prove their case (such as members of al-Dawasir tribe (Sunni) 
in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia or members of the Qarooni 
and al-Asfoor clans (Shiite) in the al-Ahawaz province of Iran.
The bidun granted a passport (possible in special cases but valid 
only to one country and taken back at the border point upon return) 
is designated as an inhabitant of Bahrain. Such passports obviously 
have been viewed with suspicion by foreign countries. The situation 
of the bidun in Bahrain was basically solved in the early 2000s, 
when, with all the other political changes in the country at that 
time, most o f them were finally granted citizenship70.
69 A. Abu-Sahlieh, Ihe Islamic conception of migration.
70 Ibidem.
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According to some sources, in the UAE, there are around
100,000 bidun71, although the authorities declare that there are 
none in the country72. Some bidun in the Emirates are Sunni 
Arabs who originated from southern parts of Iran (Hormozgan), 
where many Arabs from the territories of today’s UAE settled in a 
distant past, as well as from the area of the Musandam Peninsula. 
Many such Arabs decided to return to the UAE after the country’s 
independence and rapid development thanks to the oil revenues. 
At the beginning, the returnees were granted UAE citizenship, but 
later the authorities stopped granting them that right, becoming 
suspicious that many of the late-comers were in fact the Arabised 
Iranians. Living in the country are also stateless non-Arabs, mainly 
from the Indian sub-continent, whose families settled down in the 
Gulf generations ago but whose status has never been clarified73. 
Moreover, there are also some “stateless” badu or the descendants 
of badu who are unable to prove that they are o f appropriate local 
origin74. Finally, in the Emirates there have apparently been some 
Kuwaiti bidun who came there escaping the Iraqi occupation in 
1990 and were not allowed to return by Kuwaiti authorities after 
the war.
In Saudi Arabia, there is a large, although unknown, number of 
“undocumented residents”, largely composed of pilgrims who did not 
leave the country after their pilgrimage to Mecca. Among them there 
is a large group of Africans and Asians and their Saudi born children,
71 www.refugeesinternational.org.
72 In March 2005, the UAE Ministry of Interior declared that there were no 
bidun in the country.
73 They are often known as “locals with letters”; the “letter” was from the 
Immigration Department saying that they had applied for citizenship and it was 
being considered. In the late 1980s and 90s they were still accepted as locals in 
the workforce.
74 The U.S. Department of State, “Country Report on Human Rights Practices 
for 2000 — United Arab Emirates”; www.state.gov.
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living in the Kingdom for decades but permanently unable to regulate 
their residency status. Similarly, members of certain tribes living in 
the border areas (in Assir and Najran) as well as members of Al-Enezi 
Badu tribes living in the north-eastern part of the Kingdom, have 
unclear citizenship status and often have only laissez passer for travel. 
There were reports in 2002, that Saudi government planned to provide 
citizenship to about 26,000 of such people75. They are sometimes also 
called bidun and are generally perceived troublemakers by both the 
authorities and the Saudi population at large76.
A few people with similar “stateless” status can also be found in 
Qatar, for example from the Shersheni tribe77. That happens despite 
the fact that the nationality law of 1961 (with successive amendments) 
allows naturalisation of Arabs (after 10 years of continuous residence) 
and non-Arabs (after 15 years of residence). Nevertheless, even after 
naturalisation, native-born Qataris have priority in employment, 
particularly in the public sector.
* * *
Citizenship policies in the G C C  states have so far been instrumental 
in preserving the rule o f existing regimes as well as in establishing 
a superior-subordinate relationship between citizens o f these states 
and other long-term residents. Groups perceived as non indigenous 
have been successfully controlled by the authorities through 
restrictive nationality and citizenship laws, residence and labor
”  „ A r a b  News”, November 21, 2002.
76 A. Abu-Sahlieh, Tlie Islamic conception of migration.
77 In an interesting development, members of the Shersheni tribe sued the 
producers of an Arabic sit-com for seriously damaging their social standing. The 
TV production portrayed Shershenis as nomads with no roots. In particular, 
according to the lawyer representing the tribe, a dialogue where a male character 
asks his sweetheart if she would marry a “Shersheni with no passport”, put the 
tribe in a bad light and led to many broken marriages; “Gulf News”, May 9,
2005.
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regulations, work permits, visas, and implicit threat o f expulsion 
contained in the sponsorship system. Only sometimes, the G CC 
authorities had decided for a deviation from these rules and either 
naturalised certain groups for political reasons, or, on the contrary, 
forced them to leave the country. Such policies will be most likely 
used also in future. Only the problem of legally stateless residents 
will probably be solved in the coming years.
Globalization processes, growing links between the G C C  states 
and the international community or accession to such organizations 
as WTO and ILO should help to liberalize naturalisation policies. 
O f great importance here will be continued pressure from Western 
human rights organizations, emerging local civil society groups in 
the Gulf, and some Western governments. Nevertheless, even after 
obtaining citizenship, many of naturalised people will remain for 
a long period of time, formally or informally, not equal to “real” 
nationals. Tribal affiliations as well as security and concerns o f the 
welfare state will continue to play a crucial role here.
